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Júri:
Presidente: Reitor da Universidade de Lisboa
Vogais:
Doutor Paulino Maria de Freitas Teixeira
Professor Catedrático
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1.1 What I learned from my research
At least since the publication of Keynes’s General Theory in 1936, a recurrent topic
in macroeconomics has been whether the adjustment of prices and wages is sufficiently
fast to allow an efficient allocation of resources. Nominal rigidities are regarded as the
cornerstone of New Keynesian models which are widely used for macroeconomic analysis.
In recent years, a substantial amount of theoretical research devoted to improving the
microeconomic foundations of macroeconomic behaviour has shown that the nature of
nominal rigidities plays a central role in determining the effects of different shocks on the
economy. This research has made clear that a thorough understanding of the extent and
causes of the sluggish adjustment of nominal wages and prices is crucial inter alia to the
design and conduct of economic policies and of monetary policy in particular.
The objective of this dissertation was to deepen the understanding about the sources
and implications of nominal price and wage rigidities in Portugal. It comprises four essays
based on microeconomic evidence. The first two investigate firm-level price rigidities by
using survey data; the third also on the basis of survey data but from a different source
examines the implications for employment of base-wage rigidity in a context where sev-
eral labour-cost adjustment margins are available; and finally the fourth explores a rich
matched employer-employee dataset to estimate the impact on hirings and separations
stemming from increases in the bargained wage floors. These four essays that are pre-
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sented in chapters 2 to 5. They were written in such a way that allows each of them
to be read autonomously. In this context, there will be some unavoidable overlapping
between some chapters in particular regarding the background sections (description of
the database, wage institutional setting,)
I can synthesize the main findings from these four essays in eight main stylised results.
Result 1
The lags of price reaction to shocks adjustments, a direct measure of price rigidity,
varies with the market, product, and firm characteristics, such as the cost structure of
the firm, the type of pricing policy, the competitive environment, the different factors of
competitiveness, or the type of good. In particular, firms which discriminate prices, do
quantity discounts or operate in more competitive environments react faster to shocks
than otherwise similar firms. These findings can be seen as supporting of the predictions
of models of optimal price setting like the ones suggested in Barro (1972), Caballero
(1989) orAlvarez et al. (2011).
Result 2
The evidence collected supports the existence of asymmetries in the speed with which
firms adjust their prices in response to positive and negative demand or costs shocks.
Firms seem to react faster to positive than to negative cost shocks, and more quickly
to negative than to positive demand shocks. However, there is a significant degree of
heterogeneity in the asymmetry of firm’s responses to shocks which seems to have gone
unnoticed so far. Moreover, the direction and magnitude of these asymmetries depend
on the characteristics of the firms and of the market in which they operate. For ex-
ample, firms operating in more competitive markets respond to different shocks more
symmetrically.
Result 3
Portuguese firms are strongly heterogeneous as regards their price-reviewing strate-
gies. The results show that 32 percent of the firms follow time-dependent, 43 percent
follow state-dependent and the remaining 25 percent follow time- and state-dependent
price-reviewing strategies. Importantly, the frequency of price changes and the speed of
price reaction to shocks of time-dependent firms is significantly lower than that of state-
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dependent firms, while firms that are both time- and state-dependent rank in between.
Result 4
Those factors that affect the choice of firms’ price-reviewing strategies are also the
factors that explain why some firms change prices more frequently than others or why
firms react to shocks with different lags. Given that the frequency of price changes and
the speed of price reaction to shocks of time-dependent firms are significantly lower, the
factors that increase the probability of a firm following a time-dependent price-reviewing
strategy are also the factors that reduce the frequency of price changes and decrease the
speed of price reaction to shocks. In contrast, the factors that increase the probability
of a firm following a state-dependent price-reviewing rule also increase the frequency of
price changes or the speed of price reaction to shocks.
Result 5
Reducing the number of employees is the most common strategy pursued by the Por-
tuguese firms to reduce their labour costs in the face of adverse shocks. Other important
strategies are the reduction or elimination of bonus payments and other monetary bene-
fits, the reduction or elimination of non-monetary benefits and the slowdown or freezing
of the rate at which promotions are filled. There is heterogeneity in the use of each of
these strategies across firms. It depends on several workers’ and/or firms’ attributes such
as the tenure and skills distribution, measures of the unions’ bargaining power, as well
as some indicators of the economic environment in which firms operate.
Result 6
Given that the Portuguese labour legislation strictly forbids cuts in base wages, in
a context of a common shock those firms that are able to freeze their base wages (i.e.
those that exhibit the highest degree of base wage flexibility) tend to use the strategy
“reduce employees” less frequently. The strong positive impact of base-wage flexibility on
employment is significantly strengthened by the possibility of firms resorting to alternative
margins of labour cost adjustment, like more flexible compensation components (bonuses,
benefits and promotions) and the recruitment of new employees at wages lower than those
received by the employees that have left the firm.
3
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Result 7
Every year in Portugal collective agreements update the wage floors of around 30,000
job titles. Given the widespread use of extension mechanisms, the coverage of these
“minimum wages” is close to 90 percent of all dependent workers in the private sector.
The evidence shows firms which are more strongly affected by the change in the bargained
wage floors increase their separation rates and, more importantly, significantly decrease
their hiring rates, leading to fairly sizeable higher job destruction rates. If we restrict
the analysis to the newly-hired workers, we also observe that the role of external wages
is more intense among (lower) worker accessions.
Result 8
Externally driven wage increases have also a sizeable effect on the probability of firm
closure. In particular, the results indicate a quasi-elasticity of labour demand through
firm closure of 0.67, meaning that a 1 percent increase in the wage bill generated by
the increase in the bargained wage floor increases the probability of firm closure by 0.67
percentage points. This appears to be a fairly sizeable effect, since the average failure
rate in the sample used is around 11 percent.
In the next section, I will make a short summary of each of the four essays.
1.2 Summary of the studies
This section summarises the main findings of each of the four essays to be presented in
chapters 2 to 5.
1.2.1 Understanding price stickiness: firm-data evidence on price
adjustment lags1
This work investigates firm-level price rigidities by using survey data to look into the
length of lags of price adjustments in reaction to positive and negative demand and cost
shocks. Price adjustment lags are a direct measure of price rigidity and therefore may be




seen as a better measure of price stickiness than the commonly used frequency of price
changes, which is expected to also depend on the frequency and magnitude of the shocks
to the optimal price.
The evidence shows that the lags of price adjustments vary with the market, product,
and firm characteristics, such as the cost structure of the firm, the type of pricing policy,
the competitive environment, the different factors of competitiveness, or the type of good.
In particular, firms which discriminate prices, do quantity discounts or operate in more
competitive environments react faster to shocks than otherwise similar firms. These
findings can be seen as supporting of the predictions of models of optimal price setting
like the ones suggested in Barro (1972), Caballero (1989) or Alvarez et al. (2011).
The results are support the existence of asymmetries in the speed with which firms
adjust their prices in response to positive and negative demand or costs shocks. In line
with similar evidence reported in the empirical literature, most firms in the sample seem
to react faster to positive than to negative cost shocks, and more quickly to negative
than to positive demand shocks. However, there is a significant degree of heterogeneity
in the asymmetry of firm’s responses to shocks which seems to have gone unnoticed so far.
Moreover, the direction and magnitude of these asymmetries depend on the characteristics
of the firms and of the market in which they operate. For example, firms operating in
more competitive markets respond to different shocks more symmetrically.
Some results on asymmetric price responses are individually consistent with some of
the theoretical models suggested in the literature, but, overall, the results can only be
explained by a combination of the models purporting to explain asymmetric behaviour
in response to different shocks. This fact illustrates the complexity of the problem and
suggests that further research will be needed to better understand the conditions under
which different kinds of asymmetries will be observed.
The findings presented in this work have important implications for macroeconomic
models. Based on the evidence presented it is proposed that monetary models should try
to accommodate the fact that the degree of price stickiness varies across firms and that
firms react differently to different types of shocks. The findings suggest that models of
optimal price setting which take into account various characteristics of the firm and of
the markets where this firm operates are a good way to model these heterogeneities in a
5
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micro-founded way.
The existence of asymmetries in the speed of price responses to shocks may also
have important implications for monetary policy. Indeed, the existence of firm-level
asymmetric price rigidity has the implication that the relationship between inflation and
aggregate demand (Phillips curve) might be non-linear, calling for asymmetric monetary
policy rules. However, in contrast to most of the theoretical literature which tends to
favour the idea that prices are stickier downwards than upwards in response to demand
shocks, the evidence obtained suggests that the type of asymmetry prevailing at the
aggregate level depends on the relative importance of different types of firms in the
economy and on the type of shock. Therefore, whether the relation between inflation
and aggregate demand is linear, convex or concave is still an open issue and thus more
empirical evidence is required before definite conclusions can be drawn on this matter.
1.2.2 Choosing between time and state dependence price-reviewing
strategies2
This work uses firm-level data to look into the factors that may explain why firms follow
time-, state-, or time- and state-dependent price-reviewing strategies.
In line with the evidence found in other countries, Portuguese firms are strongly
heterogeneous as regards their price-reviewing strategies. In our sample, 32 percent of
the firms follow time-dependent, 43 percent follow state-dependent and the remaining
25 percent follow time- and state-dependent price-reviewing strategies. Importantly, the
frequency of price changes and the speed of price reaction to shocks of time-dependent
firms is significantly lower than that of state-dependent firms, while firms that are both
time- and state-dependent rank in between.
The results from a multinomial probit model show that the type of price-reviewing
strategy varies significantly with those firm characteristics that measure the importance
of information costs, the variability of the optimal price and the sensitivity of profits to
sub-optimal prices. In particular, factors which increase the costs of information required




for the process of price reviewing tend to decrease the likelihood of state-dependent
rules or to increase the likelihood of time- and time- and state-dependent price-reviewing
strategies. Factors that increase the cost of deviations from the optimal price decrease
the likelihood of a firm following time-dependent rules whereas variables that increase the
variability of the optimal price increase the probability of a firm following state-dependent
price-reviewing strategies.
Menu costs, i.e., the costs of changing prices such as the cost of printing and dis-
tributing new price lists, do not emerge as playing a significant role. However, more and
better data is required before definite conclusions may be drawn on the importance of
this factor for the choice of the price-reviewing strategies by Portuguese firms.
The factors that affect the choice of firms’ price-reviewing strategies may also be seen
as the factors that explain why some firms change prices more frequently than others or
why firms react to shocks with different lags. Given that the frequency of price changes
and the speed of price reaction to shocks of time-dependent firms are significantly lower,
the factors listed above that increase the probability of a firm following a time-dependent
price-reviewing strategy are also the factors that reduce the frequency of price changes
and decrease the speed of price reaction to shocks. In contrast, the factors that increase
the probability of a firm following a state-dependent price-reviewing rule also increase
the frequency of price changes or the speed of price reaction to shocks.
The fact that the frequency of price changes and the speed of price reaction to shocks
depend on whether firms follow time-dependent, time- and state-dependent, or state-
dependent price-reviewing strategies may be expected to have important consequences for
monetary policy, as it implies that monetary policy effects will depend on the distribution
of firms in terms of their price-reviewing strategies. In particular, anything that changes
this distribution is likely to affect the speed of price reaction to monetary policy shocks.
For instance, if, in line with what was found for Portugal, the choice of a price-reviewing
strategy varies with firm size in other countries, then it may be expected that the effects of
monetary policy will be different in countries with different firm-size distributions as the
masses of time- and state-dependent firms will also be different. Similarly, because firms in
the services sector are more prone to follow time-dependent price-reviewing rules, changes
in the structure of the economy that affect its composition (manufacturing versus services)
7
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will have the implication of changing the effects of monetary policy. This idea that
firms rationally choose their price-reviewing strategy may help to understand the cross-
sectional variation of monetary shocks (different countries/states are affected differently
by the same type of monetary shock) and, at the same time, may also explain why the
same monetary shock may affect the same country differently in different periods of its
development path.
But not only structural characteristics of an economy may influence monetary policy.
The fact that the proportion of time- and state-dependent firms depends on the state
of the economy implies that different monetary policy regimes may affect the effects of
monetary policy: monetary policy rules aimed at stabilising the economy, to the extent
that they alter the proportion of firms in each price-reviewing category, will be likely to
modify the frequency of price changes and thus the speed of price reaction to monetary
policy shocks. For instance, by reducing inflation and/or demand uncertainty, monetary
policy will reduce the variability of firms’ optimal price which, according to the evidence
presented, is likely to increase the probability of firms following time-dependent or time-
and state-dependent rules as opposed to state-dependent rules. This, ceteris paribus, may
be expected to reduce the frequency of price reviews (and of price changes) or the speed
of price reaction to shocks and thus to increase the real effects of monetary policy.
1.2.3 Wage rigidity and employment adjustment at the firm
level3
Most of the studies aimed at assessing the extent and the effects of nominal wage rigidi-
ties have focused mainly on base wages or permanent wages (base wages plus the other
components that are paid regularly on a monthly basis, such as meals allowances, tenure-
related components, etc.), leaving aside potentially more flexible pay-components such as
performance related bonuses and other monetary and non-monetary benefits which may
strongly attenuate the negative impact on employment of base-wage rigidities.
Using survey data, this work investigates the implications for employment of base-
wage rigidities together with other strategies that Portuguese firms have used to cut
3Published in Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 40-49, August 2013.
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labour costs in the event of exogenous negative labour demand or supply shocks.
The sample results show that, among the firms that have reduced labour-costs, the
reduction in the number of employees (”reduce employees”) was by far the most com-
monly used strategy (around 72 percent of the firms) followed by the strategy ”flexible
margins”, which includes the reduction or elimination of bonus payments and other mon-
etary benefits, the reduction or elimination of non-monetary benefits and the slowdown
or freezing of the rate at which promotions are filled (around 45 percent of the firms).
The recruitment of new employees with a wage lower than the one of those who left the
firm (”cheaper hires”) was used by around 30 percent of the firms and around 26 percent
of the firms have resorted to ”base-wage freezes”.
The evidence also shows that there is a significant heterogeneity in the use of each
of these strategies across firms. The use of each margin depends on several workers’
and/or firms’ attributes such as the tenure and skills distribution, measures of the unions’
bargaining power, as well as some indicators of the economic environment in which firms
operate. In particular, firms operating mainly in the foreign market, a more competitive
environment, tend to use some of these strategies more heavily.
The econometric results suggest that the strategy ”cheaper hires” is used as a sub-
stitute for ”base-wage freezes” by Portuguese firms, i.e., it is predominantly used in
situations in which firms do not freeze base wages after a negative labour demand shock
or to compensate abnormal or unexpected base-wage increases after a negative labour
supply shock. In contrast, the relationship between the strategies ”flexible margins” and
”base-wage freezes” is positive (even though not significantly so) which suggests that the
”flexible margins” are predominantly used as a complement to ”base-wage freezes” in
reaction to negative labour demand shocks.
The results uncovered a clear negative association between the margin ”base-wage
freezes”, which is taken as a measure of base-wage flexibility, and the strategy ”reduce
employees”. In particular, the probability of a firm reducing employment is around 21
percentage points lower for a firm that has frozen base wages than for an otherwise
identical firm. The ability to use the ”flexible margins” or ”cheaper hires” also decreases
the probability of a firm reducing employment (between 6 and 7 percentage points).
Together, the probability for a firm of reducing employment if it uses the strategies ”base-
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wage freezes”, ”flexible margins” and ”cheaper hires” is around 35 percentage points lower
than for an otherwise identical firm.
Overall, the main conclusion of this study is that base-wage flexibility has a strong
positive impact on employment, and that such positive impact has been significantly
strengthened by the possibility of firms resorting to alternative margins of labour cost
adjustment, like more flexible compensation components (bonuses, benefits and promo-
tions) and the recruitment of new employees at wages lower than those received by the
employees that have left the firm.
1.2.4 Upward nominal wage rigidity
Every year in Portugal collective agreements update the wage floors of around 30,000 job
titles. Given the widespread use of extension mechanisms (“portarias de extensão”), the
coverage of those “minimum wages” is close to 90 percent of all dependent workers in
the private sector. This occurs despite the fact that the union density rates are very low
(around 10 percent according to Portugal and Vilares (2013)).
This means that in the Portuguese labor market firms confront not only severe down-
ward nominal wage rigidity because nominal wage cuts are forbidden (Dickens et al.
(2007)), but also what is tentatively call “upward nominal wage rigidity”. This phe-
nomenon is similar in nature to the frictions generated by nationwide mandatory mini-
mum wages, in the sense that many firms are forced to increase their wages to comply
with the updated wage agreements.
In this work it is explored an unusually rich matched employer-employee data set,
one that provides for each worker the identification of the collective agreement (and
the corresponding job title) binding the formation of base wages. In this setup it is
estimated for each firm the wage bill growth that is implied by the signature of a new
contract. The evidence shows that the firms that are more strongly affected by the
change in the bargained wage floors increase their separation rates and, more importantly,
significantly decrease their hiring rates, leading to fairly sizeable higher job destruction




When the focus is on the stock of employed workers, we observe that the impact of
externally driven wage increases is being largely concentrated on (higher) worker separa-
tions, but when we look at the determinants of the wages of new hires, what we see is
that the role of external wages is more intense among (lower) worker accessions.
The set of empirical results collected in the current essay call into question the func-
tionality of the architecture of the Portuguese wage setting system. In particular, it
raises very serious concerns with respect to the widespread use of extension mechanisms.
Also, the limited role played by the workers councils in the Portuguese legal framework
seriously dampens any moves toward a decentralized (firm based) system of wage negoti-
ations. Furthermore, given the low representativeness of the unions and of the employer
associations, it may well be possible that higher wage firms and higher wage workers






firm-data evidence on price
adjustment lags4
Co-authors:
Daniel A. Dias, Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Carlos Robalo Marques, Research Department, Banco de Portugal
J.M.C. Santos Silva, Department of Economics, University of Essex
2.1 Introduction
Most of the literature aimed at identifying the reasons of price stickiness has focused
on the frequency of price changes.5 However, an important issue that arises when using
observed price changes to measure price rigidity at the micro-level is that the differences
in the frequency of price changes across products are not expected to strictly correspond
4Published in the Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Volume 77, Issue 5, pages 701-718,
October 2015.
5See among others, Bils and Klenow (2004), Alvarez and Hernando (2005), Dhyne et al. (2006),
Munnik and Xu (2007), Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), Druant et al.
(2012), Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010), andVermeulen et al. (2012).
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to differences in firm specific characteristics, like the costs of adjusting prices or the
sensitivity of profits to sub-optimal prices. Rather, the frequency of price changes is
likely to also depend, in a significant way, on the frequency and magnitude of the shocks
that hit the firms in the period under consideration. This suggests that the frequency
of price changes might not be the best variable to be used in empirical studies aimed
at identifying the reasons of price rigidity. As Blinder (1991, p. 94) puts it: ”From the
point of view of macroeconomic theory, frequency of price change may not be the right
question to ask, for it depends as much on the frequency of shocks as on the firms’ pricing
strategies. We are more interested to know how long price adjustments lag behind shocks
to demand and cost.”
Therefore, rather than looking into the reasons for infrequent price changes, in this
work we directly investigate the deeper and more meaningful question of the determinants
of the speed of price adjustments to demand and cost shocks. In particular, we use survey
data on price adjustment lags reported by Portuguese firms to investigate how fast they
adjust their prices in response to changes in market conditions.
The contributions of this work are twofold. First, we identify firm-, product- and
market-level characteristics that are important to explain why some firms react faster
than others to demand or cost shocks. As a guide to our empirical exercise we follow the
theoretical literature on optimal price setting rules (e.g., Barro (1972), Caballero (1989)
and Alvarez et al. (2011)), which relates the degree of price stickiness to the sensitivity
of firm’s profits to sub-optimal prices, to the volatility of the optimal price, and to the
costs of reviewing and adjusting prices (information and menu costs).
Second, exploring the fact that our data set contains information on firms reactions to
different types of shocks (cost vs demand or negative vs positive), we investigate whether
firms react asymmetrically to shocks, i.e., if there are significant differences in the speed
of price reaction to positive and negative demand or cost shocks, and evaluate which
theoretical models suggested in the literature are able to account for such asymmetries.
This is a very important issue because the existence of firm-level asymmetric price rigidity
may have important implications for the conduct of monetary policy. Based on the
argument that wages are flexible upwards but rigid downwards, the literature on this
matter seems to favour the idea that prices are stickier downwards than upwards. If this
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is the case, output will be more sensitive to negative than to positive monetary policy
shocks (see, for instance, Ball and Mankiw (1994a) and Ravn and Sola (2004)). Moreover,
the relationship between inflation and aggregate demand (Phillips curve) must be non-
linear, calling for asymmetric monetary policy rules. In particular, negative monetary
policy shocks (interest rate increases) must be larger when inflation is above target than
positive shocks (interest rate cuts) when inflation is below target (see, for instance, Laxton
et al. (1994), Laxton et al. (1999), Juan et al. (2004), Dolado et al. (2005),Dobrynskaya
(2008)). However, if prices react faster to negative than to positive demand shocks, things
may be expected to work the other way around. The conclusions in Buckle and Carlson
(2000), as well as in Fabiani et al. (2006) favour this alternative assumption.
Other works have studied the speed of price reactions to demand and costs shocks; see,
e.g., Kwapil et al. (2010) for Austria, Loupias and Ricart (2004) for France, Alvarez and
Hernando (2005) for Spain, Fabiani et al. (2004) for Italy, and Small and Yates (1999) for
the United Kingdom. However, a major distinguishing feature of our approach is that we
use much more detailed information on the speed of price adjustments, and consequently
we are able to identify more precisely the effect of the covariates in our model. Specifically,
we explore the available information on price adjustment lags using a six-category random
effects ordered probit model to study the link between price adjustment lags and various
firm characteristics.
There are also other dimensions in which our dataset set is richer than those previously
used to investigate price-stickiness. In particular, we have detailed data on an extensive
list of characteristics of more than 900 firms and on the reaction time of each firm to four
types of shock. In total, therefore, we can use more than 3600 observations on a varied
set of firms.
A potential disadvantage of the type of data we use is that it does not distinguish
between aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Indeed, the economic literature has stressed
that the reaction of firms to shocks may depend on whether these are aggregate or
idiosyncratic (Lucas Jr (1973)), and recently Mackowiak andWiederholt (2009) developed
a model in which prices react quickly to idiosyncratic shocks, but only slowly to aggregate
shocks (see also Dhyne et al. (2011)). The fact that our data has no information on
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whether the firm sees the shock as aggregate or idiosyncratic is an important limitation.6
In any case, we do not expect this fact to seriously limit the interpretation of our results
because, since we have four observations for each firm, our panel data model will to some
extent account for the heterogeneity resulting from firms interpreting the nature of the
shock in different ways.
We find that adjustment lags to cost and demand shocks (either positive or nega-
tive), vary significantly with some firm characteristics such as the cost structure, type
of pricing policy, and the type of good. In particular, we conclude that firms for which
intermediate inputs represent a relatively high share of total costs, discriminate prices or
do quantity discounts on a regular basis, or face more elastic demand curves (i.e., operate
in a competitive environment or consider price an important factor of competitiveness),
react faster to demand or cost shocks than otherwise identical firms. Overall, these results
are consistent with the optimal price setting models put forward in the literature.
The evidence also suggests that firms react differently to demand and cost shocks,
as well as to positive and negative shocks. In line with similar evidence reported in the
literature, most firms in our sample seem to react faster to positive than to negative cost
shocks, and more quickly to negative than to positive demand shocks. However, the more
detailed analysis carried out in this work uncovered a significant degree of heterogeneity
in firm’s responses to shocks. Indeed, in our dataset, some firms react symmetrically but
others react asymmetrically to positive and negative demand or cost shocks. Importantly,
the direction and magnitude of this asymmetries vary with the characteristics of the firms
and of the market in which they operate. In particular, price adjustment lags are more
symmetric when firms operate in more competitive environments or have less price setting
power.
Some results on asymmetric behaviour are individually consistent with some of the
theoretical models suggested in the literature, but none of these models seems to be
able to explain the full set of empirical results found in the chapter. This suggests that
the issue of asymmetric responses by firms to the different types of shocks is a complex
6Another potential disadvantage of this type of data is that these are reported, not actual, lags and
it is impossible to know whether the answers provided are close to reality. However, the fact that in our
model we only use the ordinal information in the answers given by the firms will significantly mitigate
potential measurement errors.
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phenomenon requiring further theoretical as well as empirical investigation before definite
implications for monetary policy can be drawn.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 presents the theoretical
background which underlies the estimated model and the analysis of asymmetry in the
lags of adjustment. Section 2.3 describes the novel dataset used in the chapter and
presents the results of a preliminary data analysis. Section 2.4 presents the econometric
model and Section 2.5 presents and discusses the estimation results. Section 2.6 contains
some concluding remarks and, finally, the Appendix provides information on how the
different variables were constructed.
2.2 Theoretical background
Models of optimal price setting and the factors behind price
rigidity
Firms do not continuously adjust their prices in response to shocks. To model this fact,
the literature has focused on two costs: the ”information cost”, the cost of reviewing the
price, and the ”menu cost”, the cost of actually changing the nominal price.
Formal models with menu costs date back at least to Barro (1972).7By assuming that
firms face menu costs for changing their prices, Barro is able to show that it is optimal
for a firm to change prices only infrequently by following a state-dependent price setting
strategy: due to the existence of fixed costs of changing prices, firms change their prices
only when the difference between the actual and the optimal price is sufficiently large.
One alternative to assuming menu costs is to assume that when firms review their
price they incur in an information cost. In this case, Caballero (1989) showed that the
optimal rule for the firm is to review the price at fixed time intervals. Because there are
7There is now an extensive theoretical literature aiming at explaining why prices at the micro level may
remain unchanged for large periods of time. Here, we focus mainly on the contributions by Barro (1972),
Caballero (1989) and Alvarez et al. (2011), as these deliver closed- or almost closed-form solutions for
the average optimal time between consecutive price changes or consecutive price reviews. Other relevant
contributions in this field include, for instance, Dixit (1991), Bonomo and Carvalho (2004), Reis (2006),
Woodford (2009), Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) and Bonomo et al. (2010).
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no costs to adjust prices, every time a firm reviews the price it also changes it. These are
known as time-dependent price setting rules.
More recently, Alvarez et al. (2011) studied the case where a firm faces simultaneously
menu and information costs. In this case, like in the previous two, the optimal rule is
also to only change the price infrequently, but the optimal price setting rule is both time-
dependent and state-dependent. It is state-dependent in the sense that, after reviewing
the price, the firm also chooses when is optimal to review the price again and that interval
depends on the state of the economy. It is time-dependent because the firm will not review
its prices until the date set for doing so.
In order to derive the relevant implications for our work stemming from this literature,
we focus on the model of Alvarez et al. (2011) which assumes that: i) the loss of the firm
(out-of-equilibrium cost) may be captured by a quadratic function, L = θ[p(t) − p∗(t)]2,
where θ measures the sensitivity of profits to the price gap, i.e., the deviation of the actual
(log) price, p(t), from the optimal (log) price, p∗(t); ii) the optimal (log) price follows a
random walk with Gaussian innovations with variance σ2 per unit of time; iii) the firm
incurs in a fixed information cost, ρ, in order to determine the optimal price and on a
fixed menu cost, γ, in order to change the price; and iv) the rate of inflation, or the drift
of the stochastic process ruling p∗(t), is 0 or approximately 0.8 Under these hypotheses,

















where p is some threshold such that the firm opts for not adjusting the price if −p <
p(t)− p∗(t) < p, and Φ (·) denotes the CDF of the standard normal distribution.
Because the variable of interest in (1), τ , is on both sides of the equation, and also
because p depends on some of the parameters, obtaining comparative statics is not a
straightforward task. However, using some of the results and assumptions in Alvarez
8Note that θ depends on the parameters of the demand and costs functions, and that, in particular, it
is increasing with the elasticity of demand faced by the firm. The variance σ2 may be seen as measuring
the volatility of demand and cost functions.
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et al. (2011), it is possible to show that:
• ∂τ
∂ρ
> 0, that is, the average time between price reviews increases with the informa-
tion cost;
• For small values of the menu cost γ, ∂τ
∂γ
> 0 . In words, when the menu costs are
small, a marginal increase of these increases the average time between price reviews;
• ∂τ
∂θ
< 0, that is, the average time between price reviews decreases with the sensitivity
of profits to the price gap;
• For small values of the variance of the optimal price, σ2, ∂τ
∂σ2
< 0 . This means that
the more volatile the optimal price is the shorter is the average time between price
reviews.
These results are intuitive and generalise the predictions of the conventional menu-
cost model developed in Barro (1972) and of the simple information-cost model suggested
in Caballero (1989).9 If we make the additional assumption that price adjustment lags
are positively correlated with the average time between price reviews, then the results
above give us a set of predictions that we can test with our data. In particular, we
will look into the factors that might reflect differences in the firm’s information or menu
costs, that might be expected to make profits more or less sensitive to sub-optimal prices,
or that might affect the uncertainty surrounding the optimal price of the firm, and will
test whether this set of covariates has the impact on the lag of price adjustment that is
predicted by the optimal price setting theories.
2.2.1 Links between price adjustment lags and the type of shock
The models discussed in the previous sub-section do not explicitly account for the possi-
bility that firms may react with different lags to different types of shocks. However, there
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< 0. In the case of Caballero (1989), the average time beween price













is now a vast theoretical literature that focuses on the question of whether prices are more
sticky in response to a shock that warrants a price decrease or to shocks in the opposite
direction, or whether prices react more quickly to cost than to demand shocks. A brief
survey of this literature tells us two things: There are many possible justifications for
the existence of differences between the speed of adjustment to different types of shocks;
there is no consensus about the sign and magnitudes of these differences.
Tsiddon (1993), Ball and Mankiw (1994a) and Ellingsen et al. (2006) noted that the
coexistence of menu costs and positive trend inflation may lead firms to react differently
to positive and negative shocks. Positive trend inflation implies that, in real terms, the
price set by the firm falls continuously. Therefore, the firm may not need to react to a
shock leading to a price decrease because the inflation will automatically adjust the price
without the need for the firm to incur in the menu costs. On the contrary, if the shock
warrants a price increase the firm has an additional incentive to make the adjustment
because inflation will systematically increase the price gap. Our data, and consequently
our empirical results, are obtained in the context of positive inflation and therefore we
can directly test the prediction of these models.
Models considering the existence of search costs (e.g., Yang and Ye (2008), Tappata
(2009), Lewis and Noel (2011) and Cabral and Fishman (2012)), or of inattentive con-
sumers (e.g., Chen et al. (2008)) also predict that prices rise faster than they drop, at
least in reaction to cost shocks. Search costs and inattentive consumers create rigidities
on the side of consumers that firms take into consideration when they set their prices.In
particular, the demand elasticities faced by firms depend on whether costs fall or rise and
therefore, prices react asymmetrically to positive and negative cost shocks.
The existence of asymmetries is also predicted by models considering firms’ strate-
gic behaviour (e.g., Devereux and Siu (2007), Bhaskar (2002), Kovenock and Widdows
(1998), Hansen et al. (1996) and Maskin and Tirole (1988)). However, the predictions of
these models are not clear-cut. In the context of a state-dependent price setting model,
with menu costs, Devereux and Siu (2007) conclude that firms have more incentive to
increase prices following a positive cost shock than to lower prices following a negative
cost shock. The idea is that with a positive cost shock prices are strategic complements,
so that a firm has more incentive to increase its price when other firms increase theirs,
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while for a negative cost shock prices are strategic substitutes, so that the firm has less
incentive to lower its price when other firms lower theirs.
This result stands in stark contrast to the conventional model of oligopoly with kinked
demand curves described in Maskin and Tirole (1988), which suggests that prices may
be more rigid upwards than downwards. That is, firms adjust their prices to negative
demand and cost shocks because downward adjustments are not costly, whereas prices
may be left unchanged or adjustments delayed in the face of positive shocks because
raising prices involves a loss in market share. Another reason why prices may be more
rigid upwards than downwards, especially in response to demand shocks, is provided by
the consideration that customer antagonization might be higher for price increases than
for price decreases (Okun (1981), Rotemberg (2005) and Anderson and Simester (2010)).
Fairness and customers’ anger considerations may also give rise to different responses
to demand and cost shocks. Okun (1981) distinguishes between price increases due to
cost shocks and those that are due to demand shocks. The author argues that higher costs
are an accepted rationale for raising prices, i.e., price increases that are based on cost
increases are ”fair”, while those based on demand increases often are viewed as unfair.
Consequently, firms may hold prices constant in the face of demand shocks because they
do not want to jeopardise customer relations, and this would explain why firms in some
sectors adjust their prices more promptly in response to changes in costs than in response
to changes in demand. In a slight abuse of terminology, we also refer to these differences
as asymmetries.
Most of these results, albeit diverse and sometimes even contradictory, can be related
to the price-setting models introduced in the previous subsection. In particular, the
asymmetries can be interpreted as letting the values of the parameters depend on the
sign and type of shocks. Moreover, the asymmetries can vary across firms because the
way the parameters depend on the shocks may be a function of the characteristics of
the firm and of the market in which it operates. For example, the degree of competition
faced by a firm may be related to the magnitude of search costs and to the degree of
inattentiveness of the consumers, implying that there should be less asymmetries when
markets are more competitive because in this case search costs are smaller and consumers
are more attentive. Our results in Section 2.5 will be used to shed some light on which
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of these predictions are supported by the data.
2.3 The Data
2.3.1 Data sources
Most of the data used in this study come from a survey about price setting practices
carried out by the Banco de Portugal.10 In this survey, firms were asked how long they
would take to react to significant cost and demand shocks. More specifically, they were
asked the following four questions: 1) “After a significant increase in demand how much
time on average elapses before you raise your prices?”; 2) “After a significant increase
in production costs how much time on average elapses before you raise your prices?”; 3)
“After a significant fall in demand, how much time on average elapses before you reduce
your prices?”; and 4) “After a significant decline in production costs how much time
on average elapses before you reduce your prices?”. The responses to these questions,
which will be the dependent variable in our model, are recorded as continuous interval
data with six categories: 1 - less than one week; 2 - from one week to one month; 3 -
from one month to three months; 4 - from three to six months; 5 - from six months to
one year; 6 - the price remained unchanged. With the expression “significant increase”
or “significant decline” the authors of the survey had in mind inducing respondents to
interpret the shock as significant enough to lead firms to react to it by changing their
price. Therefore, we interpret option 6 as indicating that the price will eventually change,
but the adjustment lag is longer than one year.11
Besides the questions on price adjustments lags, the survey also contains information
on a large set of firms’ characteristics. These include information on the main market
of the firm (internal vs. external market), main destinations of sales (wholesalers vs.
retailers, private vs. public sector), number of competitors, relations with customers
(long-term vs. short-term), type of product competition (price vs. quality, differentiation
vs. after sales service), price discrimination (same price for all customers vs. decided
10For further details on this survey, see Martins (2010).
11As a robustness check, we also estimated models grouping categories 5 and 6 together and found
that the results of the next section change very little.
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on a case-by-case basis), price setting decisions (own company vs. external entity, main
customers vs. main competitors), and reasons for postponing price changes (the risk that
competitors do not follow, existence of implicit or written contracts, cost of changing
prices, costs of collecting information, absence of significant changes in variable costs,
preference for maintaining prices at psychological thresholds, etc.).
The information from the survey is supplemented with data from two other sources.
From Central de Balanços, a comprehensive dataset maintained by Banco de Portugal in
which the balance sheets and income statements of most Portuguese firms are registered,
we obtain data on the number of employees, the share of sales that are made abroad, and
the shares of labour, inputs, and financial costs. Finally, we obtain information about
the proportion of domestic and foreign capital of the firm from Quadros de Pessoal, a
large administrative database collected by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment and
Social Security, which, among other, includes information about all the Portuguese firms
with wage earners (size, ownership, location, etc.).
By combining the three datasets through the individual tax identification number of
each firm, we are able to obtain detailed information on 903 firms from different branches
of activity. More specifically, our sample includes firms with 20 or more employees, from
which almost 90 percent belong to Manufacturing (NACE - classification of economic
activities - 15 to 37) and the remaining to Services (NACE 60 to 64, 80 and 85 - Transport,
Storage and Communication, Education and Healthcare). Sectors such as agriculture,
construction, or wholesale and retail trade are not included.
2.3.2 Preliminary data analysis
As mentioned above, the four survey questions about price adjustment lags are our vari-
ates of interest. Table 2.1 summarises the information on these variables by displaying
the distribution of the observed price adjustment lags for each type of shock. These
results suggest that, in general, firms in the sample are quicker to react to cost shocks,
in particular when they are positive, than to demand shocks. For example, only around
10 percent of the firms keep their prices unchanged in the first year after a positive cost
shock, while the fraction of firms that hold their prices unchanged in response to a positive
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Table 2.1: Distribution of the price responses to demand and cost shocks
Cost shocks Demand shocks
Price adjustment lag Positive Negative Positive Negative
1 - less than one week 4.7 3.5 2.8 4.8
2 - from one week to one month 16.8 15.2 12.2 16.8
3 - from 1 month to 3 months 25.0 25.7 19.3 23.4
4 - from 3 to 6 months 17.6 15.0 13.4 13.7
5 - from 6 months to one year 26.3 21.2 17.7 14.0
6 - the price remained unchanged 9.6 19.5 34.7 27.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
demand shock is around 35 percent. Interestingly, firms in the sample seem to react more
quickly to positive than to negative cost shocks, but to be slower to react to positive than
to negative demand shocks.12. Formal tests for the hypotheses that the reaction time is
the same both for positive and negative shocks, and for demand and cost shocks, will be
performed in Section 2.5.
The results in Table 2.1 are not informative about the possible effect of the character-
istics of the firms on the speed of adjustment, and may hide important heterogeneity in
firms’ responses to shocks. As an illustration of the importance of this heterogeneity, Ta-
ble 2.2 gives the breakdown by sector and firm size of the proportion of firms that do not
adjust the price in the first year after the shock. Clearly, the speed of price adjustment
varies with firm sizes and across sectors.
2.4 An econometric model for price adjustment lags
The econometric model we use to gauge the impacts of the different covariates on the lags
of price adjustments takes into account both the interval nature of the data and the fact
12Similar results concerning the relative speed of price adjustment to cost and demand shocks using
survey data were obtained for Austria, Italy, France, Luxembourg, Spain and the US (see, respectively,
Kwapil et al. (2010), Fabiani et al. (2004), Loupias and Ricart (2004), Lünnemann and Mathä (2006),
Alvarez and Hernando (2005), Blinder et al. (1998)). Comparable results for positive and negative cost
shocks are obtained in Peltzman (2000) from quantitative data for the U.S.
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Table 2.2: Percentage of firms that do not change their prices in the
first year after the shock
Cost shocks Demand shocks
Positive Negative Positive Negative
Manufacturing 8.5 17.5 33.0 25.1
Services 20.0 37.8 50.0 47.8
Small firms 9.0 18.7 35.2 27.1
Large firms 13.5 24.1 31.6 28.6
Total 9.6 19.5 34.7 27.4
Small and large firms are firms with up to 250 employees and more than 250
employees, respectively. The percentages in the table are computed as a pro-
portion of the total number of firms in the corresponding sector or firm type.
that each firm contributes to the sample with four observations. These four responses are
likely to depend on common unobserved firm characteristics, suggesting the use of a panel
data set-up, with random effects representing the unobserved firm characteristics. Besides
providing potential efficiency gains, the inclusion of the random effects with a flexible
distribution makes the model more general and therefore less sensitive to distributional
assumptions.
Formally, we model the latent variable yi,j, which represents the time firm i takes to
react to a shock of type j, as a function of a set of firm characteristics and of a firm-
specific random-effect. Because the preliminary data analysis suggests that the speed of
price adjustment is shock specific and depends on the firms’ characteristics, we estimate a
model which allows for the possibility of different coefficients for each type of shock. This
is almost equivalent to estimating four different models, one for each type of shock, with
the difference being that in our case the four seemingly unrelated equations are linked
by the unobserved heterogeneity component, which is assumed to be common to the four
shocks.13
13Qualitatively, the results do not change if the model is estimated without the random effects or
assuming that the random effects are independent across the four equations.
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Therefore, we assume that yi,j is related to a set of firm characteristics by
yi,j = Λj (x
′
iβj + ωjvi + εi,j) , (2)
where Λj (·) is a strictly increasing invertible function that is specific to shocks of type j;
xi is a set of firm characteristics whose impact, measured by vectors βj , is shock specific;
vi is a non-observed firm-effect whose impact, measured by ωj, is shock specific; and εi,j
is a non-observed stochastic term that is firm and shock specific.
Equation (2) implies that zi,j = Λ
−1




iβj + ωjvi + εi,j.
In our data, yi,j is not fully observed and instead we observe ỹi,j, which is related to zi,j
as follows. For m = 1, 2, ..., 6,
ỹi,j = m if φm−1,j < zi,j < φm,j , (3)
where the constants φm,j are the limits of the intervals into which the domain of zi,j is
partitioned due to the fact that yi,j is observed as interval data. That is, the dependent
variable in our model is ỹi,j = m, where m = 1, 2, .., 6 indicates one of the six possible
response categories.
At this point two approaches can be followed. Because the price lags are reported
in the form of known time intervals, we could specify the form of Λj (·) and use this
information to determine the cut-off parameters φm,j. Alternatively, we can estimate the
cut-off parameters, which avoids the need to specify Λj (·). This is the approach we follow
because by not specifying Λj (·) the model gains an interesting degree of flexibility.
14
Specifically, for identification purposes, we set φ0,j = −∞, φ1,j = 0, and φ6,j = +∞,
estimating freely the remaining four cut-off parameters.
In order to be able to estimate the parameters of the model we need to make dis-
tributional assumptions on the unobserved random components. We start by assuming
that εi,j|xi, vi ∼ N (0, 1), where the normalization of the variance to 1 implies no loss of
14The fact that we only use the ordinal information provided by the firms has the additional benefit
of giving some protection against the likely presence of reporting errors.
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generality. Then, based on (3), the conditional probability of observing ỹi,j = m is given
by
Pr (ỹi,j = m|xi, vi) = Pr (φm−1,j < zi,j < φm,j|xi, vi) ,
= Pr (zi,j < φm,j |xi, vi)− Pr (zi,j < φm−1,j |xi, vi) ,
= Φ {φm,j − (x
′
iβj + ωjvi) |xi, vi} −
Φ {φm−1,j − (x
′
iβj + ωjvi) |xi, vi} ,
= hj (ỹi,j|xi, vi) ,
where, as before, Φ (·) denotes the standard normal CDF. Furthermore, assuming that
the disturbances εi,j are conditionally independent (given xi and vi) across i and j, we can
write the probability that for a certain firm we observe (ỹi,1 = m1, ỹi,2 = m2, ỹi,3 = m3, ỹi,4 = m4)
as
Pr (ỹi,1 = m1, ỹi,2 = m2, ỹi,3 = m3, ỹi,4 = m4|xi, vi) =
4∏
j=1
hj (ỹi,j|xi, vi) .
Since we also do not observe vi, we need to integrate it out of hj (ỹi,j|xi, vi) in order
to obtain an expression of the individual contribution to the likelihood that can be used






hj (ỹi,j|xi, vi) g (vi) dvi,
where λ denotes the vector of parameters of the model and g (·) is the density function of
vi. Following Dhaene and Silva (2012), we assume that g (vi) is such that sinh
−1 (δvi) /δ
has a standard normal distribution.15 That is, the shape-parameter δ introduces addi-
tional flexibility in the model by allowing the distribution of the random effect component
to have an unspecified degree of excess kurtosis.16 The integration in Li (λ) is performed
using 50-point Gauss-Hermite quadrature.
Finally, it is necessary to define the set of regressors to use. This choice was guided
15The use of this sort of transformation was pioneered by Burbidge et al. (1988) and MacKinnon and
Magee (1990).
16For the empirical model presented in the next section the estimate of δ is −0.5740, indicating that
the random-effects have a distribution with substantial excess kurtosis.
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by the literature briefly reviewed in Section 2.2. In the absence of direct quantitative
measures for some of the expected relevant factors, we have chosen as regressors sectoral,
product, and firm-level characteristics that may be related to the importance of menu
and information costs, the variability of the optimal price, and the sensitivity of profits
to sub-optimal prices. To conserve space, the particular set of regressors that is used and
the motivation to use them are presented in the next section, along with the estimation
results. The Appendix gives further details on the regressors and provides some summary
statistics.
2.5 Empirical results
2.5.1 What factors explain why some prices are stickier than
others?
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 summarize the main estimation results. In particular, Table 2.3
presents the results of the estimated model, and Table 2.4 reports the marginal effects
of the covariates on the probability that the price adjustment does not take place in
the first year after the shock.17 Specifically, the first line of Table 2.4 reports the esti-
mated probability, for a firm in the reference group, that the price adjustment does not
take place in the first year after the shock, and the remaining lines give the change to
this probability from setting to 1 the corresponding regressor. These differences to the
baseline group, for a generic covariate d and shock j (j = 1, . . . , 4), are computed as
Pr[ỹi,j = 6| x = 0, d = 1]− Pr[ỹi,j = 6| x = 0, d = 0], where x denotes the fixed values of
all other covariates in the model.
For ease of presentation, and following the theory surveyed in Section 2.2, we grouped
17It is well-known (see, e.g., Winkelmann and Boes (2006)) that in models for ordered data the signs
of the partial effects of the covariates are unambiguous only for the first and last category (ỹi,j = 1
and ỹi,j = 6, in our case). For the intermediate categories, it is possible to see how a covariate changes
the probability of a firm being in a given category, but that is not informative about whether that
variable has a positive or negative impact on the value of the underlying latent variable. We focus on
the category ỹi,j = 6 (i.e., price adjustment does not take place in the first year after the shock), as it is
more meaningful than the category ỹi,j = 1 (i.e., price adjustment takes place in the first week after the
shock).
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the covariates in our model into the following three categories: 1) Menu and information
costs, 2) Variability of the optimal price, and 3) Sensitivity of profits to sub-optimal
prices.18
Menu and information costs
The models reviewed in Section 2.2 imply that, ceteris paribus, firms with higher menu
and/or information costs are expected to display longer price lags in reaction to demand
and cost shocks.
Given the lack of direct quantitative information on these costs, we included in the
model four regressors which may be expected to have a bearing on the importance of menu
and/or information costs at the firm level: information on whether the firm practices
price discrimination and/or quantity discounts, information on the capital structure, and
information on the size of the firm. Using size to proxy the importance of firms’ menu
an/or information costs may be seen as a controversial assumption because this regressor
could also be used as a measure of the firms’ market power and thus be included in the
group of regressors that have a bearing on the sensitivity of the profits to sub-optimal
prices. Moreover, there seems also to be some controversy on whether one should expect
information costs to be higher in large or in small firms (see, for instance, Buckle and
Carlson, 2000). Here, we follow the evidence in Zbaracki et al. (2004), which suggests
that information costs are likely to be higher in larger firms.
The type of pricing policy (single price versus price discrimination and existence of
quantity discounts) emerges as playing an important role in determining the speed of
price adjustments. Firms that decide the price on a case-by-case basis, or do quantity
discounts, tend to be faster to adjust to both cost and demand shocks. For example, from
18Given the definition of the categorical variables (see the Appendix), the reference or baseline group
is composed of firms for which: a) the proportion of sales under written contracts is less than 50 percent;
b) the relationship with customers is essentially of a short-term nature; c) the price charged is the same
for all customers (absence of price discrimination) and there are no quantity discount prices; d) the price
of the product is set by the firm itself and not by an external entity, including the main competitors or
main customers; e) the share of labour and input costs are below the corresponding median share; f) the
number of competitors is less than 5; g) exports represent more than 50 percent of their main product
sales; h) price, quality and delivery time are not considered very important factors for the competitiveness
of the main product; i) the sector of activity is manufacturing; j) the production is essentially for final
consumption (the main destination market is composed of wholesalers, retailers or final consumers), as
opposed to intermediate consumption; k) the number of employees is equal or less than 250, and l) the
share of domestic capital is equal or less than 50 percent.
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Table 2.3: Panel-ordered probit estimates for the price adjustment lags
Cost shocks Demand shocks

































































































































































































Standard errors computed from analytical second derivatives are in parenthesis;**marks
significance at 5%; *marks significance at 10% level.
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Table 2.4: Probability estimates for the category ỹij = 6
Cost shocks Demand shocks



















































































































































Standard errors computed from analytical second derivatives are in parenthesis;**marks
significance at 5%; *marks significance at 10% level.
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Table 2.4 we see that for a firm that sets its price on a case-by-case basis, the probability
of adjusting its price in response to a demand shock more than one year after the shock
is 12 to 14 percentage points (pp) lower than the probability for an otherwise identical
firm (approximately 8 to 10 pp lower in the case of a firm that does quantity discounts).
These results can be interpreted as reflecting the fact that firms with such flexible pricing
practices are likely to face relatively low information, managerial, or menu costs, which
also allow them to react more quickly to shocks.
We see from Table 2.4 that size matters for the speed of price adjustment. In the face
of cost shocks, large firms tend to be slower at adjusting their prices than small firms.
However, for the reaction to demand shocks, the size of the firm does not seem to matter.
As regards the capital structure, we find that firms with a higher share of domestic
capital tend to adjust faster in the face of shocks (especially so in the face of cost shocks),
probably because, in contrast to what can be expected for foreign firms, the decision
making process of domestic firms resides inside the country allowing a prompter reaction
to shocks.
Variability of the optimal price
This category includes four regressors deemed to affect directly or indirectly the vari-
ability of the firm’s optimal price: two variables related to the cost structure of the firm
(shares of labour and intermediate input costs), and two variables related to the relation
between the firm and its customers (explicit contracts, i.e., the proportion of sales under
written contracts, and implicit contracts, i.e., whether the relation with the customers is
essentially of a long- or short-term nature).
If prices of different factors of production have different volatilities, it is expectable
that the cost structure of a firm will matter for the speed with which it adjusts its prices.
If input costs are relatively stable, such as wages which are changed on average once a
year, firms can be expected to review and/or change their prices only infrequently, thus
exhibiting longer price durations and larger price adjustment lags.19 On the contrary, if
input costs are highly volatile, as it is the case of some raw materials, prices are likely
19This is a very robust result that has been extensively documented in the literature for the frequency
of price adjustments (see, among other,Altissimo et al. (2006) and the references therein). Our results
show that the same result is valid for the speed with which firms react to shocks.
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to be reviewed and/or changed more frequently, on average, allowing faster reaction to
shocks. Thus, ceteris paribus, one may expect firms with higher labour cost shares to
react more slowly to shocks than firms with higher shares of intermediate inputs. This is
confirmed by our findings. From Table 2.4 we see that, for a firm with a share of labour
costs above the median, the probability of taking more than one year to adjust its price
after a cost shock is about 7 to 9 pp higher than the corresponding probability for an
otherwise identical firm. This difference in the probabilities increases to 11 pp in the face
of demand shocks.
Economic theory suggests that the existence of explicit and/or implicit contracts may
be an important source of price stickiness at the firm level (see, for instance, Fischer (1977)
and Okun (1981)). With explicit contracts, firms aim at building long-term relationships
with their customer in order to stabilise their future sales. Customers, on the other hand,
are attracted by a constant price because it makes their future costs more predictable
and helps to minimize transaction costs (e.g., shopping time). In turn, the theory of
implicit contracts is based on the idea that firms try to win customer loyalty by changing
prices as little as possible. Overall, the presence of explicit and/or implicit contracts
may be expected to reduce firm’s demand variability and thus to have implications for
firms’ reactions to shocks. The results in Table 2.3 show, however, that the coefficients
on ”Explicit contracts” and ”Implicit contracts” are not statistically different from zero
for either of the four shocks, suggesting that these variables do not have a bearing on the
length of these lags.20
Sensitivity of profits to sub-optimal prices
This group of variables includes the remaining regressors that appear in Tables 2.3
and 2.4, which we see as having implications for firms’ price elasticity of demand and
thus for the sensitivity of firms’ profits to sub-optimal prices.
It is known that the more competitive a sector is, the more sensitive profits are
to sub-optimal prices. Thus, for given nominal adjustment costs (due to the presence
of information or menu costs), stronger competition may be expected to translate into
20The variables conveying information on whether explicit and/or implicit contracts are present may
also be understood as providing information on the costs of changing prices, but in view of our results
this question is immaterial.
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quicker responses to shocks (see, for instance, Martin (1993)). Our results confirm that
firms in more competitive environments tend to be faster to react to shocks. From Table
2.4 we see that, in the face of a demand shock (either positive or negative), the probability
of a firm adjusting the price more than one year after the shock is reduced by around 8
pp for firms operating in more competitive markets (firms with five or more competitors).
Regarding the market destination variable, we find that the coefficients of the covariate
that measures the importance of the domestic market are not statistically significant for
any of the four shocks. Thus, whether the firm sells their products in the domestic market
or abroad does not seem to make a difference for the speed with which firms react to
shocks.
In order to investigate if the different competitiveness factors affect the speed with
which firms respond to shocks, we distinguish between price, quality, and delivery period
as alternative sources of competitiveness. We may think of these factors as reflecting
different product characteristics which translate into different demand elasticities (higher
demand elasticity for firms for which price is an important factor, and lower elasticity
for firms that value more the quality of the product or the delivery period).21 The
results in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 suggest that firms that consider price as an important factor
of competitiveness tend to adjust prices more quickly, while firms that value more the
quality of the product or the delivery period as competitiveness factors tend to adjust
their prices at a slower pace in response to shocks (specially so, in face of demand shocks).
In order to characterise firms price setting autonomy we consider two variables related
to the firms’ lack of autonomy in setting their own prices (as opposed to cases in which
the price is set by the firm itself). We find that the “price set by customers” variable
has a positive and significant impact only in the case of positive cost shocks, suggesting
that for these firms customers have enough power to delay the firms’ reaction when costs
push prices up. Regarding the “price set by competitors” variable, our results show that
firms that have their prices significantly affected by the main competitors are faster to
respond to demand shocks than firms that set their own prices. The results in Table 2.4
21Martin (1993) showed that the speed of price adjustment increases with the elasticity of demand,
that is, firms react faster to shocks when the demand schedule facing them is flatter. This same idea
was used by Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) to show the link between the frequency of price adjustment
and exchange rate pass-through.
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show that the probability of such a firm adjusting the price more than one year after the
shock is 10 to 13 pp lower than for a firm in the reference category. This suggests that
firms whose prices are set by the main competitors may be acting as market followers
in a market where the presence of market leaders helps reducing, or even eliminating,
potential coordination problems.
Finally, in order to characterise the type of product we use information regarding the
sector where firms operate (manufacturing or services), and the destination of the product
(final vs. intermediate consumption). As earlier results suggested (see Table 2.2), from
Table 2.3 and 2.4 we find that firms that operate in the services sector are substantially
slower to react to shocks than firms that operate in the manufacturing sector.In fact, for
each of the four shocks, the covariate ”Services” shows up in Table 2.4 as the one with
the largest impact on the estimated probabilities, with marginal effects ranging from 15
to 24 pp. These results are consistent with previous evidence on the frequency of price
changes which suggested a significantly higher degree of price stickiness in the services
sector.
The speed of price adjustment also varies according to the type of market for the
product. Firms that sell their products to other firms (intermediate goods) tend to be
quicker to adjust their prices than firms whose products are mainly for final demand
(whose main destinations are wholesalers, retailers or consumers). These results possi-
bly reflect the fact that services and final goods are typically more differentiated than
manufacturing and intermediate goods, respectively, and thus face a less elastic demand.
2.5.2 Symmetric or asymmetric price adjustment lags?
The results in Section 2.3, as well as those found in other countries, suggest that firms
react more quickly to positive than to negative cost shocks, and more slowly to positive
than negative demand shocks. However, formal tests of possible asymmetric reaction
times were not performed in Section 2.3, and therefore it is important to investigate this
issue formally. In the context of our model, testing for symmetry entails comparing not
only the coefficients of the different covariates in the equations for the different shocks,
but also all other parameters that are shock specific.
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Table 2.5: Tests of symmetry
Symmetry within shocks Symmetry between shocks
Positive and Positive and Positive cost Negative cost
negative negative and demand and demand
cost shocks demand shocks shocks shocks
χ2(23) = 88.33 χ2(23) = 78.29 χ2(23) = 300.0 χ2(23) = 95.88
(p = 0.000) (p = 0.000) (p = 0.000) (p = 0.000)
χ2(23) stands for the Wald test statistic with 23 degrees of freedom and p for
the corresponding p-value.
Table 2.5 presents the results of the two tests for symmetry within shocks – positive
and negative cost shocks, and positive and negative demand shocks. In both cases the
null of symmetry is rejected at all usual significance levels, suggesting that firms react
differently to negative and positive shocks. Table 2.5 also reports the results of two tests
for symmetry between shocks – positive shocks to costs and demand, and negative shocks
to costs and demand. Again, the null of symmetry is rejected at the usual significance
levels, suggesting that firms adjust differently to positive cost and demand shocks, as well
as to negative cost and demand shocks.
Combining the results of these formal tests with the evidence in Section 2.3, one may
be led to conclude that prices adjust more quickly upwards than downwards following
cost shocks, but more slowly upwards than downwards in reaction to demand shocks.
However, the results in Section 2.3 revealed strong heterogeneity in the way firms react
to shocks and therefore the direction of the asymmetry may vary with the characteristics
of the firms. In order to investigate this issue, we computed for firms in the baseline group
the differences between the probability that the adjustment to different shocks will take
more than a year, as well as the differences-in-differences for each covariate relative to
the baseline group (obtained from Table 2.4). These results, which are displayed in Table
2.6, allow us to discuss the sources and direction of asymmetries within shocks (positive
vs. negative cost or demand shocks) and between shocks (cost vs. demand positive or
negative shocks).
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Starting with the results for cost shocks - positive vs negative - we find that for the
baseline group there is evidence that firms adjust faster to positive than to negative cost
shocks: the difference between the probability that the adjustment takes more than a
year for positive and negative shocks is equal to −0.1955, and significantly different from
zero. This result is consistent with the predictions of a model with menu costs and trend
inflation and with a model that incorporates search costs or consumer inattentiveness, as
well as with the predictions of some models considering firms’ strategic behaviour (e.g.,
Devereux and Siu (2007)), but it is at odds with the predictions of the oligopoly models
with kinked demand curves of the type considered by Maskin and Tirole (1988).
However, it is interesting to notice that this result vanishes for some firms. For
example, if we consider firms whose price is set by customers, consider price as an im-
portant factor of competitiveness, and produce intermediate goods, we obtain a value
for the difference between probabilities of adjustment after 1 year very close to zero:
0.0094 = 0.1162+0.0437+0.0450−0.1955. Therefore, the asymmetry all but disappears
for firms that face more competitive markets or have less price setting power. Again,
this is something that is consistent with menu-cost models with positive trend inflation
and with models where consumers face search costs or are inattentive. Indeed, it is more
costly to maintain a sub-optimal price in more competitive markets and therefore firms
may be expected to react faster, irrespective of the direction of the price change. In the
limit, if there are no lags of adjustment, there cannot be asymmetries in the speed of
adjustment.
For demand shocks the asymmetry tests in Table 2.5 above, combined with the evi-
dence in Table 2.2, suggest that prices move more quickly in response to negative than
to positive shocks. This is something that would be consistent with a model where
customer anger is taken into consideration, under the assumption that customer antago-
nization is higher for price increases than for price decreases (Okun (1981) and Anderson
and Simester (2010)), but could have not be anticipated, for instance, by menu-cost mod-
els with positive trend inflation. However, the results in Table 2.6 do not provide clear
evidence to support this asymmetry, and do not identify covariates with a strong effect




Table 2.6: Estimates of the difference between probabilities for the category
ỹij = 6 for the baseline group, and differences with respect to this group
Within shocks Between shocks
Positive - Negative Cost -Demand
Cost Demand Positive Negative



















































































































































Standard errors computed from analytical second derivatives are in
parenthesis; ** and * marks significance at 5% and at 10%, respectively.
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Turning, finally, to the difference between cost and demand shocks (see the last two
columns in Table 2.6), we conclude that the probability of a firm in the baseline group
adjusting the price more than one year after the shocks is significantly lower for a positive
cost shock than for a positive demand shock, but that the difference is not significant in
the case of negative shocks.
The fact that firms react faster to positive cost shocks than to positive demand shocks
is consistent with models of customer anger or fair pricing. These models predict that
consumers will more easily accept a price increase caused by a change in costs than a
price increase that is caused by an increase in demand. However, once again, the result
depends on the characteristics of the firms. In particular, for large firms who practice
price discrimination, whose prices are set by competitors, consider price as an important
factor of competitiveness, and produce intermediate goods, we obtain a positive and
large value for the difference between probabilities of adjustment after 1 year: 0.2209 =
0.0882+0.0963+0.1578+0.0520+0.0697−0.2431. That is, not only the magnitude but
also the sign of the asymmetry depends on the characteristics of the firms.
The last set of results concerns the difference in the response to negative cost and
demand shocks. For the baseline group, there is no evidence of asymmetric behaviour,
but there are several characteristics of the firm that induce significant asymmetries. In
particular, we find that large firms and firms that have their prices set by competitors
react faster to negative demand shocks than to negative cost shocks. Conversely, firms
that state that intermediate input costs are important, firms that operate in the domestic
market, and firms that compete in quality or in the speed of delivery, adjust faster to
negative cost shocks than to negative demand shocks. This heterogeneity across firms is
hard to explain by any single model.
In short, three main conclusions emerge from the analysis regarding the existence of
asymmetries in the speed with which prices adjust to shocks: 1) there is evidence of
the existence of asymmetries in the speed of price responses to positive and negative
demand and cost shocks; 2) the magnitude and direction of these asymmetries vary with
the characteristics of the firm and of the market in which the firm operates; 3) there
does not seem to be a single theoretical model that can explain all the different results





This work investigated firm-level price rigidities by using survey data to look into the
length of lags of price adjustments in reaction to positive and negative demand and cost
shocks. Price adjustment lags are a direct measure of price rigidity and therefore may be
seen as a better measure of price stickiness than the commonly used frequency of price
changes, which is expected to also depend on the frequency and magnitude of the shocks
to the optimal price.
We find that the lags of price adjustments vary with the market, product, and firm
characteristics, such as the cost structure of the firm, the type of pricing policy, the
competitive environment, the different factors of competitiveness, or the type of good.
In particular, firms which discriminate prices, do quantity discounts or operate in more
competitive environments react faster to shocks than otherwise similar firms. We interpret
these findings as support of the predictions of models of optimal price setting like the
ones suggested in Barro (1972), Caballero (1989) or Alvarez et al. (2011).
We also find evidence of the existence of asymmetries in the speed with which firms
adjust their prices in response to positive and negative demand or costs shocks. In line
with similar evidence reported in the empirical literature, most firms in our sample seem
to react faster to positive than to negative cost shocks, and more quickly to negative
than to positive demand shocks. However, we have uncovered a significant degree of
heterogeneity in the asymmetry of firm’s responses to shocks which seems to have gone
unnoticed so far. Moreover, the direction and magnitude of these asymmetries depend on
the characteristics of the firms and of the market in which they operate. For example, we
find that firms operating in more competitive markets respond to different shocks more
symmetrically.
Some results on asymmetric price responses are individually consistent with some of
the theoretical models suggested in the literature, but, overall, our results can only be
explained by a combination of the models purporting to explain asymmetric behaviour
in response to different shocks. This fact illustrates the complexity of the problem and
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suggests that further research will be needed to better understand the conditions under
which different kinds of asymmetries will be observed.
Our results have important implications for macroeconomic models. Based on the
evidence presented here we propose that monetary models should try to accommodate the
fact that the degree of price stickiness varies across firms and that firms react differently
to different types of shocks. Our findings suggest that models of optimal price setting
which take into account various characteristics of the firm and of the markets where this
firm operates are a good way to model these heterogeneities in a micro-founded way.
The existence of asymmetries in the speed of price responses to shocks may also
have important implications for monetary policy. Indeed, the existence of firm-level
asymmetric price rigidity has the implication that the relationship between inflation and
aggregate demand (Phillips curve) might be non-linear, calling for asymmetric monetary
policy rules. However, in contrast to most of the theoretical literature which tends to
favour the idea that prices are stickier downwards than upwards in response to demand
shocks, the evidence obtained in this study suggests that the type of asymmetry prevailing
at the aggregate level depends on the relative importance of different types of firms in
the economy and on the type of shock. Therefore, whether the relation between inflation
and aggregate demand is linear, convex or concave is still an open issue and thus more
empirical evidence is required before definite conclusions can be drawn on this matter.
2.7 Appendix
In this Appendix, we describe the covariates used in the ordered probit model whose
results are presented in Section 2.4, and provide the corresponding summary statistics.
All the covariates used in the model are dummy variables. The details are as follows:
Explicit contracts – Equal to one if the percentage of sales under written contracts is
larger than 50 percent of total sales.
Implicit contracts – Equal to one if the relationship with customers is essentially a
long-term one (more than one year).




Quantity discount – Equal to one if the price depends on the quantity sold but ac-
cording to a uniform price list.
Price set by customers – Equal to one if the price of the product is set by the firm’s
main customer(s).
Price set by competitors – Equal to one if the price of the product is set by the firm’s
main competitor(s).
Labour costs – Equal to one if the labour cost share is above the median of the sample.
Intermediate input costs – Equal to one if the other input costs share is above the
median of the sample.
Competition – Equal to one if the number of firm’s competitors is equal to 5 or bigger.
Domestic market – Equal to one if Portugal is the main destination market for the
firm’s product.
Price competitiveness – Equal to one if the firm considers price as a very important
factor for competitiveness.
Quality competitiveness – Equal to one if the firm considers quality as a very important
factor for competitiveness.
Delivery competitiveness – Equal to one if the firm considers delivery period as a very
important factor for competitiveness.
Services – Equal to one if the firm operates in the Services sector.
Intermediate goods – Equal to one if ”other companies” is the main destination of
sales (as opposed to wholesalers, retailers, Government, consumers).
Size – Equal to one if the number of employees is larger than 250.
Capital structure – Equal to one if the share of domestic capital (owned by Portuguese
entrepreneurs) is larger than 50 percent.
Table 2.7 summarizes the relative importance in the sample of the above defined
covariates. The entries in the Table record the share of firms in each category, with the
exception of the labour and intermediate input costs, which represent the corresponding
average shares, and the capital structure, which represents the share of firms whose
42
Chapter 2. Understanding price stickiness: firm-data evidence on price adjustment lags
Table 2.7: Main characteristics of the sample:
Share of firms in each category in percentage
Total Sectors Firms’ size
Manufacturing Services Small Large
Explicit contracts 25.5 23.9 40.0 23.6 36.1
Implicit contracts 82.6 83.3 76.7 82.0 86.5
Price discrimination 37.4 38.3 30.0 37.8 35.3
Quantity discount 41.0 42.2 30.0 40.8 42.1
Price set by customers 11.7 11.8 11.1 10.9 16.5
Price set by competitors 12.3 12.9 6.7 13.6 4.5
Labour costs(a) 27.3 26.2 36.8 27.6 25.2
Intermediate input costs(a) 39.3 43.1 5.1 39.2 40.3
Competition 76.0 74.8 86.7 79.0 58.6
Domestic market 68.4 66.3 87.8 70.5 56.4
Price competitiveness 59.5 61.4 42.2 59.2 60.9
Quality competitiveness 77.0 76.4 82.2 76.1 82.0
Delivery competitiveness 51.1 51.7 45.6 50.0 57.1
Intermediate goods 30.9 30.6 33.3 31.8 25.6
Size (large firms) 15.0 14.5 18.9 – –
Capital Structure(b) 88.2 87.6 93.2 90.4 75.4
(a)Average of labour or intermediate input cost share (percent);
(b)Share of firms whose national capital accounts for 50 percent or more of total capital.
national capital accounts for 50 percent or more of total capital. For instance, from the
Table we see that around 83 percent of firms have implicit contracts, i.e., they have an
essentially long-term relationship with customers, and that the distribution of implicit
contracts is relatively homogeneous across sectors and do not vary much with the size of
firms. In contrast, only in about 25 percent of the firms do formal contracts account for 50
percent or more of total sales (explicit contracts), and its distribution varies significantly
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3.1 Introduction
In recent years, a substantial amount of theoretical and empirical research, devoted to
improving the microeconomic foundations of macroeconomic behaviour, has made clear
that a thorough understanding of the extent and causes of the sluggish adjustment of
nominal prices is crucial to the design and conduct of monetary policy.
In this regard, an important conclusion that emerges from the literature is that firms
differ from each other with respect to their price-reviewing or price-setting strategies,
22Published in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Volume 115, Issue 3, pages 756–780, July
2013.
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and that the different strategies are widespread throughout the economy.23 A second
important conclusion is that the effects of monetary policy may depend crucially on the
underlying mechanism of firms’ price adjustment, namely on whether firms follow state-
or time-dependent price-setting rules.24 Understanding the factors that underlie firms’
choice of different price-reviewing strategies is thus an issue of paramount importance.
This work adds to this strand of the literature by studying the determinants of the
choice of the price-reviewing strategies followed by firms. On the theoretical front, there
is now a significant literature that directly addresses this issue, but a corresponding
empirical contribution is virtually nonexistent.
Using information from a firm-level survey for Portugal, this chapter investigates the
main reasons that lead Portuguese firms to select time-dependent, state-dependent or a
combination of both price-reviewing practices, which we shall denote by time- and state-
dependent price-reviewing strategy. Specifically, we explore the information available on
firms’ pricing decisions using a multinomial probit model to study the link between their
price-reviewing strategies and a number of their characteristics. The identification of
such characteristics allows us to anticipate changes in firms’ behaviour, i.e., changes from
time- to state-dependent and vice-versa, as a reaction to changes in economic conditions
and, therefore, to anticipate changes in monetary policy transmission.
As a byproduct, this work also contributes with additional evidence on the factors that
may explain why some firms change prices more frequently than others. The initial liter-
ature on this issue, mainly due to the lack of firm level detailed information, was unable
to identify a relevant set of covariates that significantly correlates with the frequency of
price changes at the micro level (see, for instance, Bils and Klenow (2004) and Gopinath
and Itskhoki (2010)). More recently, the availability of firm-level survey data allowed the
identification of some factors (that basically include measures of firms’ cost structure and
the degree of competition faced by firms) that correlate significantly with the frequency
23For instance, Fabiani et al. (2006) find that in the Euro Area about 34 percent of the firms follow
time-dependent rules, 20 percent follow state-dependent rules and the remaining 46 percent follow a
combination of both, i.e., follow time-dependent rules under normal circumstances, but change to state-
dependent price-reviewing rules upon the occurrence of specific events.
24See, among many others, Sheshinski and Weiss (1977), Caplin and Spulber (1987), Dotsey et al.
(1999), Bonomo and Carvalho (2004), Dotsey and King (2005), Burstein and Hellwig (2007), Midrigan
(2007), Golosov and Lucas (2007), Bils et al. (2009) and Woodford (2009).
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of price changes.25 This work, by identifying a number of significant correlations between
the different price-reviewing strategies and a large set of firm characteristics on the one
side, and by establishing a clear relation between such strategies and the frequency of
price changes on the other side, is able to provide additional evidence on this issue.
Finally, our exercise allows us to answer several interesting questions from which
the following are just some examples: How do the frequency of price changes and the
lags of price reaction to shocks vary between time- and state-dependent firms? How
important are menu and/or information costs for the choice between time- and state-
dependent price-reviewing rules? Does the type of price-reviewing strategy vary with
the size of the firms? Does the cost structure matter for the firm’s strategy? How does
uncertainty affect firms’ choice? Are firms’ price-reviewing strategies more likely to be
state-dependent when they operate in more competitive environments?
A potential disadvantage of using survey data for this type of investigation is that,
in our case, these are reported data and thus it is impossible to know how accurate the
answers provided in the survey are. However, in this particular case, there does not seem
to be a valid alternative to identify the price-reviewing strategies at the firm level. In
particular, quantitative data on the frequency of price changes or the duration of price
spells does not allow for the examination of the issue. On the one hand, these data do
not distinguish between price changes and price reviews, the latter being the variable of
interest in this work. On the other hand, time-dependent rules as implied by models with
information costs, are not distinguishable in practice from state-dependent rules, as the
frequency of price changes or of price reviews depends on underlying relevant parameters
that may change over time. Therefore, by simply looking at the relationship between the
frequency of price changes or the duration of price spells and the state of the economy,
it is not possible to tell whether a firm follows a time-dependent, a state-dependent or a
combination of both price-reviewing strategies (see Blanchard and Fischer (1989), chapter
8).26
25See, for instance, Alvarez and Hernando (2005) and Druant et al. (2009) for research based on firm-
level survey data, and Vermeulen et al. (2012), which summarise evidence for some European countries,
for research based on sectoral data.
26An important strand of the literature on time-dependent pricing models assumes that the timing
of price reviews and/or price changes is periodic and exogenous, i.e., taken as given and hence neither
explained nor assumed to be affected by the state of the economy, the timing of the shocks or monetary
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In this work, we document that the type of price-reviewing strategy followed by firms
has important consequences for the frequency of price changes and for the speed of price
reaction to shocks. In particular, firms that follow state-dependent price-reviewing rules
change their prices more frequently and react more quickly to demand and cost shocks
than do firms that follow time-dependent strategies.
We also find that the type of price-reviewing strategy varies significantly with the firm
characteristics used to measure the importance of information costs, the variability of the
optimal price and the sensitivity of profits to sub-optimal prices. More specifically, we
document that smaller firms, firms for which changes in the prices of raw materials are
important factors for pricing decisions or that operate in competitive environments are
more likely to follow state-dependent price-reviewing rules. In turn, larger firms, firms for
which information costs or changes in wages are important factors for pricing decisions
and firms that operate in the services sector are more likely to follow time- or time- and
state-dependent price-reviewing strategies. Interestingly, we also find that the time- and
state-dependent strategy is closer to the time-dependent, than to the state-dependent
price-reviewing rule. Yet, the two price-reviewing rules are very distinct. In fact, for
many regressors, the magnitude of the impact on the likelihood of the two categories is
different and, for some of them, the probability of a firm choosing between one of the two
strategies may even go in the opposite direction.
The fact that the frequency of price reviews and the speed of price reaction to shocks
vary with firms’ price-reviewing strategies, together with the fact that the distribution of
firms’ price-reviewing strategies depends on the state of the economy is expected to have
important consequences for monetary policy. In particular, anything that changes this
distribution is likely to affect the speed with which prices react to monetary policy shocks.
For instance, if, in line with what we find for Portugal, the choice of a price-reviewing
strategy also varies with firm size in other countries, then the effects of monetary policy
will be different in countries with different firm-size distributions as the masses of time-
and state-dependent firms will also be different. Similarly, because firms in the services
policy rules. Notable examples of these, sometimes called exogenous time-dependent models, include
Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983). In this work, we are interested in explaining the choices between time-
and state-dependent price-reviewing practices, so that we focus on the sometimes also called endogenous
time-dependent models in which the optimal timing of price-reviewing depends on underlying relevant
parameters, which may change over time (see, for instance, Caballero (1989)).
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sector are more prone to follow time-dependent price-reviewing rules, changes in the
structure of the economy that alter the relative importance of the services sector will
change the impact of monetary policy. But, and maybe even more interestingly, the type
of monetary policy may have an impact on the effects of monetary policy: monetary
policy aimed at stabilising the economy by reducing the variability of firms’ optimal
price (through the reduction of inflation or demand uncertainty) is likely to increase the
proportion of time-dependent firms which, in turn, to the extent that such firms display
a lower frequency of price changes or a lower speed of price reaction to shocks, will tend
to increase the real effects of monetary policy. A simple implication of these results is
that DSGE models designed for the conduction of monetary policy should be improved
in order to account for the heterogeneity and endogeneity of firms’ price-reviewing or
price-setting strategies. Otherwise, the implications of changes in monetary policy rules
generated by these models might be misleading.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents the theoretical
background which underlies the estimated model. Section 3.3 describes the dataset and
presents some preliminary results. Section 3.4 presents the estimated model and discusses
the main results. Section 3.5 provides some concluding remarks and, finally, an Appendix
presents an explanation of how the different variables were constructed.
3.2 Theoretical background
The process by which firms determine an optimal price may be thought of as involving
two distinct activities: price-reviewing and price-setting. Price reviewing may be defined
as the activity of assessing whether the firm’s current price is appropriate or not and,
in general, precedes the price-setting decision which involves adjusting the price to the
optimal level. In practice, a price review may or may not be followed by a price adjustment
so that if the two activities entail different types of costs it may be the case that the firm
follows distinct price-reviewing and price-setting strategies.27
27Survey data indicate that firms review their prices infrequently, and that not all price reviews yield
a price adjustment. For instance, for the Euro Area, Fabiani et al. (2007) document that the frequency
of price reviews is generally higher than the frequency of price changes. The surveys show that in most
Euro Area countries the modal number of price reviews lies in the range from one to four times a year,
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This section briefly reviews the literature on firms’ price-reviewing strategies and
discusses the implications for those strategies stemming from changes in the relevant
parameters.
Models without costless information
We start by summarizing the implications for the firms’ price-reviewing strategies of
the models suggested in Caballero (1989) and Alvarez et al. (2011), which assume that
firms do not have access to costless information about current economic conditions.
To make the presentation easier, let us start by assuming that: i) the efficiency loss
of the firm (out-of-equilibrium cost) may be captured by a quadratic function, L=θ[p(t)-
p*(t)]2, where θ measures the sensitivity of profits to the price gap, i.e., the deviation
of the actual price, p(t), from the optimal price, p∗(t); ii) the optimal price follows a
random walk with Gaussian innovations with variance σ2 per unit of time;28 and iii) the
firm has to pay a fixed information cost, ρ, in order to review its price. Under these
circumstances, it may be shown (see Caballero (1989)) that it is optimal for the firm
to follow a time-dependent price-reviewing strategy, where the optimal price-reviewing






According to equation (1), the optimal length for price-reviewing is increasing with
information costs and decreasing with the parameters that measure the efficiency loss
from sub-optimal prices and the variability of the underlying optimal price.29
In the model suggested in Caballero (1989) there are no menu costs, i.e., costs of
but most firms actually change their prices only once a year. In the case of Portugal, these figures are 2
and 1, respectively.
28Notice that θ depends on the parameters of the demand and cost functions and that, in particular, θ
is increasing with the elasticity of demand faced by the firm. The variance σ2 may be seen as measuring
the volatility of demand and cost functions.
29The model by Caballero (1989) was further developed by Bonomo and Carvalho (2004) and Reis
(2006). Bonomo and Carvalho (2004), by assuming the existence of menu and information costs that
are borne together, provide a model with time-dependent price-reviewing in which prices are fixed in
between price reviews. Reis (2006) models imperfect information as arising from a fixed cost of observing
the state. In the general case, the optimal planning intervals are not always the same, since they depend
recursively on the state of the economy at the last revision date. However, in standard frameworks the
optimal price-reviewing rule is also purely time dependent.
50
Chapter 3. Choosing between time and state dependence price-reviewing strategies
changing prices, so that every price review implies a price change. In a recent contribution,
Alvarez et al. (2011) generalise Caballero’s model by assuming that the firm has to pay
an information cost to review the price and a menu cost if it decides to change the price.
In this model, price reviews and price changes are separate activities: a firm may assess
the adequacy of its current price, i.e., conduct a price review, and decide not to adjust if
the current price is inside the inaction band (stemming from the presence of menu costs).
The timing of each price review is predetermined as it has been decided on the previous
revision date. Nevertheless, the process of price reviewing is also state-dependent because
the optimal time between price reviews is a function of the expected price gap at the time
of price-reviewing.30
Models with costless information
In contrast to Caballero (1989) and Alvarez et al. (2011), Woodford (2009) and
Bonomo et al. (2010) assume that firms have access to partial information at no cost, on
which they support the decision to conduct a price review.
In Woodford’s (2009) model, which draws on the theory of rational inattention pro-
posed by Sims (see Sims (1998, 2003, 2006)), the assumptions about information avail-
ability have important implications for the strategy of price reviews. In this model it
is assumed that: i) the firm obtains full information about the economy’s state at the
moment when it decides to pay the information costs and review the price; ii) partial
information about current conditions is available between the occasions when the fixed
information cost is paid, which allows firms to decide whether or not to review prices; and
iii) the memory of the firm (information on the time at which the firm last reviewed its
price) is as costly as information about current conditions external to the firm.31 Under
30In a similar approach Abel et al. (2009) address consumption portfolio problems under the assump-
tion of separate observation (information) and adjustment (transaction) costs. In general, the model
has elements of both state- and time-dependent behaviour. Interestingly, the authors show that for
sufficiently small fixed transaction costs the two processes of ”observation” and ”transaction dates” will
eventually converge to pure time-dependent rules. Intuitively, when the fixed transaction costs are not
too large compared to the observation costs, the agent will find it optimal to synchronize observation
and transaction dates, in order to avoid ”wasting” observation costs without using the new information
to undertake a transaction.
31This assumption may be justified in the context of the theory of rational inattention: the cost of any
kind of information is assumed to be the same as any other because the relevant bottleneck is limited
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these circumstances, it is shown that the optimal timing of price reviews follows a state-
dependent rule. However, when the information cost is sufficiently large, the dependence
of the optimal hazard (that indicates the probability of a price review) on the current
state is attenuated so that in the limit, when the information cost becomes unboundedly
large, the resulting model approaches one with a constant hazard rate as assumed in
Calvo (1983). If instead, memory is costless, the optimal hazard also depends on the
number of periods since the last price review. If memory is costless and the information
costs are unboundedly large, the model becomes one in which prices are reviewed at
deterministic intervals as in Caballero (1989).
In the model suggested in Woodford (2009), there are no menu costs dissociated from
information costs, so that every price review implies a price change, as in Caballero’s
model. More recently, Bonomo et al. (2010) developed a model that allows for dissociated
menu and information costs and assumes a continuous flow of partial information which
may be factored into pricing decisions at no cost, together with some information that is
only incorporated infrequently due, for instance, to gathering and processing costs. Nev-
ertheless, the price-reviewing process emerges as having both time- and state-dependent
components, as in Woodford (2009)’s memory costless case. It is state-dependent because
the firm has access to partial information on which it conditions the decision to undertake
a price review, and it is time-dependent because the decision to undertake a price review
also depends on the time elapsed since the last date when information was fully factored
into the pricing decision.
Impact on the price-reviewing strategy of changes in the relevant parameters
We have seen that in some of the models surveyed above changes in the importance
of menu and information costs may alter the nature of the price-reviewing strategy. In
particular, in the context of the time-and state-dependent model suggested in Alvarez
et al. (2011) and Abel et al. (2009), a decrease in the importance of menu costs makes
the model converge towards a time-dependent rule. The intuition is that a decrease
in menu costs makes the width of the inaction band converge to zero, which makes
attention on the part of the decision maker, rather than anything about the structure of the economy
that obscures the value of certain variables.
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the source of the state-dependent component in the price-reviewing strategy vanish. In
turn, an increase in information or observation costs makes the state-dependent model
in Woodford (2009) converge to a pure time-dependent rule with a constant hazard rate
as assumed in Calvo (1983) or, in the absence of memory costs, one in which prices are
reviewed at predetermined intervals as in Caballero (1989). The intuition is similar: an
increase in the information costs attenuates the dependence of the optimal hazard on the
current state, making the optimal time between two consecutive price reviews to converge
towards a pure time-dependent rule as information costs become unboundedly large.
The impact that changes in the variability of the optimal price (σ2) and the sensitivity
of firm’s profits to sub-optimal prices (θ) have on the optimal price-reviewing strategy
may be discussed in a context of a model in which firms have access to partial information
about current conditions (as in Woodford (2009)).32 In this model, an increase in θ or
in σ2 may be thought of as bringing about both a decrease in the information costs (an
increase in the uncertainty about the price gap or on the costs associated to a given price
gap makes information more valuable, reducing its relative cost) and an increase in the
relative cost of firm’s memory (the higher is σ2 or θ the less valuable the memory will
be). Thus, an increase in θ or in σ2, to the extent that it decreases the information costs
on the current conditions and increases the memory costs of the firm, will increase the
probability of a firm following state-dependent price-reviewing strategies as opposed to
time-dependent or time- and state-dependent rules.
In this article, we look into the factors that may explain why firms follow state-
dependent, time-dependent or both time- and state-dependent price-reviewing strategies.
For that purpose, in section 3.4 we consider an econometric model that relies on the
theoretical approaches presented in this section, whose relevant factors, in face of the
discussion above, include the menu costs, the information costs, the variability of the
optimal price and the sensitivity of firm’s profits to sub-optimal prices.
32Notice that changes in σ2 and θ do not alter the mode of price reviewing in the context of the models
developed in Caballero (1989) and Alvarez et al. (2011), as in these models firms are not assumed to
have access to partial information about current conditions that they could use to decide whether or not





The data used in this study come from a survey of price setting practices carried out by
the Banco de Portugal in 2004.33 In this survey firms were asked the following question
concerning their price-reviewing strategies:
The price in your company is reviewed (without necessarily being changed):
1) at a well-defined frequency (annually, quarterly,..),
2) generally at a defined frequency, but sometimes also in reaction to market conditions
(change in the price of raw materials or in demand conditions) or
3) without any defined frequency, being reviewed in reaction to market conditions
(changes in price of raw materials or in demand conditions).
The responses to this question, the dependent variable in our model, are interpreted
as reproducing time-dependent, time- and state-dependent, and state-dependent price-
reviewing practices by firms, respectively.
Besides the questions on price-reviewing practices, the survey also contained informa-
tion on a large set of firms’ characteristics. These included information on the size and
sector of the firm, its main market (domestic versus external market), the destination of
sales (wholesalers vs. retailers, private vs. public sector), number of competitors, type of
relation with customers (long-term vs. short-term), factors of product competitiveness
(price vs. quality, differentiation vs. after sales service), price discrimination (same price
for all customers vs. decided on a case-by-case basis), importance of changes in different
factors for price adjustments (price of raw materials, wage costs, demand, competitors’
prices), duration of products (short vs. long-duration), information of wage-setting prac-
tices, price setting decisions (own company vs. external entity, main customers vs. main
competitors), and reasons for postponing price changes (the risk that competitors do not
follow, existence of implicit or written contracts, cost of changing prices, costs of collecting
information, absence of significant changes in variable costs, preference for maintaining
prices at psychological thresholds, etc.). Finally, the survey also contained information
33Further details on this survey may be found in Martins (2010).
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Table 3.1: Price-reviewing strategies (Country evidence):
Share of firms in percentage
PT ES DE NL BE IT AT EA
Time-dependent 32 33 26 36 26 40 41 34
Time- and state-dependent 25 28 55 18 40 46 32 46
State-dependent 43 39 19 46 34 14 27 20
PT-Portugal, ES-Spain, DE-Germany, NL-Netherlands, BE-Belgium, IT-Italy
AT-Austria and EA-Euro Area; Source: Fabiani et al. (2007).
on the frequency of price adjustment and the speed of price responses to demand and
costs shocks by Portuguese firms.
In total, for estimation purposes, we have detailed information on 906 firms with 20
or more employees, from Manufacturing (NACE - classification of economic activities - 15
to 37) and Services (NACE 60 to 64, 80 and 85 - Transport, Storage and Communication,
Education and Healthcare).
3.3.2 Preliminary data analysis
As mentioned above, the type of price-reviewing strategy by Portuguese firms is our
variable of interest. Table 3.1 summarises some useful information on this variable by
displaying the distribution of the observed price-reviewing strategies in our sample, as
well as comparable figures for other European countries and the Euro Area taken from
Fabiani et al. (2007).34
Table 3.1 reveals that in Portugal 32 percent of the firms in the sample follow time-
dependent rules, 43 percent follow state-dependent rules while the remaining 25 percent
follow time- and state-dependent price-reviewing strategies, i.e., generally review prices
at a defined frequency, but sometimes also in reaction to market conditions. From Table
1, we can also see that figures for Portugal do not differ significantly from the general
34Figures for Portugal in Table 1 do not strictly coincide with those reported in Fabiani et al. (2007)
due to differences in the samples used.
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Table 3.2: Price-reviewing strategies (Sectoral and size breakdown):
Share of firms in percentage
Sectors Size∗
Total Manufacturing Services Small Large
Time-dependent 32 30 47 30 41
Time- and state-dependent 25 25 25 22 35
State-dependent 43 45 28 48 24
∗Small and large firms are firms with up to 250 employees and more than 250 employees,
respectively.
picture obtained from several European countries. Even though the distribution of the
price-reviewing strategies varies somewhat across countries, we notice that the three
alternative price-reviewing strategies are equally important as none emerges as clearly
dominating the others. For instance, from Table 3.1 we see that the proportion of time-
dependent firms is above 25 percent in all cases, and that the importance of the time-
and state-dependent strategy varies between 18 percent (NL) and 55 percent (DE).
Table 3.2 considers the breakdown by sector and firm size of the different price-
reviewing strategies. The table suggests the existence of strong heterogeneity in these
two dimensions. Indeed, the share of firms following time-dependent rules is higher in
services than in manufacturing and tends to increase with the size of the firms.
As in similar studies, the survey data also contains information on the frequency of
price changes and the speed of price reaction to shocks.35 Table 3.3 reports the average
frequency of price changes as reported by the firms in the sample. From the table, it can
be seen that on average time-, time- and state- and state-dependent firms have different
frequency of price changes. In particular, state-dependent firms emerge as adjusting
prices more frequently than firms following time-dependent price-reviewing strategies.
Indeed, 17 percent of firms following state-dependent rules change their prices at least
35Firms in the survey were asked the following questions: a) On average, at what frequency is the price
changed?; b) After a significant positive demand shock how much time on average elapses before you
change your price? (and similar questions for a significant negative demand shock and for a significant
positive or negative cost shock). The answers in the form of quantity or time intervals are summarised
in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
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Table 3.3: Frequency of price adjustment:
Share of firms in percentage
Frequency of price Time- Time- and state- State-
adjustment dependent dependent dependent
1 - Once per month or more 3 5 8
2 - Once per quarter 5 9 9
3 - Twice a year 16 14 17
4 - Once a year or less 76 72 66
once per quarter, while 8 percent do it at least once a month. On the other hand, only
8 percent of firms following time-dependent rules change their prices at least once per
quarter. The frequency of price changes for time- and state-dependent firms seems to be
somewhere in between that of time- and state-dependent firms. The analysis based on
visual inspection of Table 3.3 is corroborated by a formal non-parametric χ2 homogeneity
test, which rejects the null hypothesis of equal frequency of price changes across the three
types of firms.36
Table 3.4 reports the lags or price reaction to significant positive cost and demand
shocks, reported by the firms in the survey.37 Simple visual inspection of the table
suggests that the speed of price adjustment to shocks varies according to the type of
price-reviewing strategy. In particular, in both cases, time-dependent firms seem to be
slower to adjust than firms following state-dependent price-reviewing strategies. Indeed,
26 percent of firms with state-dependent price-reviewing rules adjust their prices in the
first month after a positive cost shock, while 58 percent do it in the first three months.
The corresponding figures for time-dependent firms are 14 and 38 percent, respectively.
The results for firms with time- and state-dependent rules suggest that the speed of price
adjustment is somewhere in between the speed of time-dependent and the speed of state-
dependent firms. Once again, the analysis based on visual inspection is corroborated by
formal non-parametric χ2 homogeneity tests, which clearly reject the null hypothesis of
36The outcome of the test is χ2(6)=15.1, so that the null hypothesis is rejected at 5 percent level.
37This information was explored by Dias et al. (2011) to investigate the characteristics that explain
why some firms react to shocks faster than others.
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Table 3.4: Speed of price response to positive demand and cost shocks:
Share of firms in each category
Time- Time- and state- State-
Price adjustment lag dependent dependent dependent
Positive cost shocks:
1 - Less than one week 3 6 6
2 - From one week to one month 11 16 20
3 - From one to three months 24 28 32
4 - From three to six months 19 21 18
5 - From six months to one year 33 24 18
6 - More than one year 10 5 7
Positive demand shocks:
1 - Less than one week 3 4 4
2 - From one week to one month 7 11 15
3 - From one to three months 17 18 23
4 - From three to six months 13 21 13
5 - From six months to one year 22 21 14
6 - More than one year 38 26 31
identical adjustment lags across the three types of firms.38
Overall, Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show that whether firms follow time-, time- and state-, or
state-dependent price-reviewing strategies has important consequences for the frequency
of price changes and the speed of price reaction to shocks. This may be expected to
have important consequences for monetary policy, as its effects would depend on the
distribution of firms in terms of their price-reviewing strategies. In particular, anything
that changes this distribution is likely to affect the speed of price reaction to monetary
policy shocks.
38For the positive cost and demand shocks the results of the tests are χ2(10) = 34.26 and χ2(10) =
32.65, respectively, so that the null hypothesis is rejected at 5 percent level for the two tests. The
results for negative cost and demand shocks, as regards the price adjustment lags for the three type of
price-reviewing strategies, including the χ2 homogeneity tests, are qualitatively similar.
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3.4 An econometric model for the price-reviewing
strategies
In order to understand what makes firms choosing one price-reviewing strategy over the
others, we specify and estimate a multinomial probit choice model. Given that the firm
has 3 choices we can define the latent variable y∗i,j = x
′
iβj+εi to denote the gain for firm i
stemming from choosing the price-reviewing strategy j = {1, 2, 3}. It is further assumed
that the residuals εi have a multivariate normal distribution. The observed dependent
variable yi is defined as:
yi =
{








i.e., strategy j is chosen if y∗ij is highest for j. The multinomial probit model allows us to
model probabilities of the three different outcomes of the dependent variable yi in such a
way that they sum up to unity: P(yi=1)+P(yi=2)+P(yi=3)=1. The probability of firm
i choosing price-reviewing strategy k is given by




ij, j = {1, 2, 3} , j 6= k
)
These probabilities can be easily obtained given the normality assumption for the
error terms.39
The choice of the set of regressors, xi, used in the empirical model was guided by
the literature on price-reviewing strategies, summarised in section 3.2. As discussed
there, the relevant factors determining the type of pricing policy may be divided into
four categories: menu costs, information costs, variability of the optimal price and the
sensitivity of profits to sub-optimal prices. We use proxies as the regressors for each one
of the four categories whenever direct quantitative data are not available.40 The different
39For further details see, for instance, Maddala (1983) or Train (2009).
40We also use binary dummy variables as regressors in the few cases where quantitative data were
available because we believe that the use of such variables, on the one hand, greatly reduces the impor-
tance of potential reporting errors that may emerge with survey data and, on the other hand, makes it
easier to extract the information from the regressors by increasing the contrast between the groups of
firms defined by the binary dummy variables.
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regressors are described in the Appendix together with some summary statistics.
Table 3.5 presents the average marginal effects of each of the covariates on the prob-
ability of a firm following either a time-, a time- and state- or a state-dependent price-
reviewing strategy, computed from the estimated parameters of the multinomial probit
model.41
Menu costs
According to the theoretical models surveyed above, we may expect high menu costs
to increase the likelihood of a state-dependent component in a firm’s price-reviewing
strategy. However, in our estimated model, menu costs do not emerge as a relevant factor
to discriminate among the three alternative price-reviewing strategies. This of course
may stem from the type of covariate we use. In our model, the regressor ”importance of
menu costs” is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm considers that those costs
are important or very important to explain the existence of price rigidity, and is zero
otherwise. However, it might be the case that two firms with a very different degree of
price stickiness attach the same degree of importance to menu costs. In this case, our
measure of menu costs would be unable to discriminate among firms with different price-
reviewing strategies. Of course, it may also be the case that menu costs, if they are very
small when compared to information costs, do not in fact play an important role for the
decision on the type of price-reviewing strategy (see Ball and Mankiw (1994b), Zbaracki
et al. (2004) and Woodford (2003, 2009)). Overall, we believe that more and better data
on menu costs is required before definite conclusions may be drawn on the importance of
this factor for the the type of price-reviewing strategy.
Information costs
In this group of regressors, we consider both a direct measure of the information
costs, which we label ”importance of information costs”, and two more indirect measures
labelled ”price discrimination” and ”size”.
According to the theoretical literature reviewed in section 3.2, we may expect high
information costs to increase the likelihood of time- or time- and state-dependent price-
41Figures in Table 3.5 refer to the output of an independent multinomial probit. As a robustness
check, we also estimated a multinomial probit allowing for the possibility of correlated errors. However,
the estimates for the average marginal effects are virtually unchanged. We note that by construction the
average marginal effects for each regressor in Table 3.5 add up to zero.
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Table 3.5: Multinomial Probit:
Average marginal effects
Regressors Time- Time- and State-
Dependent State-Dependent Dependent
Menu costs :

























Variability of the optimal price:























































Number of observations: 906
Log pseudo-likelihood: -894.889
Wald χ2(26)=148.80 (P=0.000); MacFadden’s Pseudo R2=0.079.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***,**,* denote significance at 1, 5
and 10 percent level, respectively.
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reviewing strategies, as opposed to state-dependent rules. The variable, ”importance of
information costs” maps directly into the theories presented in section 3.2. The ”price
discrimination” variable indicates whether a firm charges different prices to different
customers or not. Our assumption is that a firm which discriminates prices must be able to
process all the necessary information very cheaply at the time of charging a different price.
In that sense, firms that price discriminate may be expected to prefer state-dependent
price-reviewing strategies. With respect to the ”size” variable, our assumption is that,
in principle, larger firms will tend to have larger product portfolios and also that their
decision structures are less centralized as compared to smaller firms. For that reason,
we expect larger firms to have higher information costs and therefore to be more likely
to follow time- or time- and state-dependent price reviewing strategies as opposed to
state-dependent ones.
Regarding the variable ”importance of information costs”, we see that firms for which
information costs are important are less likely to follow state-dependent price-reviewing
strategies. In particular, for a firm for which information costs are important or very
important, the probability of following a state-dependent price-reviewing strategy is 6.9
percentage points lower than the probability for an otherwise identical firm. This result
is in line with what is predicted by theory, but it lacks some statistical strength.42
In the case of the type of pricing policy, namely whether the firm sets a single price or
discriminates the price among the customers, we obtain a result that is in line with our
predictions. That is, we estimate that, for a firm that price discriminates the probability
of following a state-dependent rule is 14.3 percentage points higher than the corresponding
probability for a firm that does not.
With respect to ”size”, the last variable in this group, we find that larger firms tend to
prefer time- or time- and state-dependent price reviewing rules to the detriment of state-
dependent rules. According to our estimates, the probability of a large firm following a
state-dependent price-reviewing rule is 22.2 percentage points lower than the probability
42The variable ”importance of information costs” is defined in a similar way to the ”importance of menu
costs”. Thus, similarly to what was suggested for the latter, it might be the case that our direct measure
of information costs is unable to fully discriminate among firms with different price-reviewing strategies.
The fact that the other (indirect) measures of information costs have very significant impacts on the
estimated model suggests that this may in fact be the right explanation for the absence of statistically
strong results for the ”importance of information costs”.
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for a comparable small firm. This result is also in line with the preliminary findings in
section 3.3.43
Variability of the optimal price
This category includes a group of variables deemed to affect directly or indirectly the
variability of the optimal price of the firm: ”changes in the prices of raw materials”,
”changes in wages”, ”changes in demand” and ”explicit contracts”.
The first three covariates measure the importance of changes in the prices of raw mate-
rials, in wages and in demand for the firm’s decision of a price change. Estimates in Table
3.5 show that firms where the prices of raw materials are considered important or very
important for price changes are more likely to follow a state-dependent price-reviewing
strategy. In particular, the probability of such firms following a time-dependent price-
reviewing strategy is 17.7 percentage points lower, than the probability for an otherwise
identical firm. In contrast, the more important changes in wages are, the more likely it is
that a firm follows a time-dependent price-reviewing strategy. In both cases, the results
accord with intuition: in general, the price of raw materials is highly volatile, which will
increase the variability of the optimal price and thus may be expected to increase the
likelihood of state-dependent behaviour. In turn, we may expect changes in wages to
occur at well-defined frequencies (once a year, usually) and thus their importance for
price changes to be negatively correlated with the uncertainty surrounding the optimal
price.44 Interestingly, the larger importance of changes in demand for the decision of a
price change does not seem to have a bearing on the type of price-reviewing strategy
43Using ”size” as proxy for information costs may be seen as a controversial assumption. This variable
may also be seen as a measure of the firm’s market power. In that sense, it could equally be considered
in the group of variables aimed at measuring the ”efficiency loss”. Larger firms, ceteris paribus, have a
higher degree of price setting power (through a higher market share) and thus face a less elastic demand,
which makes profits less sensitive to non-optimal pricing, increasing the likelihood of a time-dependent
component in the firm’s price-reviewing strategy.
In the model, ”size” is defined as dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is a large firm (i.e., the
number of employees is larger than 250) and is zero otherwise (see Appendix). Some sensitivity tests
showed that the results in the model do not qualitatively change if ”size” is defined as the number of
employees.
44In the survey, firms were asked at what frequency wages are normally changed and slightly more
than 80 percent (736 in our sample of 906 firms) answered ”once a year”. Among these, about 70 percent
answered that they adjust wages in a specific month of the first quarter of the year (January, February
or March).
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followed by Portuguese firms.
The existence of ”explicit” or written contracts has been suggested in the literature
as an important explanation for price rigidities at the firm level. With such contracts,
firms aim at building long-term relationships with their customers in order to stabilise
their future sales. Customers, on the other hand, are attracted by a constant price
because it makes their future costs more predictable and helps to minimize transaction
costs (e.g., shopping time). According to Table 3.5, the existence of explicit contracts has
also a bearing on the type of price-reviewing strategy followed by Portuguese firms. In
particular, we see that firms with a large proportion of sales made using written contracts
are less likely to follow state-dependent price-reviewing rules and more likely to follow
time- and state-dependent rules. This accords with the idea that contracts are in fact
also used to reduce the variability of the optimal price.
Efficiency loss
This category includes a group of variables expected to be related to the determinants
of the sensitivity of firm’s profits to deviations from the optimal price (e.g., demand
elasticity or slope of the cost function). In this category, we included the following
regressors: ”number of competitors”, ”price competitiveness”, ”changes in competitor’s
prices”, ”intermediate goods” and ”services”.
The number of competitors, which is used to measure the degree of competition faced
by firms, may be expected to have a significant impact on the choice of a price-reviewing
strategy, because it is known that the more competitive a sector is, the more sensitive
profits are to sub-optimal prices (Martin (1993) and Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010)). Thus,
ceteris paribus, firms operating in more competitive environments may be expected to
prefer state-dependent practices. Our estimates show that this is indeed the case. From
Table 5, we see that, for a firm operating in a competitive environment, the probability
of following a time-dependent price-reviewing rule is 7.2 percentage points lower than the
probability for and otherwise identical firm.
As it is well known, firms can compete in many different dimensions: price, quality,
after-sales service, etc. We may think of these factors as reflecting different product char-
acteristics which translate into different demand elasticities. In that sense, we added to
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our model a variable that indicates whether price is a very important factor of firm’s
competitiveness. We find that firms which compete in price (as opposed to other dimen-
sions of competition) are more likely to follow state-dependent price-reviewing strategies.
According to Table 3.5, the probability for such a firm of following a state-dependent rule
is 11.2 percentage points higher than for an otherwise identical firm. This is the expected
result, as firms that compete in price may be expected to display higher demand elasticity
and thus their profits to be more sensitive to deviations from the optimal price.
As regards the effects of ”changes in competitors’ prices”, we notice that a firm for
which such changes are important or very important for pricing decisions is less likely
to follow a time-dependent rule and more likely to follow a time- and state-dependent
rule, but the likelihood of following a state-dependent rule is not affected. This is a very
interesting result which may be explained in a context of strategic complementarities
(see, for instance, Bonomo and Carvalho (2004)). In such a context, a firm should not be
expected to follow a simple time-dependent rule, as such rule does not accommodate the
possibility of a firm reacting to changes in the firms’ relevant environment. In contrast, by
being time- and state-dependent the firm has the possibility of generally reviewing their
prices at well-defined frequencies but sometimes also in reaction to market conditions,
namely, changes in competitors’ prices.
As earlier results suggested (see Table 3.2 in Section 3.3), from Table 3.5 we find that
firms that operate in the services sector are more likely to follow time-dependent price-
reviewing strategies than firms that operate in the manufacturing sector. In fact, the co-
variate ”services” shows up with a very large impact, with estimated positive marginal ef-
fects on time-dependent behaviour of 12.5 percentage points. The type of price-reviewing
strategy also varies according to the type of market for the product. Firms that sell their
products to other firms (intermediate goods) are more likely to follow state-dependent
rules than firms whose products are mainly for final demand (whose main destinations are
wholesalers, retailers or consumers). These results may reflect the fact that services and
final goods are typically more differentiated than manufacturing and intermediate goods
and, thus, face a less elastic demand, which makes profits less sensitive to non-optimal
pricing.
Finally, the results in Table 3.5 show that the time- and state-dependent strategy
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is closer to the time-dependent than to the state-dependent strategy, in the sense that
changes in regressors that bring about significant changes in the likelihood of one of the
two strategies usually also bring about changes of the same sign in the likelihood of the
other (even though in some cases the changes are not statistically different from zero).
However, the results also show that time-dependent and time- and state-dependent be-
haviour are to be seen as two distinct choices. Indeed, for many regressors, the magnitude
of the impact on the likelihood of the two categories differs from each other and, more-
over, the probability of a firm choosing between the two strategies sometimes goes in the
opposite direction as, for instance, in the case of a firm for which changes in competitors’
prices are important or very important for pricing decisions.
3.5 Conclusions
This work uses firm-level data to look into the factors that may explain why firms follow
time-, state-, or time- and state-dependent price-reviewing strategies.
In line with the evidence found in other countries, Portuguese firms are strongly
heterogeneous as regards their price-reviewing strategies. In our sample, 32 percent of
the firms follow time-dependent, 43 percent follow state-dependent and the remaining
25 percent follow time- and state-dependent price-reviewing strategies. Importantly, the
frequency of price changes and the speed of price reaction to shocks of time-dependent
firms is significantly lower than that of state-dependent firms, while firms that are both
time- and state-dependent rank in between.
By estimating a multinomial probit model, we find that the type of price-reviewing
strategy varies significantly with those firm characteristics that measure the importance
of information costs, the variability of the optimal price and the sensitivity of profits to
sub-optimal prices. In particular, we document that factors which increase the costs of
information required for the process of price reviewing tend to decrease the likelihood of
state-dependent rules or to increase the likelihood of time- and time- and state-dependent
price-reviewing strategies. Factors that increase the cost of deviations from the optimal
price decrease the likelihood of a firm following time-dependent rules whereas variables
that increase the variability of the optimal price increase the probability of a firm following
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state-dependent price-reviewing strategies.
Menu costs, i.e., the costs of changing prices such as the cost of printing and distribut-
ing new price lists, do not emerge as playing a significant role. But, we believe that more
and better data is required before definite conclusions may be drawn on the importance
of this factor for the choice of the price-reviewing strategies by Portuguese firms.
The factors that affect the choice of firms’ price-reviewing strategies may also be seen
as the factors that explain why some firms change prices more frequently than others or
why firms react to shocks with different lags. Given that the frequency of price changes
and the speed of price reaction to shocks of time-dependent firms are significantly lower,
the factors listed above that increase the probability of a firm following a time-dependent
price-reviewing strategy are also the factors that reduce the frequency of price changes
and decrease the speed of price reaction to shocks. In contrast, the factors that increase
the probability of a firm following a state-dependent price-reviewing rule also increase
the frequency of price changes or the speed of price reaction to shocks.
The fact that the frequency of price changes and the speed of price reaction to shocks
depend on whether firms follow time-dependent, time- and state-dependent, or state-
dependent price-reviewing strategies may be expected to have important consequences for
monetary policy, as it implies that monetary policy effects will depend on the distribution
of firms in terms of their price-reviewing strategies. In particular, anything that changes
this distribution is likely to affect the speed of price reaction to monetary policy shocks.
For instance, if, in line with what was found for Portugal, the choice of a price-reviewing
strategy varies with firm size in other countries, then it may be expected that the effects of
monetary policy will be different in countries with different firm-size distributions as the
masses of time- and state-dependent firms will also be different. Similarly, because firms in
the services sector are more prone to follow time-dependent price-reviewing rules, changes
in the structure of the economy that affect its composition (manufacturing versus services)
will have the implication of changing the effects of monetary policy. This idea that
firms rationally choose their price-reviewing strategy may help to understand the cross-
sectional variation of monetary shocks (different countries/states are affected differently
by the same type of monetary shock) and, at the same time, may also explain why the




But not only structural characteristics of an economy may influence monetary policy.
The evidence shown in this chapter that the proportion of time- and state-dependent
firms depends on the state of the economy implies that different monetary policy regimes
may affect the effects of monetary policy: monetary policy rules aimed at stabilising
the economy, to the extent that they alter the proportion of firms in each price-reviewing
category, will be likely to modify the frequency of price changes and thus the speed of price
reaction to monetary policy shocks. For instance, by reducing inflation and/or demand
uncertainty, monetary policy will reduce the variability of firms’ optimal price which,
according to the evidence presented, is likely to increase the probability of firms following
time-dependent or time- and state-dependent rules as opposed to state-dependent rules.
This, ceteris paribus, may be expected to reduce the frequency of price reviews (and of
price changes) or the speed of price reaction to shocks and thus to increase the real effects
of monetary policy.
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Appendix
In this Appendix, we describe the covariates used in the multinomial probit model whose
results are presented in section 3.4, and provide the corresponding summary statistics.
All the covariates used in the model are dummy variables. The details are as follows:
Importance of menu costs – Equal to one if the menu costs are ranked by the firm as
an important or a very important factor to postpone price changes.
Importance of information costs – Equal to one if the costs of collecting the relevant
information for price decisions are ranked by the firm as an important or a very important
factor to postpone price changes.
Price discrimination – Equal to one if the price of the firm’s product is decided on a
case-by-case basis.
Size – Equal to one if the number of employees is larger than 250.
Changes in prices of raw materials – Equal to one if they are considered as important
or very important for the firm’s decision of a price increase or a price decrease.
Changes in wages – Equal to one if they are ranked as important or very important
for the firm’s decision of a price increase or price decrease.
Changes in demand – Equal to one if they are ranked as important or very important
for the firm’s decision of a price increase or price decrease.
Explicit contracts – Equal to one if the percentage of sales under written contracts
is larger than 25 percent of total sales.
Number of competitors – Equal to one if the number of firm’s competitors is greater
than or equal to 5.
Price competitiveness – Equal to one if the firm considers the price as a very important
factor for competitiveness.
Changes in competitors’ price – Equal to one if they are important or very important
for the firm’s decision of a price increase or price decrease.
Intermediate goods – Equal to one if ”other companies” is the main destination of
sales (as opposed to wholesalers, retailers, Government, consumers).
Services – Equal to one if the firm operates in services.
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Table 3.6: Main characteristics of the sample:
Share of firms in each category in percentage
Total Sectors Firms’ size
Manufacturing Services Small Large
Importance of menu costs 57.1 57.0 57.3 57.9 53.5
Importance of information costs 40.6 41.2 34.8 41.6 36.5
Price discrimination 36.5 36.6 36.0 36.3 37.6
Size (large firms) 18.8 17.9 27.0 – –
Changes in prices of raw materials 93.4 95.7 71.9 93.8 93.4
Changes in wages 84.8 84.9 83.1 86.3 78.2
Changes in demand 77.7 77.5 79.8 78.0 76.5
Explicit contracts 33.0 31.0 51.7 30.8 42.4
Number of competitors 75.7 75.6 76.4 79.9 57.6
Price competitiveness 61.5 62.2 55.1 61.0 63.5
Changes in competitors’ prices 74.6 74.3 77.5 73.9 77.6
Intermediate goods 29.9 28.9 39.3 30.8 25.9
Services 9.8 - - 8.8 14.1
Table 3.6 summarizes the relative importance in the sample of the covariates defined
above. The entries in the table record the share of firms in each category. For instance,
from the table we see that around 93 percent of the firms consider that changes in prices of
raw materials are important or very important for price decisions on either price increases
or price decreases, and that the distribution of such firms does not change with firms’
size, but varies across sectors, being relatively more frequent in manufacturing than in
services. In contrast, only about 30 percent of the firms produce intermediate goods, i.e.,
sell their main product to other companies (as opposed to wholesalers, retailers or the
Government) and are relatively more frequent in the services sector.
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4.1 Introduction
Understanding the interaction between wage and employment adjustments is very impor-
tant for the design of monetary or fiscal policies aiming to stabilise the economy. This
work contributes to this literature by analysing how firms, in the presence of wage rigidity,
combine different channels of labour-cost adjustment in response to adverse shocks.
Wage rigidity is expected to have implications for unemployment because, in the face
of negative shocks, employment adjustment is likely to be larger when wages are rigid
downwards. Wage rigidity is also thought to have important implications for monetary
policy, as it may condition the inflation target that monetary authorities should pursue.
If nominal wages were perfectly flexible it would be optimal to aim at zero inflation but,
45Published in Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 40-49, August 2013.
4.1. Introduction
in the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity, a certain amount of inflation may be
required to ”grease the wheels” of the labour market by easing reductions in real wages.46
The bulk of the empirical literature aimed at assessing the extent and the effects of
nominal wage rigidities has focused on base wages or permanent wages (base wages plus
other components that are paid on a permanent or regular basis, such as meals allowances,
tenure-related components, etc.), leaving aside potentially more flexible pay components,
such as performance-related bonuses, commissions and other benefits, which may strongly
attenuate the negative impact on employment of strict downward base-wage rigidity.47
Exceptions are the contributions by Lebow et al. (2003), Dwyer (2003) and Oyer (2005)
who look at the role played by benefits in reducing nominal wage rigidity. They conclude
that firms seem to be able to partly circumvent wage rigidity by varying benefits so that
total compensation displays less rigidity than do wages alone.
This work extends the existing literature by discussing the implications of wage rigidity
in a context where several labour-cost adjustment margins are available to firms. Since
firms are primarily concerned with total compensation per employee, the assessment of
the importance of these alternative labour cost adjustment strategies is crucial to evaluate
the overall degree of labour cost flexibility and its implications. Based on firm-level survey
data for a sample of Portuguese firms, this work investigates whether these alternative
margins of labour cost adjustment have been used as substitutes or complements to
base wages and, most importantly, whether their utilisation has significantly reduced
the detrimental impact on employment of base-wage rigidities in the Portuguese labour
market.
Overall, the analysis carried in this chapter shows that base-wage flexibility has a
strong positive impact on employment in the face of negative shocks, and that such
impact is significantly reinforced by the existence of alternative margins of labour cost
adjustment. In particular, the availability of compensation components (bonuses, benefits
and promotions) that firms can freeze or cut in bad times, and the possibility of recruiting
46For a discussion, see, among many others, Akerlof et al. (1996), Gordon (1996), Mankiw (1996),
Dwyer (2003), Fehr and Goette (2005), Carlsson and Westermark (2007), Elsby (2009), Messina and
Sanz-de Galdeano (2011) and Stüber and Beissinger (2012).
47For empirical evidence on downward wage rigidity see, for instance, Altonji and Devereux (2000),
Knoppik and Beissinger (2006), Dickens et al. (2007), Goette et al. (2007), Holden and Wulfsberg (2008,
2009), Behr and Pötter (2010) and Messina et al. (2010).
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new employees at a wage lower than the one of those who have recently left the firm
contribute to partly offset the negative impact of base-wage rigidities on employment.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes the dataset.
Section 4.3 provides the institutional and theoretical background for the econometric
model used in the empirical section of the chapter. Section 4.4 presents some preliminary
analysis of the data. Section 4.5 discusses the econometric methodology, presents the
estimated models and discusses the main results. Section 4.6 provides some concluding
remarks. Finally, the Appendix describes how the different variables were constructed.
4.2 Data sources
Most of the data used in this study come from a survey on wage and price setting practices
carried out by Banco de Portugal in 2008 on a sample of Portuguese firms48.
In this survey, firms were asked two questions pertaining to the different margins of
labour cost adjustments, including base-wage freezes, reduction or elimination of other
compensation components and reduction of employment.
As regards base-wage freezes firms were asked the following question: ”Over the last
five years, has the base wage of some workers in your firm ever been frozen?”. Under the
assumption of a common negative shock, and in the absence of nominal wage cuts, wage
freezes identify those firms in the sample where base wages exhibit the lowest degree of
real downward rigidity. Thus, for the purposes of the present work, we look at base-wage
freezes as a measure of downward wage flexibility.49
In the second question, firms were asked if they had ever used ways of cutting labour
costs other than changing their base wages. In particular, they were asked the following
question: ”Have you ever used any of the following strategies to reduce labour costs?”
48Details on the sample selection method, as well as a copy of the full questionnaire can be found in
Martins (2011).
49Information on wage freezes has been used in the literature as a measure of the degree of downward
nominal wage rigidity (see, for instance, Babecký et al. (2009, 2010)). In our view, however, wage freezes
can be seen as a measure of downward nominal wage rigidity only if the analysis is restricted to the
population of firms where wages have been frozen or cut (see for instance, Holden (2004), Dickens et al.
(2007) and Holden and Wulfsberg (2008)). Radowski and Bonin (2008) have also used the frequency of
wage freezes or wage cuts as a proxy for wage flexibility in Germany.
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Firms participating in the survey were allowed to choose as many options as they wished
from the list below:
1) Reduce or eliminate bonus payments and other monetary benefits ;
2) Reduce or eliminate non-monetary benefits ;
3) Slow or freeze the rate at which promotions are filled.
4) Recruit new employees at a wage lower than the one of those who left the firm;
5) Reduce the number of employees.
These five strategies together with wage freezes summarise the main labour cost-
cutting strategies available to Portuguese firms in the face of negative shocks.50 Wage
freezes and strategies 1 to 4 may be seen as affecting the average price of labour. Further
below, for estimation purposes and tractability reasons, strategies 1 to 3 (the reduction
or elimination of monetary and non-monetary benefits and the slowdown or freezing
of promotions) will be aggregated in a single margin and denoted together as ”flexible
margins” as they are usually seen as more flexible than base wages. The reduction in the
number of employees affects the quantity of labour and will be denoted simply as ”reduce
employees”.
Besides the questions on base-wage freezes and on the alternative margins of labour
cost reduction, the survey also contains information on a large set of firms’ characteristics.
These include information on the composition of the labour force (share of white collar
vs. blue collar workers; share of low skilled vs. high skilled workers; share of workers with
permanent contracts), the percentage of workers covered by collective wage agreements,
the share of exports in firms’ total sales, and the relevance of some factors as obstacles to
wage cuts/freezes in a context where firms may desire to reduce their labour costs, such
as the constraints imposed by collective wage agreements, the negative impact on firms’
reputation or the difficulties in attracting new workers in the future.
After excluding from the sample those firms that have not fully answered the two
50The original question in the survey included also the option ”Change the policy of shifts (reducing
the number of hours and or shift premia)”. The answers to this option are not analised in this work
because they involved a small number of firms and because we also believe that such option is basically
used by firms whose product has very specific characteristics, making it difficult to find a meaningful set
of regressors capable of explaining why some firms use that option with higher probability than others.
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questions on the alternative strategies to reduce labour costs, we were able to obtain de-
tailed information on 1319 firms from different branches of activity. More specifically, our
sample includes firms with 10 or more employees, covering manufacturing (38 percent),
energy (3 percent), construction (11 percent), retail and wholesale trade (17 percent),
and other business services (31 percent).
However, for estimation purposes, and for reasons that will become clear further below,
we restrict the analysis to firms that have reduced costs, i.e., that have used at least one
cost-cutting strategy. This reduces the original sample to 757 firms. Also for estimation
purposes, the information from the survey was supplemented with data from Quadros de
Pessoal, a large administrative database collected by the Ministry of Employment and
Social Security, which, among other, includes information about all the Portuguese firms
with wage earners (size, ownership, location, etc.). From this database, we obtained
information on size (number of employees) and workers’ tenure.
By combining these two datasets through the individual tax identification number of
each firm and after excluding the firms that have not answered to all the questions that
are used as regressors in the estimated model the initial sample is further reduced to 635
firms. This constitutes the final sample retained for estimation purposes.
4.3 Institutional and theoretical background
4.3.1 Institutional background
In the face of negative labour demand or supply shocks, firms are expected to reduce
labour costs. This can be achieved by reducing employment and/or the average labour
costs. In the real economy, however, firms face restrictions in terms of the channels of
adjustment they can use, so that the way in which they distribute shocks across the vari-
ous labour-cost adjustment channels is expected to depend not only on the technological
and market restrictions, but also on the institutional and structural constraints of the
economy, including wage rigidity and employment protection legislation.
As regards nominal wage rigidity, many studies place the Portuguese labour market
among the most rigid countries in Europe (see, Behr and Pötter (2010), Messina et al.
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(2010), Holden and Wulfsberg (2008), Dickens et al. (2007) and Knoppik and Beissinger
(2006)). Such rigidity stems above all from the fact that labour legislation forbids nomi-
nal wage cuts. According to the Portuguese law, a firm cannot reduce contracted wages,
including other regular and periodic monetary or non-monetary pay components, unless
this is permitted by collective agreements. As a general rule, only bonuses, commissions
and other monetary or non-monetary benefits associated to the worker’s performance,
not included in the collective agreement, may legally be reduced (Portuguese Labour
Code, art. 129, 258 and 260). Also, collective negotiations are usually conducted at
the industry or occupation level, and collective agreements stipulate minimum working
conditions, like the monthly minimum wage for each category of workers, overtime pay
and the normal duration of work. Such collective bargaining covers a large part of the
workforce resulting both from the presence of labour unions and the existence of mech-
anisms of contract extension, i.e., the Government normally uses extension mechanisms
to broaden the coverage of the collective bargaining agreement to workers not covered
by unions. This largely regulated institutional framework, as well as the existence of a
compulsory minimum wage, which establishes a wage floor for many workers, introduce
strong additional rigidity in the wage-setting process.51
In contrast, the Portuguese labour market is usually seen as displaying a very low level
of real wage rigidity. This conclusion emerges not only from the literature that uses micro
data on the distribution of wage changes to compute measures of downward real wage
rigidity (see Dickens et al. (2007) and Messina et al. (2010)), but also from the literature
that looks at the wage supply curve using micro or macro data, where real wages appear
as highly responsive to the unemployment rate (see OECD (1992), Luz and Pinheiro
(1993), Gaspar and Luz (1997), Dias et al. (2004) and Marques (2008)). Estimates based
on more recent data, however, suggest that things may have changed significantly during
the last decade or so. According to Portugal et al. (2010), the large cyclical sensitivity
of real wages, prevailing in the 1980s and the 1990s, has basically vanished in the most
recent period.52
51In recent years, however, the number of firm-level agreements, which are supposed to allow greater
wage flexibility, has increased. According to our survey, they are present in around 10 percent of the
firms.
52According to the authors’ estimates, the semi-elasticity of real wages to changes in the unemployment
rate dropped from -2.46 in the 1986-2000 period to about zero in the 2002-2007 period for job-stayers,
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The Portuguese labour market is also seen as displaying a high level of employment
rigidity among European economies mainly due to legislation that protects employees
with permanent contracts against individual dismissal (see Venn (2009)). Nevertheless,
the typical Portuguese firm appears to have more control over employment than it has
over contracted wages, namely because it has the possibility of resorting to collective
dismissals and temporary contracts or finding ways to get around individual dismissals
regulation by negotiating voluntary quits.
4.3.2 Theoretical background
Given the characteristics of the Portuguese labour market, we assume a ”right to manage”
situation where base wages are bargained collectively but other components of total
compensation and employment are chosen optimally by firms subject to adjustment costs
(namely hiring and firing costs), as well as to institutional constraints.
In order to discuss the impact of negative labour demand and supply shocks on wages
and employment, we start with a very stylised model where it is assumed that firms do not
pay bonuses or any other monetary or non-monetary benefits, so that total compensation
coincides with base wages. To maximise profits in a ”right to manage” situation firms
must choose employment so as to equate the wage, which they take as given, to labour’s
marginal impact on firm’s revenues. Let us assume that the inverse labour demand
schedule of firm i may be written as:
wi = −θili + di (1)
where w is the log of firm’s labour cost, li is the log of employment, di measures other
factors that affect labour demand (marginal revenues) and θi is the inverse of the elasticity
of the labour demand schedule.
Similarly, let us assume that firm i faces the following inverse log-linear labour supply
schedule:
wi = λili + si (2)
and from -0.955 to -0.343 for new-hires.
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where λi is the inverse of labour supply elasticity and si measures other factors that affect











(di − si) (4)
In this simple framework, a labour demand shock may be represented by ∆di and a labour
supply shock by ∆si.
From equation (4), we see that the response of employment to labour demand shocks
is small when the labour supply curve is inelastic, i.e., λi is large. In contrast, if wages do
not change, i.e., λi is very small, possibly because they are set by binding collective wage
agreements, then employment responds strongly to labour demand shocks. Thus, in the
face of a negative labour demand shock several final adjustments are possible. If the firm is
not able to freeze nominal wages (the most likely situation under downward wage rigidity),
it will likely reduce employment and answer in the survey that it has reduced employment
but not frozen wages. If, by negotiating with the workers’ representatives, the firm
manages to freeze nominal wages (the best it can aim at, given the existence of strict base-
wage nominal downward rigidity), the firm will answer in the survey that it has frozen
wages and reduced employment (if freezing wages was not enough to prevent employment
reduction) or that it has frozen wages and not reduced employment, otherwise.
In the case of a labour supply shock, employment responses are expected to be larger
when θi is small, i.e., labour demand is more elastic, which in turn reflects the degree of
market competition, as well as the substitutability of labour with other factors. In the
face of a negative labour supply shock (for instance, an unexpected base-wage increase
imposed by collective agreements), the most likely final outcome (in the absence of other
adjustment mechanisms) is a reduction in employment, so that the firm will answer in
the survey that it has reduced employment but has not frozen wages.
The role played by the alternative mechanisms investigated in this work, like the
flexible components of total compensation (such as bonuses and other monetary and
non-monetary benefits) and the possibility of recruiting new employees at a lower wage
than the one of those who have left the firm, may be discussed by noting that they
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operate in the model by affecting total compensation and thus the labour supply and
demand curves. In the context of downwardly rigid base wages, the negative impact on
employment of a negative labour demand shock will be lower if the firm has the possibility
of resorting to other total compensation components (i.e., freezing or reducing bonuses
and other monetary or non-monetary benefits, freezing or slowing down the rate at which
promotions are filled or recruiting new employees at wages lower than those received
by the employees that have recently quit). Similarly, in the face of a negative labour
supply shock, these margins may be used to attenuate the increase in total compensation,
reducing the negative impact on employment. In the case of a negative labour demand
shock, these margins will emerge in the sample either as complements to base-wage
freezes (if firms manage to freeze wages), or as substitutes (if firms are unable to freeze
base wages) while, in the case of a negative supply shock, they will emerge as substitutes
to (unexpected) base-wage increases.
4.4 Preliminary data analysis
Table 4.1 summarises some information on the different cost-cutting strategies used by
Portuguese firms in our sample. From the table, we see that the reduction in the number
of employees (”reduce employees”) is by far the most used strategy. Indeed, around
72 percent of the firms in the sample answered that they had used this margin in the
past. The ”flexible margins”, which aggregate the reduction or elimination of bonus
payments and other monetary benefits (”reduce bonuses”), the reduction or elimination
of non-monetary benefits (”reduce benefits”) and the slowdown or freezing of promotions
(”slowdown promotions”), ranks second with around 45 percent of the firms, and the
recruitment of new employees with a wage lower than the one of those who left the firm
(”cheaper hires”) ranks third with around 30 percent of the firms.
Table 4.1 also shows that the use of the different strategies by Portuguese firms does
not vary much across sectors, with the possible exception of energy and construction.
The energy sector displays a slightly lower usage of ”base-wage freezes” and ”flexible
margins” and a relatively higher usage of ”cheaper hires” and ”reduce employees”, while
firms in the construction sector also use the ”reduce employees” strategy more frequently
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Table 4.1: Labour cost-cutting strategies:
Share of firms that have used each margin at least once
Base Flexible wage margins
Sectors and firm wage Reduce Reduce Slowdown Flexible Cheaper Reduce
sizes freezes bonuses benefits promotions margins hires employees
Total 0.258 0.243 0.148 0.246 0.454 0.297 0.715
Manufacturing 0.284 0.254 0.167 0.227 0.448 0.284 0.732
Energy 0.190 0.190 0.095 0.238 0.333 0.333 0.857
Construction 0.254 0.127 0.127 0.282 0.423 0.282 0.803
Trade 0.252 0.289 0.111 0.163 0.422 0.274 0.681
Business services 0.234 0.242 0.156 0.307 0.502 0.329 0.671
Large firms 0.244 0.269 0.154 0.260 0.474 0.349 0.724
Small firms 0.276 0.208 0.140 0.227 0.429 0.277 0.702
”Flexible margins” is the aggregation of ”slowdown promotions”, ”reduce bonuses” and
”reduce benefits”. Large firms are those firms with 100 or more employees, while firms
with less than 100 employees are considered as small firms. Number of observations: 757.
than the average firm.
As regards the distribution by firm size, Table 4.1 does not reveal strong asymmetries.
Nevertheless, large firms seem more likely to use the ”flexible margins” and ”cheaper
hires”, as opposed to small firms which seem to make a more extensive use of ”base-wage
freezes”.
According to the discussion in Section 4.3, we may expect the detrimental implications
for employment of base-wage rigidity to be partly offset by the availability of other mech-
anisms through which firms can reduce their labour costs, such as the ”flexible margins”
and/or the ”cheaper hires”. In order to investigate whether some of these relationships
are apparent in the data, we computed some sample conditional proportions, as well as
tetrachoric correlation coefficients for pairings of different margins (see Tables 4.2 and
4.3, respectively).
From Table 4.2, we see that around 72 percent of the firms in the sample have reduced
employment but only around 26 percent have frozen wages, which suggests that a large
proportion of firms has reduced employment without freezing wages. However, among
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Table 4.2: Sample conditional proportions
Reduce Cheaper Flexible Base-wage
employees hires margins freezes
P(.) 0.715 0.297 0.454 0.258
P(. | Base-wage freezes=1) 0.564 0.215 0.503 1
P(. | Flexible margins=1) 0.657 0.305 1 -
P(. | Cheaper hires=1) 0.680 1 - -
P(Y | X=1) stands for the proportion of firms that used strategy Y among
those firms that have used strategy X. Number of observations: 757.
Table 4.3: Tetrachoric correlation coefficients between different pairs of
labour cost-cutting strategies
Reduce Cheaper Flexible Base-wage
employees hires margins freezes
Base-wage freezes -0.330∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ 0.097 1.000
Flexible margins -0.193∗∗∗ 0.027 1.000
Cheaper hires -0.086 1.000
Reduce employees 1.000
∗∗∗,∗∗ and ∗ stand for significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level,
respectively. Number of observations: 757.
the firms that have frozen base wages only around 56 percent have also reduced employ-
ment. In turn, from Table 4.3, we see that the correlation coefficient between ”base-wage
freezes” and ”reduce employees” is significantly negative (-0.330). Thus, overall, the sam-
ple evidence suggests that ”base-wage freezes” might have been used as a substitute to
employment reduction.
A similar picture emerges for ”cheaper hires”. Conditional on having frozen wages,
only around 22 percent of the firms have used ”cheaper hires”, compared to around 30
percent in the full sample. The correlation between ”base-wage freezes” and ”cheaper
hires” is also significantly negative (-0.195) .
In contrast, there is no indication that ”flexible margins” could have been used as a
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substitute for ”base-wage freezes”. If anything, the data suggest that firms that managed
to freeze wages also tended to use the ”flexible margins”. In other words, flexibility in
the total compensation components (”base-wage freezes” and ”flexible margins”) seems
to be positively correlated, even though not significantly so (Table 4.3).
As regards the other strategies, Table 4.2 suggests that ”flexible margins” or ”cheaper
hires” could also have been used as substitutes to employment reduction, but according to
Table 3 only the correlation between ”flexible margins” and ”reduce employees” appears
as significantly different from zero. Finally, according to Tables 4.2 and 4.3, there seems
to be no relationship whatsoever between the ”flexible margins” and the ”cheaper hires”.
Overall, Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 suggest that in the sample some margins were used
as substitutes for other margins (”base-wage freezes” for ”reduce employees” and for
”cheaper hires”, and ”flexible margins” for ”reduce employees”), but no significant evi-
dence emerges as regards complementarity relationships. In the next section these rela-
tionships will be further characterised using an appropriate econometric model.
4.5 Empirical Analysis
4.5.1 An econometric model for the cost-cutting strategies
In the face of negative shocks firms are expected to respond through adjustments that
affect directly their demand (price of the product) and/or their supply (costs of produc-
tion). For reasons of data availability and econometric tractability, this work focuses
on the labour-cost adjustment strategies that Portuguese firms have used in the face of
negative labour demand and supply shocks. Thus, implicitly, we assume that the degree
of price stickiness and the costs of wage and employment adjustment determine the rel-
ative importance of the price versus the cost channel, but that the relationship among
the different labour-cost margins is chiefly determined by their relative adjustment costs.
This allows a two-stage approach where it is assumed that firms first decide whether to
reduce prices and/or costs and then, conditional on having decided to reduce costs, they
determine which type of costs they are going to cut, subject to technical or institutional
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restrictions.53
Against this background, we model firms’ cost-cutting strategies by assuming the
following multivariate recursive probit model:
y∗i1 = x
′
i1β1 + ǫi1 (5)
y∗i2 = x
′
i2β2 + α1yi1 + ǫi2 (6)
y∗i3 = x
′
i3β3 + δ1yi1 + δ2yi2 + ǫi3 (7)
y∗i4 = x
′
i4β4 + γ1yi1 + γ2yi2 + γ3yi3 + ǫi4 (8)
where y∗ij (i=1,..N; j=1,...4) represents a latent variable which measures the amount of
margin j used by firm i and x
′
ij is a set of regressors whose impacts are measured by
vector βj. As y
∗
ij is not observed, we define, as usually:
yij = 1 if y
∗
ij > 0; yij = 0 if y
∗
ij ≤ 0, i = 1, ..N ; j = 1, ...4. (9)
Equations (5)-(8) describe the most general recursive triangular model that complies
with the condition for logical consistency. It has been shown in the literature that such a
model allows for causal interpretations enabling us to understand the underlying mech-
anisms generating the observations (see Maddala (1983)). It has also been shown that
such a model does not suffer from identification problems.54
We define the 4 variables as follows: yi1=”base-wage freezes”, yi2=”flexible margins”,
yi3=”cheaper hires” and yi4=”reduce employees”. By ordering ”base-wage freezes” first,
53Ideally, in order do draw conclusions on the impacts of the different regressors on the alternative
adjustment channels, we would like to have detailed data on the reaction of firms to the different shocks.
Our sample, has information on whether a given margin was used, but is mute on the frequency and
timing of its utilisation. Thus, we proceed under the implicit identifying assumption that the data on the
labour cost-cutting strategies is the result of a single reaction by the firm to a negative labour demand
or labour supply shock (or a single reaction to the accumulation of several negative labour demand or
supply shocks). This qualification requires, of course, that the estimated parameters be interpreted with
some caution.
54Wilde (2000) has shown that the identification of the model is achieved if the same exogenous
regressors appear in all equations, provided these regressors are sufficiently variable, so that theoretical
identification does not require availability of additional instruments. See also Freedman and Sekhom
(2010). Still, equations (5) and (6) in the estimated model include three additional regressors in order
to ensure proper empirical identification of the model.
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we are assuming that base wages are basically negotiated outside the firm, through col-
lective agreements, such that they are not significantly affected by adjustments in the
other cost margins, in line with a right-to-manage approach. In turn, by ordering ”re-
duce employees” last, we are assuming that the probability of employment reduction may
depend on whether the remaining margins are also used. Ceteris paribus, employment
adjustment is expected to be lower when base wages are flexible and the firm has the
possibility of using the ”flexible margins” or the ”cheaper-hires”.
In model (5)-(8) it may further be assumed that:
corr(ǫij , ǫik) = ρjk 6= 0 ∀j, k = 1, 2, 3, 4 (j 6= k) (10)
Under assumption (10), the dependent variables yij (j=1,2,3) in the right-hand side of
equations (6)-(8) are endogenous for the equations where they appear as regressors,
and the four equations of model (5)-(8) must be estimated jointly. But if ρjk =
0, ∀j, k (j 6= k), the dependent variables yij in the right-hand side of equations (6)-(8)
become exogenous for estimation purposes and each equation in (5)-(8) may be estimated
separately.
Given that our purpose is to identify the relationships among the different cost-cutting
strategies, model (5)-(8) is estimated by restricting the original sample to firms that have
reduced labour costs, i.e., that have used at least one cost-cutting strategy. Restricting
the sample to firms that have reduced costs may raise sample selection issues because the
restricted sample becomes endogenously determined. However, sample selection will only
be a problem if the residuals in the selection equation are correlated with the residuals
of the model estimated over the restricted sample. In order to handle this situation, we
start by estimating model (5)-(8) together with a selection equation which, in our case,
is an equation for the ”cost margin” defined over the full sample:
w∗i = z
′
iδ + vi, wi = 1[(w
∗
i > 1], (11)
where wi = 1 if the firm has reduced costs (has used one cost margin at least), and
wi = 0 otherwise; z
′
i is a vector of exogenous regressors. From this model we may proceed
by testing the joint hypothesis of endogeneity of the yij variables (j=1,2,3) in equations
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(6)-(8) and the existence of sample selection problems, i.e.,:
H0 : ρjk = θr = 0, j, k, r = 1, 2, 3, 4 (j 6= k) (12)
where θr = corr(vi, ǫir), r = 1, 2, 3, 4.
According to the likelihood ratio (LR) test, the null hypothesis in equation (12) is
not rejected at standard significance levels. More specifically, from the estimated model
we get LR(10)=4.943 with P-value=0.895, so that the test suggests the absence of any
significant correlation among the residuals of the recursive triangular model (5)-(8), as
well as among those residuals and the residuals of the selection equation, suggesting that
endogeneity and sample selection are not relevant issues in our case.55
It is well-known that inference on multivariate binary models is very demanding in
terms of sample sizes (see, for instance, Fabbri et al. (2004)). Thus, in the absence of
endogeneity and sample selection problems, we proceed by estimating each equation of
the model separately, as this is is likely to imply strong estimation efficiency gains.56
4.5.2 Estimation results
Table 4.4 presents the results of the estimated model and Table 4.5 reports the average
total marginal effects of each of the covariates on the probability of a firm using each
55The sample selection model is estimated by maximum likelihood methods using the mvprobit Stata
routine with some modifications. The vector of exogenous regressors, z
′
i, includes a set of variables aimed
at explaining why firms adjust prices and not costs in reaction to negative labour demand and supply
shocks. Thus, besides the regressors x
′
i considered in the triangular model (5)-(8), and described in the
next section, z
′
i includes 5 additional regressors aimed at capturing the degree of price rigidity/flexibility:
”price autonomy”, ”domestic competition”,”share of temporary employees”, ”cost price rigidity” and
”demand price rigidity”. See the Appendix for the description of these regressors.
56As a robustness check, we also conducted a single exogeneity test for the dependent variables yij
(j=1,2,3) that appear as regressors in equations (6)-(8) by testing the correlation among the residuals of
model (5)-(8). This hypothesis was tested using both the likelihood ratio (LR) test and the conditional
moments (CM) test. The first one requires estimating the full model jointly by maximum likelihood
methods, but the second one is particularly attractive as it is based on univariate probit estimation
of the four equations. Simulations performed in Monfardini and Radice (2008) in a bivariate context
show that the size of these two tests is not very sensitive to misspecification errors (omission of a
relevant variable). For the two tests we get LR(6)=3.207 with P-value=0.783 and CM(6)=2.531 with
P-value=0.865. Thus, both tests suggest the absence of any significant correlation involving the residuals




The choice of the exogenous regressors, xij , to be used in the empirical model was
guided by the literature on downward wage rigidity. These include regressors aimed at
measuring the importance of workers’ and firms’ attributes such as tenure, the proportion
of high-skilled blue- and white-collar workers, the proportion of permanent employees or
of employees covered by collective wage agreements, the importance of competition, etc.
The Appendix describes how they were constructed.
We start by investigating how the exogenous regressors affect the use of the labour
cost-cutting strategies, and then proceed by analysing the relationships among these
strategies, with a special focus on wage-freezes and employment.
Effects of the exogenous regressors
For ease of presentation, we grouped the exogenous regressors into the following four
categories: 1) labour force composition, 2) union activity, 3) barriers to wage freezing
and 4) other characteristics.
Labour force composition
This group includes the regressors that provide information about the labour force
composition of the firm: proportion of workers with less than 5 years of tenure, the
proportion of high-skilled blue- and white-collar workers, and the share of permanent
employees.
According to the turnover model (Stiglitz (1974)), wages of high-tenured workers are
expected to be more rigid downwards than those of low-tenured workers, but it may
also be argued that high-tenured workers are more likely to face higher costs of job loss
and thus might be expected to have lower bargaining power and thus lower degree of
57The average marginal effects were calculated from the difference in the predicted probabilities con-
ditional on marginal changes for continuous regressors and zero and one changes for discrete variables in
each equation. We notice that in our triangular model the total marginal effect on yj from a covariate
xk may be decomposed into the sum of a direct effect (the partial effect computed directly from the
equation for yj) and an indirect effect coming from the contribution of the equations that precede yj in
the triangular model. For instance the impact of xk on the probability of ”reduce employees” involves
a direct effect through the ”reduce employees” equation and an indirect effect from the use of the other
margins: ”base-wage freezes”, ”flexible margins” and ”cheaper hires” (provided xk enters those equations
as a regressor). Figures in Table 4.5 refer to the total marginal effects with bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table 4.4: Labour cost-cutting strategies:
Probit estimates
Base-wage Flexible Cheaper Reduce



























































































































cheaper hires − − − −0.2137∗
(0.1256)








N=635 R2 =0.047 R2 =0.036 R2 =0.045 R2 =0.083
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4.5: Labour cost-cutting strategies:
Probit Model - Average marginal effects
Base-wage Flexible Cheaper Reduce
Regressors freezes margins hires employees



























































































cheaper hires − − − −0.0663∗
(0.0388)
The average marginal effects include both the direct and indirect effects
(see footnote 13). Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
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downward wage rigidity.58 Whether higher tenure is associated with higher or lower wage
rigidity is therefore an empirical matter.
The results for this regressor indicate that it does not have a significant impact on
the two compensation related margins, suggesting that it is not a relevant variable as
regards firms’ decisions on freezing base-wages or reducing the ”flexible margins”. In
contrast, firms with a higher proportion of less experienced or younger workers are more
likely to use the margin ”cheaper hires”. This result suggests that firms with a higher
proportion of less experienced or younger workers are also the ones where quits are more
frequent, allowing firms to reduce labour costs by paying lower wages to new employees.
This result may be due to the prevailing dual labour market in Portugal which provides
very high protection to older workers with open-ended contracts and very little to the
younger ones with fixed-term contracts (see Centeno and Novo (2012)). In the case of
”reduce employees”, however, the coefficient is negative suggesting that firms with higher
proportion of high-tenured workers are more likely to reduce employment in the face of
negative shocks. This effect may stem from the fact that the proportion of high-tenured
workers is proxying the age of the firm and collective dismissals being more frequent in
older firms.59
The literature also suggests that wages of high-skilled or white-collar workers are likely
to display higher downward rigidity than those of low-skilled or blue-collar workers either
because the effort of high-skilled workers is more valuable and more difficult to monitor or
58If we consider the tenure profile of wages predicted by Lazear (1979), who suggests that workers are
likely to earn less than the value of their marginal productivity (VMP) when they are young and to earn
more than their VMPs when they are old, together with the shirking model (see Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984)), we conclude that the cost of job loss may be higher for older workers and workers with higher
tenure. In fact, it is typically more difficult for older workers to find a new job and workers with long
tenure often lose their tenure component of wages when changing jobs.
59Tenure is usually seen as an endogenous variable in wage or dismissals equations defined at the
worker level, where tenure endogeneity is due to unobserved worker’s match and/or heterogeneity effects.
However it is unclear whether one should expect tenure endogeneity to be an important issue for equations
defined at the firm level and pertaining not to wage or unemployment levels equations, but to the
probability of a firm freezing wages or reducing employment. Yet, to see whether tenure endogeneity
could be a problem in our equation for ”reduce employees” (tenure is not significant in the equations
for ”base-wage freezes” and ”flexible margins”), we carried out a simple endogeneity test by estimating
a bivariate probit model involving the equation for ”reduced employees” (which includes tenure as a




because costs of hiring and training costs are higher for high-skilled and/or white-collar
workers making firms more reluctant to cut their wages (see, for instance, Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984), Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990)).
From Tables 4.4 and 4.5, we see that, in comparison to low-skilled workers (blue- and
white-collar), firms with more high-skilled workers are more likely to use the first three
margins of adjustment: ”base-wage freezes”, ”flexible margins” and ”cheaper hires”, but
less likely to ”reduce employees”. These results, apparently not in line with most theories,
are likely to reflect a greater use of flexible pay components among high-skilled workers.60
To the extent that workers with permanent contracts have more bargaining power
in the wage-setting process than workers with temporary contracts, the ”insider-outsider
model” (Lindbeck and Snower (1988)) will imply higher wage rigidity for the former group
of workers. From Tables 4.4 and 4.5, we see that the impact of the share of permanent
employees on each of the margins tends to be negative (the exception is ”base-wage
freezes”), even though not statistically significant for most of the margins. In line with
the theory, this result suggests that the higher the share of permanent workers, the harder
it is, in general, to use the adjustment margins.
Union activity
The role played by labour unions in the wage setting process and the employment
protection legislation is also likely to have strong implications for wage rigidity and for
employment responses to shocks. The higher is the unions’ bargaining power, the more
rigid wages are expected to be and thus changes in employment are also likely to be
higher. For instance, in the model developed in Holden (2004), downward wage rigidity
is likely to be stronger the higher the coverage of collective agreements and the stricter
the employment protection legislation. The idea is that with collective wage agreements
wage cuts need the consent of employees and such cuts are more difficult to implement
under stricter employment protection legislation.
60In practice, the sign and magnitude of the estimated parameters for some regressors, in the model
for a given margin, are likely to depend not only on workers’ relative bargaining power but also on
how widespread that margin is across the different type of workers. For instance, the use of the ”flexible
margin” (bonuses, benefits or promotions) is likely to be more widespread among the class of high-skilled
and/or white-collar workers. Under these circumstances, firms with higher proportion of high-skilled
and/or white-collar workers may emerge in the estimated models as displaying higher probability of
reducing the flexible margin, in contrast to what the theory would suggest.
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In order to capture the role played by unions in the wage setting process, we included
the variables ”coverage” and ”legislation” in the model. The first measures the propor-
tion of workers covered by collective agreements and the second is a dummy variable
which equals one if the firm considers labour regulation or the collective wage agreement
as a relevant or very relevant factor that prevents wages from being cut or frozen.61 From
Tables 4.4 and 4.5, we see that the two regressors, with the exception of ”reduce employ-
ees” are not very relevant to explain differences across firms in the use of the different
cost-cutting strategies. In the case of coverage, we see that it increases the likelihood of
a firm reducing employment, which suggests that the presence of unions does not limit
the firms’ ability to adjust the quantity margin.
Barriers to wage freezing
Efficiency wage theories and, in particular, the adverse selection model or the socio-
logical models suggested in the literature may also explain why some firms do not freeze
or cut wages in the event of negative shocks (see Katz (1986) and Campbell and Kamlani
(1997)). According to these models, firms may be very reluctant to cut back wages or
other compensation components if they think that would reduce workers effort and/or
induce workers to shirk or to leave the firm, consequently increasing monitoring, supervis-
ing and/or turnover costs. In order to capture these ideas, we included in the model the
variables ”reputation of the firm” and ”workers attraction”. These are dummy variables
which equal one if the firm considers that the negative consequences for the reputation
of the firm and the difficulties in attracting new employees are relevant or very relevant
factors that prevent cutting or freezing their nominal wages. From Tables 4.4 and 4.5,
we see that the impact of these two regressors is negative both for ”base-wage freezes”
and ”flexible margins”, which means that these two obstacles to reducing or freezing base
wages are also obstacles to reducing the ”flexible margins”. Interestingly, we notice that
these two regressors do not enter the equations for ”cheaper hires” and ”reduce employ-
ees” directly, but they exert an indirect effect on these two margins, which is particularly
significant in the case of ”reputation of the firm”. By reducing the probability of a firm
61Notice that ”legislation”, ”reputation of the firm” and ”workers attraction” are included only in the
first two equations. On the one hand, we believe that these regressors are capturing firm’s characteristics
that are expected to be more relevant for compensation related components and, on the other, by
excluding them from the other two equations, we intend to ensure proper empirical identification of the
model. See also footnote 9.
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freezing base wages or using the ”flexible margins”, this regressor indirectly increases the
probability of a firm using the margins ”cheaper hires” and ”reduce employees”.62
Other characteristics
International economic integration is likely to increase both competition and factor
substitutability, thus increasing the elasticity of labour demand and labour productivity.
Firms operating in such an environment should also feel stronger pressure to reduce costs
and thus one may expect a more intense adjustment of wages and employment in reaction
to shocks. But wage rigidity may also vary with firm size, as well as with the type of
sector in which the firm operates. If monitoring costs and/or turnover costs are higher
in larger firms (Oi (1983) and Barron et al. (1987)) such firms are more likely to pay
efficiency wages in order to reduce the probability of shirking or to avoid the hiring and
training costs and thus to exhibit stronger downward wage rigidity.
In order to account for these possibilities we included in the model the regressors
openness, size and four sectoral dummies. Openness measures the importance of exports
for the firm (is a dummy variable that equals one if the share of exports on total sales is
50 percent or higher). From Tables 4.4 and 4.5, we see that firms where exports account
for a higher share of total sales are also firms that adjust more their ”flexible margins”
and take advantage of existing ”cheaper workers”, in line with what could be expected.
From Tables 4.4 and 4.5, we conclude that large firms do not make more intensive use
of the labour cost-cutting strategies than small firms. A similar conclusion holds for the
sectoral dummies in Table 4.4, suggesting that the use of labour cost-cutting strategies
does not vary significantly across sectors, as the analysis in Section 4.4 suggested.
62In this work, we assume that bonuses and other monetary and non-monetary benefits are more
flexible than base wages. This seems a reasonable hypothesis for countries like Portugal where base
wages cannot be cut for legal reasons. However, in general, this is as debatable assumption. On the one
hand, it may be argued that benefits over which the firm has at least some discretion are likely to be
less rigid than wages because firms have more (and more subtle) ways to lower benefits than to lower
wages. It has also been suggested that one of the reasons firms provide some benefits to employees is to
reduce nominal wage rigidity (see Oyer (2005)). But, on the other hand, it may be claimed that many
of the theories suggested in the literature to justify the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity are
likely to apply to benefits too. In particular, efficiency wage theories would suggest that firms may be
very reluctant to cut back bonuses and other benefits for the reasons presented above. The estimated
results for the covariates ”reputation of the firm” and ”workers attraction” show that this type of effect
is indeed present in data. Thus, in general, whether bonuses and benefits are significantly less rigid
downwards than base wages is to be seen as an empirical matter.
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Relationships among the labour-cost cutting strategies
In general, we may expect the adjustment of a given margin to depend on the degree of
rigidity of the other margins. For instance, the probability of a firm using employment
adjustment as a reaction to a negative labour demand shock is expected to be higher
when base wages are rigid and smaller if alternative more flexible margins are available.
We start by noticing that the estimated results in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 are consistent with
the preliminary analysis presented in section 4.4. From the probit equation for ”reduce
employees”, we see that ”base-wage freezes”, ”flexible margins” and ”cheaper hires” have
been used as substitutes for employment reduction by Portuguese firms. In particular,
from Table 4.5, we conclude that the probability of a firm reducing employment is around
20 percentage points lower for a firm that has frozen base wages, around 6.4 percentage
points lower for a firm that has used the ”flexible margins” and around 6.6 percentage
points lower for a firm that has used the ”cheaper hires”.
The probability of a firm using ”cheaper hires” is around 11.6 percentage points lower
for a firm that has frozen base wages. This result suggests that ”cheaper hires” and ”base-
wage freezes” were used as substitutes by firms, i.e., ”cheaper hires” were mainly used
in situations in which firms were unable to freeze base wages following a negative labour
demand shock or to compensate abnormal or unexpected base-wage increases following
a negative labour supply shock.
In contrast, the ”flexible margins” do not emerge as substitutes to ”base-wage freezes”.
That would be the case if they had been mainly used to compensate for abnormal or
unexpected base-wage increases. Rather, the relationship between these two margins is
positive (even though not significantly so) which means that the ”flexible margins” have
been predominantly used as a complement to ”base-wage freezes” in reaction to negative
labour demand shocks.
The probability for a firm of reducing employment if it has frozen base wages and
used the ”flexible margins” is around 27 percentage points lower than for an otherwise
identical firm, and the probability for a firm of reducing employment if it has frozen base
wages and used the ”flexible margins” and the ”cheaper hires” is around 35 percentage
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points lower than for an otherwise identical firm.63
These results show that base-wage flexibility has a strong negative impact on the
probability of a firm reducing employment, and that such effect has been significantly
strengthened by the availability of alternative margins of labour cost adjustment, like the
”flexible margins” and the ”cheaper hires”.
4.6 Concluding remarks
The studies aimed at assessing the extent and the effects of nominal wage rigidities have
focused mainly on base wages or permanent wages (base wages plus the other compo-
nents that are paid regularly on a monthly basis, such as meals allowances, tenure-related
components, etc.), leaving aside potentially more flexible pay-components such as per-
formance related bonuses and other monetary and non-monetary benefits which may
strongly attenuate the negative impact on employment of base-wage rigidities.
Using survey data, this chapter investigates the implications for employment of base-
wage rigidities together with other strategies that Portuguese firms have used to cut
labour costs in the event of exogenous negative labour demand or supply shocks.
Our dataset shows that, among the firms that have reduced labour-costs, the reduc-
tion in the number of employees (”reduce employees”) was by far the most commonly
used strategy (around 72 percent of the firms) followed by the strategy ”flexible margins”,
which includes the reduction or elimination of bonus payments and other monetary bene-
fits, the reduction or elimination of non-monetary benefits and the slowdown or freezing of
the rate at which promotions are filled (around 45 percent of the firms). The recruitment
of new employees with a wage lower than the one of those who left the firm (”cheaper
hires”) was used by around 30 percent of the firms and around 26 percent of the firms
have resorted to ”base-wage freezes”.
We find significant heterogeneity in the use of each of these strategies across firms.
63These correspond to the following probabilities (not shown in Table 4.5):
Prob(y4 = 1|y1 = 1, y2 = 1, x4) - Prob(y4 = 1|y1 = 0, y2 = 0, x4) and
Prob(y4 = 1|y1 = 1, y2 = 1, y3 = 1, x4) - Prob(y4 = 1|y1 = 0, y2 = 0, y3 = 0, x4) respectively, where
y4=reduce employees, y3=cheaper hires, y2=flexible margins, y1=base-wage freezes and x4=vector of
exogenous regressors entering equation for y4.
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The use of each margin depends on several workers’ and/or firms’ attributes such as
the tenure and skills distribution, measures of the unions’ bargaining power, as well as
some indicators of the economic environment in which firms operate. In particular, firms
operating mainly in the foreign market, a more competitive environment, tend to use
some of these strategies more heavily.
The econometric results suggest that the strategy ”cheaper hires” is used as a sub-
stitute for ”base-wage freezes” by Portuguese firms, i.e., it is predominantly used in
situations in which firms do not freeze base wages after a negative labour demand shock
or to compensate abnormal or unexpected base-wage increases after a negative labour
supply shock. In contrast, the relationship between the strategies ”flexible margins” and
”base-wage freezes” is positive (even though not significantly so) which suggests that the
”flexible margins” are predominantly used as a complement to ”base-wage freezes” in
reaction to negative labour demand shocks.
We also find a clear negative association between the margin ”base-wage freezes”,
which we use as a measure of base-wage flexibility, and the strategy ”reduce employees”.
In particular, we estimate that the probability of a firm reducing employment is around
21 percentage points lower for a firm that has frozen base wages than for an otherwise
identical firm. The ability to use the ”flexible margins” or ”cheaper hires” also decreases
the probability of a firm reducing employment (between 6 and 7 percentage points).
Together, the probability for a firm of reducing employment if it uses the strategies ”base-
wage freezes”, ”flexible margins” and ”cheaper hires” is around 35 percentage points lower
than for an otherwise identical firm.
Overall, we conclude that base-wage flexibility has a strong positive impact on em-
ployment, and that such positive impact has been significantly strengthened by the pos-
sibility of firms resorting to alternative margins of labour cost adjustment, like more
flexible compensation components (bonuses, benefits and promotions) and the recruit-




Appendix - The covariates
In this Appendix, we describe the covariates used in the probit models whose results are
presented in section 4.5, and provide the corresponding summary statistics. The details
are as follows:
Tenure less than 5 years – Proportion of employees whose tenure is less than 5 years.
High-skilled blue-collar – Proportion of High-skilled blue-collar employees in total
employment.
High-skilled white-collar – Proportion of High-skilled white-collar employees in total
employment.
Permanent employees – Dummy variable that is equal to one if the proportion of
permanent workers is higher than 98 percent of total workforce.
Coverage – Dummy variable that is equal to one if the proportion of employees covered
by collective agreements is equal to 80 percent or higher.
Legislation – Dummy variable that equals one if the firm considers labour legislation
or the collective agreement as an important or very important obstacle to freeze wages
in a context where the firm needs to reduce costs.
Reputation of the firm – Dummy variable that equals one if the firm considers that
the negative impact on firm’s reputation is an important or very important obstacle to
freeze wages in a context where the firm needs to reduce costs.
Workers attraction – Dummy variable that equals one if the firm considers that the
difficulties in attracting new employees is an important or very important obstacle to
freeze wages in a context where the firm needs to reduce costs.
Openness– Dummy variable that equals one if the proportion of sales in the foreign
market is 50 percent of total sales or higher.
Size – Equal to one if the number of employees is larger than 100.
Price autonomy – Equal to one if the firm considers that it has autonomy to set
the price (as opposed to cases in which the price is regulated by an external entity, or
determined by the main competitors or main customers).
Domestic competition – Equal to one if the degrees of price competition experienced
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by the firm vis-à-vis its main product is classified as ”strong” or ”severe” (as opposed to
”weak” or ”no competition”).
Share of temporary employees – Proportion of temporary employees in total employ-
ment.
Cost price rigidity – Equal to one if the firm reacts to significant positive cost shocks
with a long lag (changes the price more than a year after the shock).
Demand price rigidity – Equal to one if the firm reacts to significant negative demand
shocks with a long lag (changes the price more than a year after the shock).
Energy – Equal to one if the firm operates in the energy sector.
Construction – Equal to one if the firm operates in the construction sector.
Trade – Equal to one if the firm operates in the trade sector.




Upward nominal wage rigidity
5.1 Introduction
The role played by labor market institutions in molding the dynamics of employment and
the structure of wages is a matter of considerable debate both empirically and conceptu-
ally. Even though there is an ample discussion about the role of labor market institutions
and its potential contribution to the sluggish adjustment of employment, there is still
scant empirical evidence at the micro level about the way collective agreements influence
firms’ hiring and firing decisions.
Many institutional factors may hamper the efficient allocation of workers and jobs.
Caballero and Hammour (2000) stress that a number of distortions in product, input,
and credit markets can introduce inefficiencies in the reallocation process. Aside from
the impact on flows stemming from quantitative restrictions on labor market adjustment,
wage-setting policies, such as legal provisions restricting wage adjustment, wage schedules
determined at the sector level, or the presence of national minimum wages also have an
impact on the reallocation.
A factor that might affect the allocation of workers and jobs is the widespread practice
of extending collective bargaining agreements to non-subscriber workers and employers.
Since these agreements establish wage floors for most job titles, their frequent extension
is equivalent to setting a wide range of compulsory minimum wages, which are regularly
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adjusted upward, even if the scope in most cases is restricted to some sectors or industries.
In some firms these extensions can result in a wage structure that may not be appropriate
for some workers, causing fewer hirings and/or added dismissals. As pointed out by Cahuc
and Zylberberg (2009) and Teulings and Hartog (2008), the potential job losses are the
result of setting wage floors above the marginal productivity for some workers in firms
that are bound by those extensions.
Legal provisions for mandatory extensions exist in several European countries such as
Spain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium, and they explain to a great
extent the large gap observed between union density and union coverage.64 The extension
of contracts is also an important feature of the Portuguese wage setting system. Martins
(2014) shows that between 2007 and 2011 around 90 percent of the sectoral collective wage
agreements in Portugal were extended by the Ministry of Employment. The extension of
collective agreements were issued almost uniformly throughout the twelve months of the
year.
The scattered timing of these extensions introduces a type of wage rigidity that is
very close to that emphasized in some macroeconomic models (Olivei and Tenreyro (2007,
2010) and Card (1990)). These models underscore the importance of the timing of col-
lective wage agreements for the employment fluctuations observed in some advanced
economies. Due to contract staggering, they show that wage rigidity is toned down in
periods when collective agreements are under negotiation, i.e. the impact of a negative
shock on employment depends on the timing of the wage negotiations. If the shock
occurs at the time of wage negotiations, the wage bargaining process can reflect the im-
pact of the shock and wages are set accordingly; if the shock occurs after wages have
been settled by contracts, wages are unable to be adjusted and the risk of job losses is
magnified. Catalán and Villanueva (2012) test this hypothesis for Spain in the period
surrounding the late-2008 economic decline. They show that the probability of job sepa-
ration increased significantly for workers covered by contracts negotiated before the drop
in economic activity. Their results also suggest that the automatic extension of collective
agreements in Spain during this period accounted for 36 percent of the increase in the
64See Visser (2013) for a comprehensive survey of wage bargaining institutions in a wide number of
developed countries.
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probability of job separation for low-skilled workers.
The impact of the (scattered) extension of collective agreements on employment is
also examined by Martins (2014). Using data for Portugal covering the period between
2007 and 2011, this study analyzes the impact on employment over the four-month period
after the extension of a collective agreement. The results show that over this time window
the total number of workers in an industry fell by 1.7 percent. The detrimental effect of
these extensions on employment is driven to a large extent by the fall in firms’ hirings
and not by an increase in separations, which remain largely unaffected. On the other
hand, non-formal employment (the so-called service providers), which is not subject to
the extension of wage floors, increased by 1.1 percent. In complement to this exercise the
study also examines the impact of the extension of collective agreements on firm entry and
exit. The evidence suggests that the entry of new firms is not affected by the extension
of collective agreements, while the number of firms that leave an industry increases by 4
percent.
This work examines the microeconomic link between the increase in wage floors
through automatic extension and the employment outcomes. As in Martins (2014),it
is measured the impact on firms’ hirings and separations, and the probability of closure
resulting from firms’ obligations to adjust their wages upward in order to comply with
the new wage floors. This phenomenon will be called upward nominal wage rigidity.
However, unlike the approach followed by Martins (2014), the focus in not on the timing
of the extensions but on the magnitude of their impact on each particular firm. For this
purpose for each firm (on the basis of each job title) it is computed the increase in the
total wage bill necessary to comply with new collective wage agreement (implied wage
bill growth).
The impact of the upward nominal wage rigidity on each particular firm is conditional
on its workers’ position in the wage distribution. In each firm we can distinguish two
major groups of workers: those who are already collecting a base wage equal to or above
the newly-agreed wage floor and whose contribution to the implied wage bill growth is
zero; and those who are receiving a base wage that is below the new wage floor and whose
contribution to the implied wage bill growth is the difference between their current base
wage and the new wage floor. The impact of increasing the wage floors is potentially more
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acute in firms with a greater fraction of the latter group of workers. Our approach differs
from that of Martins (2014) also because Martins assumes that the impact of extensions
is homogeneous for all workers in the same industry.
In the second part of the study a different but somewhat complementary exercise is
performed. The analysis will be restricted to the newly-hired workers, i.e. workers with
job tenure of less than one year. Most micro-level empirical research aimed at analyzing
the degree of wage rigidity has been mostly concerned with wage changes of individual
employees. This invariably restricts the focus of analysis to wages in ongoing employment
relationships (see Haefke et al. (2007)). In contrast, the degree of rigidity of wages of
newly-hired workers has received much less attention, despite the recognized importance
of wages of this particular labor force group for job creation and for understanding the
behavior of wages over the business cycle (see Pissarides (2009) and Galuscak et al.
(2012)): newly-hired workers are the “marginal” workers that affect the decision of firms
to create new jobs.65
The purpose of this exercise is to identify the extent to which firms’ insider forces
are important for the determination of wages of newly-hired workers. Bils et al. (2014)
provide empirical evidence supporting the notion that the wages of new hires are partially
determined by the prevailing wages of stayers. As Blanchard and Summers (1987) point
out, if wage changes are essentially determined by insider factors (such as the internal
wage schedule or the wages of workers with the same qualifications), this may generate
hysteresis in the economy, so that the impact of shocks may last for long periods. We
first analyze the relative importance of internal factors vis-à-vis the external factors (such
as the wages of workers with similar qualifications and experience or the availability of
workers with similar characteristics in the labor market) in the determination of entry
wages. We then investigate the impact of the external wages on job flows (i.e. hirings
and separations) of newly-hired workers as well as on the probability of firm closure.
65Most empirical research that distinguishes entry wages from wages of ongoing jobs focuses on their
different behaviour over the business cycle. Such studies show that wages of newly-hired workers are
considerably more volatile that the wages of incumbent workers. However, since the number of workers
in ongoing jobs is higher than the number of new hires, the aggregate wage invariably becomes rigid.
These studies have highlighted the idea that the wage response to aggregate labor conditions differs
considerably between workers in ongoing jobs and newly-hired workers. Carneiro et al. (2012) use
matched employer-employee data for Portugal 1986-2005 and find that after controlling for both firm
and worker heterogeneity, entry wages are much more procyclical than wages of ongoing jobs.
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The remainder of this work is structured as follows. A description of the main in-
stitutional characteristics of the wage setting process in Portugal is presented in Section
5.2. Section 5.3 describes the main features of the database used and explain how the key
variables were obtained. Section 5.4 looks closely at the employment effects of increases
in the wage floors for each specific job title and estimates the impact of externally driven
wage increases on the probability of firm exit. Section 5.5 attempts to disentangle the
internal and external drivers of the wages of newly-hired workers in order to reveal the
link between external (internal) wages and job flows. Finally, Section 5.6 summarizes the
main results of this research and suggests some of their implications.
5.2 Institutional Wage Setting in Portugal
This section succinctly describes some of the main institutional characteristics of the
wage setting process in Portugal.
The Portuguese Constitution provides the legal principles of collective bargaining and
grants unions the power to negotiate. The effects of the agreements are formally recog-
nized and considered valid sources of labor law. Concerning the bargaining mechanisms,
two regimes can be distinguished: the conventional regime and the mandatory regime.
Conventional bargaining results from the direct negotiation between employers’ and work-
ers’ representatives. A mandatory regime, on the other hand, does not result from direct
bargaining between workers and employers, but is instead dictated by the Ministry of
Employment. The systematic extension of industry-wide agreements by the Ministry of
Employment is the most important mechanism shaping the formation of wages. Indeed,
even though by law the collective agreement only binds the trade union members and
the employer associations’ affiliated firms that are parties to the agreement, there is no
legal mechanism that obliges the trade unions and the employers association to reveal
their constituency. This legal conundrum is almost always circumvented by extending the
agreement to the whole sector through the use of the so-called “portarias de extensão”.66
66Article 514 of the Portuguese labor code states that “a collective agreement [...] in force can be
applied, entirely or partly, by an extension ordnance to employers and employees in the economic activity
and profession considered in the collective agreement. The extension is possible after weighting the social
and economic circumstances that may justify it, in particular the identity or economic social similarity
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This means that wage agreements reached by trade unions and employers’ associations
with even very low representation have a strong impact in setting wage floors.67 Indeed,
in any given year collective bargaining sets around 30,000 minimum wages that corre-
spond to 30,000 job-titles (see Carneiro et al. (2014), Torres et al. (2013), and Martins
(2014)).
Since most collective agreements are industry-wide, covering companies with very dif-
ferent sizes and economic conditions, their contents tend to be general, setting minimum
working conditions, especially the base monthly wage for each category of workers, over-
time pay and the normal duration of work. Underlying the bargaining process there is a
mandatory minimum monthly wage that sets the floor for wage negotiations.68 National
legal minimum wages and pervasive wage floors set by collective bargaining coupled with
the legal prohibition of nominal wage cuts (that survives since the 1950s) creates a de
facto situation of extreme nominal wage rigidity. In the context of the high inflation
regime that characterized Portugal in the 1980s and 1990s, this restriction was not bind-
ing in real terms, as adjustments in real wages could be achieved by raising nominal wages
at a rate below the inflation rate, or for firms paying wages above the corresponding new
minimum, by reducing the wage drift. In such a setting, the higher the inflation rate the
greater the leeway for manipulating the real wage.
However, in the current low-inflation regime nominal wage rigidity becomes an active
restriction. Indeed, in this environment employers’ response on the wage margin is limited
to the possibility of reducing the wage drift or going for the lowest nominal wage increase
possible, ultimately freezing wages. Hence, in a low-inflation regime negative shocks are
expected to shift the employment distribution of nominal wage adjustment toward zero,
the magnitude of real wage adjustment being conditional on the inflation rate. This is,
in fact, what is observed during the current recession, in which the wage response is
of the cases in the extension and the underlying collective agreement.”
67In 2012 a Government resolution stated that the extension would be possible only when the em-
ployers’ subscribers to the agreements employ at least 50% of the workers of the relevant economic
sector.
68Currently there is a unique legal minimum wage that applies to all workers. Workers formally
classified as apprentices receive just 80% of the full rate. The minimum wage is updated annually by
the parliament, under government proposal. Decisions on the level of the minimum wage are made on
a discretionary basis, usually taking into account past and predicted inflation and after consulting the
trade unions.
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characterized as in the past by no (or limited) nominal negative variations (measured
from base pay), but a much greater likelihood than in the past that wage variations
are zero; there is also a salient move toward zero in the distribution of wage variations,
corresponding approximately to the expected inflation rate and accentuating even more
the low distribution spread.69
5.3 Dataset
5.3.1 Personnel Tables (Quadros de Pessoal)
The data used in this study come from a longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset
known as the Tables of Personnel (Quadros de Pessoal). This unique dataset was created
by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment and is constructed from a mandatory annual
survey addressed to firms with wage earners. It has been conducted every year since 1986
with the exception of 1990 and 2001. The survey covers various firm and establishment
characteristics, as well as a set of characteristics of the workforce. Being compulsory, it
does not suffer from the non-response problems that often plague standard household and
firm surveys. Furthermore, the survey covers almost all Portuguese employees, excluding
only Public Administration.
The dataset includes information on the establishment (establishment identifier, loca-
tion, industry, and employment), the firm (firm identifier, location, industry, legal form,
ownership, year of start-up, employment, sales, and capital), and its worker (social secu-
rity identifier, gender, age, education, skills, occupation, employment status, professional
level, seniority, earnings, normal and overtime hours, time elapsed since the last promo-
tion, and classification in the collective bargaining agreement).
69Dias et al. (2013) show that besides freezing the base wages, Portuguese firms make frequent use of
a number of labor cost-cutting strategies, like freezing or cutting bonuses and other monetary or non-
monetary benefits, slowing down or freezing the rate at which promotions are filled, or recruiting new
employees at wages lower than those received by the employees that have left the firm. They provide
evidence that the availability of these alternative labor-cost adjustment margins that firms can use in
bad times makes dismissals a less likely outcome.
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5.3.2 Bargained wage floor
The unique characteristics of our dataset with detailed information about the job title
structure within each collective wage agreement provide the means to calculate with a
great level of accuracy the bargained wage floor. The bargained wage floor for a given
job title - a key variable in this study - is proxied by the modal base wage for each job
title within each collective agreement. As shown in Cardoso and Portugal (2005), the
mode of the distribution of the base wage corresponds with remarkable accuracy to the
contractual wage set by collective bargaining.
5.3.3 Sample definition and general variables
The sample covers the period from 1986 to 2009, excluding the years in which the Per-
sonnel Tables have been discontinued (1990 and 2001). For the purposes of this study
a subset of variables was selected, certain new variables created, and some observations
removed. The final set of variables retained for analysis is given in Table 5.9 in Appendix
A. A number of general restrictions were placed on the data used throughout the study.
Given the specific purpose of this investigation (i.e. the impact of externally-set wage
increases), the analysis excludes firms that apply firm-level agreements. In addition, the
data exclude those individuals who were not working full time, who were aged less than
18 years and more than 60 years, who earned a nominal wage less than 80 percent of the
legal minimum wage in each year or above the 99.9 percent quantile in each year, and
who recorded errors in admission/birth dates, duplicate social security codes or other
errors in their social security codes.70
The analysis performed herein examines the impact of extensions upon workers flows
(hirings, separations and the net job creation), as well as upon the probability of firm
exit (failure). Both hirings and separations were computed on the basis of social security
identifiers: hirings correspond to the number of new social security identifiers reported
by firms in each year (i.e. workers that are new in the database in a given year), whereas
separations are the number of social security identifiers that were reported by firms in
70Individuals employed outside of mainland Portugal and those in agriculture, hunting, forestry, and
fishing (as well as misclassified industries) were also excluded.
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the previous year but not in the current year (i.e. workers that left the database in
the current year). Both variables are divided by the number of workers in the previous
year (hiring rate and separation rate). The net job creation rate is simply the difference
between the hiring rate and the separation rate. The variable “failure” that is used to
gauge the impact of extensions on the probability of firm closure is a binary variable that
is equal to 1 in year t for firms whose individual identifier left the database in that year
and 0 otherwise.
5.3.4 Specific sample restrictions and variables
In Section 5.4 is measured the employment effects of increases in the wage floors for each
specific job title on the basis of a variable called implied wage bill growth. This variable
is computed in the following way. For each firm based on each job title within the firm
we calculate the increase between the actual base wage at time t and the new bargained
wage floor set by the collective wage agreement for t+1 (i.e. the increase in the wage bill
necessary to comply with the new collective agreement). The implied wage bill growth
corresponds to the aggregation of these changes for each firm assuming that the job title
structure remains unchanged between year t and year t+1. In the imputation of the wage
bill growth we exclude values above the 90th percentile to minimize measurement errors.
Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of the implied wage bill growth weighted by the number
of workers. The average implied wage bill growth in the sample period is 3.2 percent.
5.4 The impact of the upward nominal wage rigidity
on job flows and firm closures
This section closely looks at the employment effects of increases in the wage floors for
each specific job-title. For this purpose we compute for each firm, based on each job title
within the firm, the increase in the wage bill necessary to comply with the new collective
agreement. For this we took the job-title structure of the workforce of form i at year t,
and assuming that the same exact job-title structure would prevail at year t+1, obtained
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of the implied wage bill growth weighted by the number of
workers
the increases in the base wage that would place those workers at the new wage floors,
and aggregated all positive wage increases to define the implied wage bill growth. At this
stage it is worth mentioning that there are potentially two types of workers: workers who
are already collecting a wage equal to or above the newly-agreed wage. In this case the
contribution to the implied wage bill growth will be zero; workers who are receiving a
base wage that is below the new minimum. In this case, the contribution is, of course,
the difference between the current base wage and the new wage floor.71
Within each firm both cases are possible. The larger the fraction of workers that are
paid below the new job title wage floor, the larger will be the implied wage bill growth.
Collective agreements that settle higher wage increases will also, of course, engender
higher wage bill increases. The implied wage bill growth is our critical treatment variable.
The identification of the employment effects of these externally imposed wage changes
depends, of course, on the past wage policy of the firm, the job title structure of the
workforce, and the size of the newly agreed wage floor increases. In this sense, this
methodology is a straightforward generalization of the one suggested by Abowd et al.
71In our sample, on average 67 percent the workers receive wages below the new minimum wage: 25
percent are paid exactly at the current minimum, 22 percent receive a wage between the current and the
new minimum, and 20 percent are even paid below the current wage floor.
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(2000) to study the impact of minimum wage increases in France and the USA. Portugal
and Cardoso (2006) exploit a similar strategy to analyze the impact of a subminimum
wage hike on the workers’ accession and separation rates.
To measure the effect of an increase in the wage bill implied by the updating of the
wage floors settled by collective agreement on net job creation, we specified a simple labor
demand equation in first differences:
△yft = ξ△wbft +△x
′
ftβ + λt + εft (1)
where △yft stands for the net job creation rate, hiring rate, or separation rate in
firm f at time t. △wbft represents the implied wage bill growth, x
′
ft denotes a vector of
explanatory variables (firm age, change in the market share and change in base wages),
λt represents a set of time (yearly) effects, and εft is a conventional error term.
The results provided in the firsts columns of Table 5.1 suggest a modest impact on
the net job creation rate resulting from externally driven changes in the wage bill of the
firms. According to our estimates, a 10 percent (real) increase in the wage bill leads
to an employment decrease of 1.5 percentage points. The presence of firm’s age, firm’s
average base wage, and firm’s market share are not especially revealing but their inclusion
(or exclusion) does not materially change the estimates of the implied wage bill growth
regression coefficient. The estimates shown for the determinants of the hiring rate and
the separation rate indicate that the impact of exogenous changes in wages produced via
changes in collective agreements is largely driven by increases in separation rates (which
increase by 1.56 percentage points in response to a 10 percent increase in the wage bill)
rather than by decreases in hiring rates.
So far, we have taken the (job title specific) wage floors settled at the bargaining table
as largely exogenous to the firm. But at least some firms are represented in the bargaining
process. Since we cannot identify which firms are part of the bargaining and which are
excluded, we still face endogeneity issues. One way to circumvent this problem is to
account in the estimation for distinct time trend with each contract. A fully flexible way
to proceed is simply to include a full set of contract/year dummies, removing (filtering)
contract heterogeneity and contract time variation from the estimation. That is, the
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Table 5.1: The impact of increases in bargained wage floors on firms’ net job creation
OLS estimates
Dependent variables
Net job creation Hiring rate Separation rate

































number of firms 851,829 1,068,782 851,829 1,068,782 998,562 1,483,802
number of workers 8,382,456 9,372,755 8,382,456 9,372,755 9,035,794 10,253,881
yearly dummies Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Results are weighted by firms’ size based on the number of
employees.
The sample excludes firms that apply firm-level collective agreements.
The original database covers the period from 1986 to 2009 (excepting 1990 and 2001). However,
some years had to be excluded for estimation purposes (1986, 1989, 1999, 2000 and 2002) given the
formulation of the dependent variables.
The “implied wage bill growth” for each firm results from the aggregation of the changes between the
actual base wage at time t and the new wage floor set by the collective wage agreement for t+1 for
all workers in the firm assuming that the job title structure remains unchanged. In the imputation
of the wage bill growth we exclude values above the 90th percentile to minimize measurement errors.
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Table 5.2: The impact of increases in bargained wage floors on firms’ net job creation
least square dummy variable estimates
Dependent variables
Net job creation Hiring rate Separation rate

































number of firms 606,218 859,698 606,218 859,698 727,728 1,086,673
number of workers 2,293,543 2,951,842 2,293,543 2,951,482 2,568,741 3,406,289
collective wage agreements × year(s) dummies YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Results are weighted by firms’ size based on the number of employees.
See notes to Table 5.1 for additional details.
estimating equation is now:
△yft = ξ△wbft +△x
′
ftβ + λct + εft (2)
where λct identifies the collective agreement ruling the bargained wages of firm f at
time t.
Proceeding in this way we obtained the results shown in Table 5.2. The coefficients
on the implied wage bill growth suggest a strong impact on the net job creation rate
resulting from externally driven changes in the wage bill. However, differently from what
we found before the estimates shown for the determinants of the hiring rate and the
separation rate now indicate that the impact of exogenous changes in wages produced
via changes in collective agreements is now largely driven by decreases in the hiring rate
(which decrease by 1.27 percentage points in response to a 10 percent increase in the
wage bill) rather than by increases in separation rates. These results are consistent with
those provided by Martins (2014), despite the use of distinct identification strategies.
A frequently neglected dimension of the employment adjustment is its corresponding
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extensive margin, that is, the entry and exit of firms (Addison et al. (2014)). In the
current exercise any attempt to guess the effect of collective bargaining on the entry
rates of firms would be a “tour de force”, despite the potential importance of such an
inquiry. Nonetheless, our sampling plan allows us to estimate how externally driven wage
increases impact the probability of firm exit. To this end we specified a simple probit
regression model taking the same covariates as before.
The regression results on the determinants of the failure of firms are given in Table
5.3. The main thrust of the estimation is the indication that the estimate of the quasi-
elasticity of labor demand through firm closure is equal to 0.67, meaning that a 1 percent
increase in the wage bill generated by the increase in the bargained wage floor increases
the probability of firm closure by 0.67 percentage points. This appears to be a fairly
sizeable effect, since the average failure rate in the current sample is around 11 percent
(see Table 5.10 in Appendix A).
Table 5.3: The impact of increases in bargained wage floors on
the probability of firm closure
probit estimates
Dependent variable: failure
Probit estimates Marginal effects



























number of firms 659,309 901,956 659,309 901,956
collective wage agreements × year(s) dummies YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
“Failure” is a binary variable that is equal to 1 for firms whose indi-
vidual identifier left the database and 0 otherwise.
See notes to Table 5.1 for additional details.
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5.5 The impact of external wages on hirings and sep-
arations of newly-hired workers
5.5.1 How important are external wages for the determination
of wages of newly-hired workers
So far we have focused on the wage behavior of workers that were assumed to stay in the
same firm, that is, of (potential) job stayers. Given the nature of the exercise we neglected
by construction the wage behavior of new hires. But as discussed above, the determinants
of entry wages are critical at both the theoretical and the empirical levels. In this section
we shall attempt to disentangle the internal from external drivers of the wages of newly-
hired workers. Once we succeed distinguishing between firms with different degrees of
externally (internally) driven entry wages, we should be able to unveil the link between
external (internal) wages and job flows.
The importance of internal wages driving entry wages has a number of implications.
First, it may signify that firms more often than not choose to negotiate entry wages
above the wage floors defined by the collective agreements. This may be due to fairness
considerations or other strategic considerations (e.g., incentive contracting). In any case,
such a finding would provide direct empirical evidence supporting the notion that the
wages of new hires are partially determined by the prevailing wages of stayers, as hinted
at in Bils et al. (2014). Second, by negotiating wages above the external option of the
worker, those firms are more likely to avoid worker turnover and retain those workers,
therefore decreasing worker separations. Third, because a significant fraction of firms
offer wages above the minimum defined at the bargaining table (typically sectoral), they
may benefit from the wage cushion (Cardoso and Portugal (2005)) engendered by the
difference between the actual wage paid and the bargained wage. Confronted with a
negative shock in the product demand or in the costs of inputs, those firms may better
adjust through wages than firms that are remunerating their workers at the established
minimum.
If this argument has some value, one should expect lower failure rates and less em-
ployment volatility among firms that are less constrained by external wages. On the other
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hand, if the bargaining power of the workers, that is, the union power, is strong enough,
wage floors agreed through collective negotiations may not leave space for firms to settle
wages above the external wages. In this case, where external wages are binding (as in,
for example, Dolado et al. (1997) for unskilled workers) the wage cushion will be small
and the firms may lack room for maneuver to successfully adjust to negative product
demand shocks. Fourth, there is convincing empirical evidence showing that that the
wage policy of the firms is notoriously heterogeneous. The fact that firm fixed effects
account for a large fraction of the wage variation (Torres et al. (2013)) is a clear sign that
firms often cannot be taken as wage takers. Webber (2013) argues forcefully that the
labor supply elasticities faced by the firms are relatively low, indicating that firms detain
significant monopsony power (Manning (2003)). If, indeed, monopsony power plays an
important role, it should influence the relative strength of internal and external factors
in the determination of wages.
To better understand the nexus between entry wages and employment adjustments,
we first provide a measure of the importance of inside and outside wages to next in-
vestigate, as before, the impact of externally driven wages on job flows. The exercise
is restricted to the newly-hired workers, i.e. workers with a job tenure of less than 12
months. Furthermore, the analysis is also restricted to those cases where for each newly-
hired worker there is at least one worker in the same firm and job title but with a job
tenure of more than 12 months. A minimum of 10 hirings over the entire period is also
imposed as a threshold for a firm to be included in the sample. In order to disentangle
the internal from the external drivers of the wages of newly-hired workers, for each newly-
hired worker in a particular firm we compute an internal wage and an external wage. The
latter is simply the bargained wage floor that corresponds to the job title of the new hire
in each year, whereas the internal wage is the modal base wage of all ongoing workers in
the same job title, firm and year.
The way we measure the relative importance of internal and external wages driving
the wages of new hires is simple but unconventional. In essence, what we do is run a
regression of the entry wage on the internal and external wages as well as on a set of
time dummies. Because we need to distinguish the wage policy of the firms, we allow
the regression coefficients on the two wage regressors to change from one firm to another.
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In other words, the model we wish to estimate relates the entry wages of workers to the









f + αf + λt + εifjt (3)
where wifjt is the (log of) entry wage of worker i in firm f , in job j at time t, w
I
fjt is
the corresponding “internal” wage (the modal wage of ongoing workers in the same job
title, firm and year) and wofjt is the “external” wage (the bargained wage floor for the
same job title and year). The αf is a standard firm fixed-effect that accounts for unique
firm (or industry) characteristics that affect all entry wages alike (firm internal organiza-
tion, higher productivity, etc) and λt is a time fixed effect. Note that the β coefficients
in the above equation are specific to each firm, reflecting the fact that firms place differ-
ent weights on “internal” and “external” wages when setting entry level wages. Direct
estimation of the above model cannot be implemented using the standard procedure to
deal with a model with one fixed effect. In Appendix B we detail the procedure to find
the exact least squares solution for the parameters of the above model.
The regression coefficients of the (internal and external) wage variables can straight-
forwardly be interpreted as the weights attached to such drivers in the formation of
starting wages.72 Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the distribution of both the internal wage and
external wage fixed effects, whereas Table 5.4 illustrates how the mean of the distribution
for the external wage fixed effect varies according to gender, sector, and worker age.
Results from Table 5.4 show that firm internal wage structure is relatively more im-
portant for the determination of wages of new workers: It accounts on average for 56
percent of the determination of base wages of newly-hired workers. However, the impor-
tance of externally-set wages is far from being negligible, as it accounts on average for 31
percent.
72To mitigate the unavoidable sampling error that result from firms with very low recruitments, we
excluded weights below zero and above one.
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Table 5.4: The determinants of wages of newly-hired workers
internal vs. external factors
Internal External Number of
wage wage recruitments
Full sample 0.562 0.312 1,454,695
Men 0.571 0.309 894,157
Women 0.547 0.319 560,538
Manufacturing 0.554 0.334 444,129
Construction 0.585 0.341 280,846
Non-financial business services 0.548 0.277 417,259
Financial services 0.418 0.520 41,710
Trade 0.595 0.273 260,728
Workers older than 30 0.566 0.311 613,182
Workers under the age of 30 0.559 0.314 841,513
The “external wage” for a given newly-hired worker is the bargained
wage floor for the corresponding job title and year, whereas the “inter-
nal wage” is the modal base wage of all ongoing workers in the same
job title, firm and year. In both cases the values are expressed in loga-
rithms.
The sample excludes firms that apply firm-level collective agreements.
Observations: 1,454,695 newly hired workers.
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of the internal
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external wage fixed−effect
Figure 5.3: Distribution of the external
wage fixed-effect (weighted by the number
of recruitments)
5.5.2 How externally-set wages impact on firms’ hirings and
separations of newly-hired workers
The importance attached to the role of internal wages seems to vindicate the notion that
entry wages are largely driven by the wages of job stayers, as forcefully argued by Bils
et al. (2014). More generally, it is also consistent with the hysteresis story of Blanchard
and Summers (1987). Galuscak et al. (2012) using survey data for 15 European countries
provide evidence that suggests that the internal pay structure is more important for
determining hiring wages than the external wage constraints. However, from the evidence
that internal wages are good predictors of the wages of new hires it cannot be concluded
that external wage constraints, such as those defined by wage floors, do not play a role.
To shed some light on this issue we estimate a regression model on the determinants of
job flows. In particular, we specified the following equation:
△yft = θewf +△x
′
ftβ + λt + εft (4)
where ewf is the estimated external wage weight for firm f obtained from equation 3,
that is β̂of . As before, △yft stands for the net job creation rate, hiring rate, or separation
rate in firm f at time t, x′ft denotes a vector of explanatory variables, λt represents a set
117
5.5. The impact of external wages on hirings and separations of newly-hired workers
Table 5.5: The impact of externally set wages on firms’ net job creation
OLS estimates
Dependent variables
Hiring rate Separation rate Net job creation rate






























number of firms 271,625 182,879 271,625 182,879 271,625 182,879
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Results are weighted by the recruitments in each
firm.
The sample excludes firms that apply firm-level collective agreements.
The “external wage weight” measures the contribution of external wages (see definitions
above) to the formation of entry wages. To mitigate the unavoidable sampling error that
result from firms with very low recruitments, we excluded weights below zero and above
one.
of time (yearly) effects, and εft is a conventional error term.
The estimation results are shown in Table 5.5. Here the critical parameter is the
regression coefficient for the external wage variable: a 10 percent increase in the external
wage weight generates a tiny 0.3 percentage point decrease in the net job creation rate.
Interestingly this result is now largely driven by the sizeable hiring rate decrease (-0.7
percentage points), because the impact on separation rates is negative (-0.4 percentage
points).
When we turn our attention to the effect of external wages on the failure rate, we find
that firms whose wage policies are more driven by external wages face higher probabilities
of failure, but this effect is small. A 10 percent increase in the external wage weight is
associated with a 0.1 percentage point increase in the probability of firm closure (Table
5.6).
A thorny problem that emerges from our approach comes directly from the assump-
tion that the wage policy of the firm is exogenous. The notion that the wage policy of
the firm regarding the definition of entry wages is independent from the error term is
clearly questionable, to say the least. Whereas the definition of the external wages is
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Table 5.6: The impact of externally set wages on the
probability of failure
Dependent variable: failure
Probit estimates Marginal effects




























number of firms 182,879 271,625 182,879 271,625
yearly dummies YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The sample excludes firms that apply firm-level collective agree-
ments.
“Failure” is a binary variable that is equal to 1 for firms whose
individual identifier left the database and 0 otherwise.
See notes to Table 5.5 for additional details.
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largely exogenous to the firm, the decision to pay above the external wage floors can
hardly be argued to be exogenous. Fortunately we can rely on the information regarding
the identification of each collective agreement that binds each firm to construct a valid
instrument. In other words, we shall replace the external weight variable by its estimated
value from an auxiliary regression that simply regresses the external weight on a set of
dummy variables identifying the ruling wage agreement. The estimating equation is now:
△yft = θêwf +△x
′
ftβ + λt + εft (5)
where ˆewf is the predicted estimated external wage weight for firm f obtained from an
auxiliary regression that regresses the external wage weight on a set of dummy variables
identifying the ruling wage agreement.
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 exhibit the results from this two-stage approach. Now the regres-
sion coefficient for the external wage variable is -0.13, which means that a 10 percent
increase in the external wage weight generates a 1.3 percentage point decrease in the
net job creation rate. As before, this result is largely driven by the sizeable hiring rate
decrease (-1.7 percentage points), because the impact on separation rates is small and
negative (-0.4 percentage points). More generally, these results clearly indicate that the
internal and external wage weights contain relevant information that can help us to pre-
dict employment outcomes. The impact of the external wage weight on firms’ failure
is greater than in the previous formulation: a 10 percent increase in the external wage
weight is associated with a 1.1 percentage point increase in the probability of firm closure
(Table 5.8).
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Table 5.7: The impact of externally set wages on firms’ net job creation
instrumental variable estimates
Dependent variables
Hiring rate Separation rate Net job creation rate






























number of firms 271,625 182,879 271,625 182,879 271,625 182,879
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Results are weighted by the number of recruitments
in each firm.
The sample excludes firms that apply firm-level collective agreements.
The “external wage weight estimate” is the predicted estimated external wage weight for each firm
obtained from an auxiliary regression that regresses the external wage weight on a set of dummy
variables identifying the ruling wage agreement.




Probit estimates Marginal effects





























Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
Failure is a binary variable that is equal to 1 for firms whose individual
identifier left the database and 0 otherwise.




Every year in Portugal collective agreements update the wage floors of around 30,000
job titles (Carneiro et al. (2014), Torres et al. (2013), and Martins (2014)). Given the
widespread use of extension mechanisms (“portarias de extensão”), the coverage of those
“minimum wages” is close to 90 percent of all dependent workers in the private sector.
This occurs despite the fact that the union density rates are very low (around 10 percent
according to Portugal and Vilares (2013)).
This means that in the Portuguese labor market firms confront not only severe down-
ward nominal wage rigidity because nominal wage cuts are forbidden (Dickens et al.
(2007)), but also because what we tentatively call “upward nominal wage rigidity”. This
phenomenon is similar in nature to the frictions generated by nationwide mandatory min-
imum wages, in the sense that many firms are forced to increase their wages to comply
with the updated wage agreements.
In this study we explore an unusually rich matched employer-employee data set, one
that provides for each worker the identification of the collective agreement (and the
corresponding job title) binding the formation of base wages. In this setup we estimate
for each firm the wage bill growth that is implied by the signature of a new contract.
We then present evidence showing that the firms that are more strongly affected by the
change in the bargained wage floors increase their separation rates and, more importantly,
significantly decrease their hiring rates, leading to fairly sizeable higher job destruction
rates. Furthermore, higher wage impacts are also associated with greater failure rates of
firms. These results are consistent with those provided by Martins (2014) and Catalán
and Villanueva (2012), despite their use of distinct identification strategies.
When we focused on the stock of employed workers, we observe the impact of exter-
nally driven wage increases being largely concentrated on (lower) worker accessions. This
is also true if we restrict the analysis to the newly-hired. Indeed, when we look at the
determinants of the wages of new hires, what we see is that the role of external wages is
more intense among (lower) worker accessions.
The set of empirical results collected in the current essay call into question the func-
tionality of the architecture of the Portuguese wage setting system. In particular, it
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raises very serious concerns with respect to the widespread use of extension mechanisms.
Also, the limited role played by the workers councils in the Portuguese legal framework
seriously dampens any moves toward a decentralized (firm based) system of wage negoti-
ations. Furthermore, given the low representativeness of the unions and of the employer
associations, it may well be possible that higher wage firms and higher wage workers
engage in a strategic behavior, seeking to avoid the competition of lower wage firms and
lower wage workers.
In this framework it seems to be justified to limit the extension of wage agreements to
criteria based on the representativeness of the negotiation partners, as recently approved
in Portugal. The praised German experience (Dustmann et al. (2014)) favoring opting
out clauses and decentralized mechanisms where worker councils play an important role
should also be given serious consideration, even though the governance structure of the
Portuguese system of industrial relations is, unlike the German one, firmly rooted in
legislation and overwhelmingly governed by the political process.
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Appendix A - Description of variables
Table 5.9: Description of the variables used in the models
Variables Description
Hiring rate number of new social security identifiers reported by firms in each year
divided by the number of workers in the previous year
Separation rate number of social security identifiers that were reported by firms in the
previous year but not in the current year divided by the number of
workers in the previous year
Net job creation rate difference between the hiring rate and the separation rate
Failure binary variable that is equal to 1 in a given year t for firms whose
individual identifier left the database in that year and 0 otherwise
Implied wage sum for each firm of the changes between the new wage floor set by
bill growth the collective wage agreement for t+1 and the current base wage at time t
for all workers, assuming that the job title structure remains unchanged
External wage weight contribution of external wages to the formation of entry wages; it is the
coefficient of the external wage that results from a model that regresses
entry wages on the internal and external wages in the same job title
External wage weight estimate predicted estimated external wage weight for each firm obtained from
an auxiliary regression that regresses the external wage weight on a set
of dummy variables identifying the ruling wage agreement
Firm age number of years since start-up expressed in logs
△market share difference between the log of the market share in time t and the log of
the market share in t-1; market share calculated as the share of firms’
sales in the 5-digit sector
△firm size difference between the number of workers in time t and the number of
workers in time t-1 (number of workers in logs).
△base wages difference between the log of base wages in time t and the log of base
wages in t-1
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Table 5.10: Descriptive statistics
Full sample Newly-hired workers
Model of section 5.4 Model of section 5.5
mean std. error mean std. error
net job creation 0.002 0.279 0.056 0.241
hiring rate 0.210 0.291 0.335 0.244
separation rate 0.206 0.305 0.279 0.217
failure rate 0.115 0.320 0.016 0.125
implied wage bill growth 0.024 0.023 - -
external wage weight - - 0.313 0.227
△ market share 0.000 0.019 0.002 0.073
△ base wages 0.055 0.176 0.055 0.136
firm age 2.100 0.836 2.972 0.988
△ firm size 0.021 0.461 0.098 0.456
firms×years 1,311,160 271,625
Firm age is expressed in logs; △base wages, △market share and △firm
size are expressed as difference in logs.
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Appendix B - Least squares solution to the model pre-
sented in Section 5.5
The estimation of the model shown in section 5.5 cannot be implemented using the
standard procedure to deal with a model with one fixed effect. This is because the
number of β coefficients that would need to be estimated (2 × 15, 787) is too large to
allow for the application of the within estimator. However, it is still possible to find the
exact least squares solution to the model (equation 3).
The trick is to estimate the model in two steps making use of the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell
(FWL) theorem and the fact that for a subset of variables the firm-level observations are
independent. In the first step we expurgate from wifjt and xt the effect of the other
variables in the model. This amounts to calculating the residual of regressions on wIfjt
and wojt for each individual firm. Then we regress the residual of wifjt on the residual of









jt again for each individual firm.
The constant term on firm level regressions are the OLS estimates of the αf and the
standard errors obtained by this procedure are correct as long as we adjust the degrees
of freedom.73
73The Stata user-written program regintfe programmed by one of the authors implements this method.




This dissertation uncovered a number of new facts about the degree and sources of nom-
inal price and wage rigidities in Portugal. It used two unique micro level datasets: a
firm-level survey covering the most important sectors of the economy and a large longi-
tudinal matched employer-employee dataset known as the Tables of Personnel.
In terms of price setting, the results presented in chapter 2 show that degree of price
rigidity – measured by the time lags of price reaction to shocks – varies substantially
across sectors and depends on market, product, and firm characteristics, such as the
intensity of competition, the cost structure of the firm, the type of pricing policy, or the
type of good. In particular, firms which discriminate prices, do quantity discounts or
operate in more competitive environments tend to react faster to shocks than otherwise
similar firms. I interpret these findings as support of the predictions of models of optimal
price setting like the ones suggested in Barro (1972), Caballero (1989) or Alvarez et al.
(2011).
The type of price reviewing strategy followed by firms (time-dependent or state-
dependent) is also an indication about the degree of price rigidity. In the presence of
frequent shocks, time-dependent price reviewing rules (e.g. annually, monthly,...) might
lead to stickier prices than a state-dependent/contingent behaviour, provided that the
time frame is quite large and the cost of changing prices low enough. Indeed, the re-
sults presented in chapter 3 show that the frequency of price changes and the speed of
price reaction to shocks of time-dependent firms are significantly lower than that of state-
dependent firms. In line with the evidence found in other countries, Portuguese firms are
strongly heterogeneous as regards their price-reviewing strategies: 32 percent of the firms
follow time-dependent, 43 percent follow state-dependent and the remaining 25 percent
follow time- and state-dependent price-reviewing strategies.
The fact that the frequency of price changes and the speed of price reaction to shocks
depend on whether firms follow time-dependent, time- and state-dependent or state-
dependent price-reviewing strategies is not irrelevant for monetary policy, as it implies
that monetary policy effects will depend on the distribution of firms in terms of their
price-reviewing strategies. In particular, changes in this distribution are likely to affect
the speed of price reaction to monetary policy shocks. For instance, if, in line with what
it was found for Portugal, the choice of a price-reviewing strategy varies with firm size,
then it may be expected that the effects of monetary policy will be different in countries
with different firm-size distributions as the masses of time- and state-dependent firms
will also be different. Similarly, because firms in the services sector are more prone to
follow time-dependent price-reviewing rules, changes in the structure of the economy
that affect its composition (manufacturing versus services) will have the implication of
changing the effects of monetary policy. This idea that firms rationally choose their
price-reviewing strategy may help to understand the cross-sectional variation of monetary
shocks (different countries/states are affected differently by the same type of monetary
shock) and, at the same time, may also explain why the same monetary shock may affect
the same country differently in different periods of its development path.
Another important result in terms of price setting is the existence of asymmetries in
the speed with which firms adjust their prices in response to positive and negative demand
or costs shocks. In line with similar empirical evidence found in literature, most firms
seem to react faster to positive than to negative cost shocks, and more quickly to negative
than to positive demand shocks. However, there is a significant degree of heterogeneity in
the asymmetry of firm’s responses to shocks which seems to have gone unnoticed so far.
Moreover, the direction and magnitude of these asymmetries depend on the characteristics
of the firms and of the market in which they operate. For example, firms operating in
more competitive markets respond to different shocks more symmetrically.
Some results presented on asymmetric price responses are individually consistent with
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some of the theoretical models suggested in the literature, but, overall, the results can only
be explained by a combination of the models purporting to explain asymmetric behaviour
in response to different shocks. This fact illustrates the complexity of the problem and
suggests that further research will be needed to better understand the conditions under
which different kinds of asymmetries will be observed.
This result is also important for monetary policy. Indeed, the existence of firm-level
asymmetric price rigidity has the implication that the relationship between inflation and
aggregate demand (Phillips curve) might be non-linear, calling for asymmetric monetary
policy rules. However, in contrast to most of the theoretical literature which tends to
favour the idea that prices are stickier downwards than upwards in response to demand
shocks, the evidence obtained suggests that the type of asymmetry prevailing at the
aggregate level depends on the relative importance of different types of firms in the
economy and on the type of shock. Therefore, whether the relation between inflation
and aggregate demand is linear, convex or concave is still an open issue and thus more
empirical evidence is required before definite conclusions can be drawn on this matter.
Overall, in line with the results found elsewhere in other European countries (see
Druant et al. (2012)) firms price setting behaviour varies substantially across sectors
and depends strongly on economic features. In contrast, wage adjustment strategies are
shaped to a great extent by the labour market institutional setting which is strongly
country-specific. The role played by labour market institutions in shaping the dynam-
ics of wages and employment is a matter of considerable debate both empirically and
conceptually. Many institutional factors may obstruct the efficient allocation of workers
and jobs. Aside from the impact on flows stemming from quantitative restrictions on
labour market adjustment, wage-setting policies, such as legal provisions restricting wage
adjustment, wage schedules determined at the sector level, or the presence of national
minimum wages also have an impact on the reallocation.
A factor that might affect the allocation of workers and jobs is the widespread practice
of extending collective bargaining agreements to non-subscriber workers and employers.
Since these agreements establish wage floors for most job titles, their frequent extension
is equivalent to setting a wide range of compulsory minimum wages, which are regularly
adjusted upward, even if the scope in most cases is restricted to some sectors or industries.
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This phenomenon - tentatively called “upward nominal wage rigidity” – is in fact similar
in nature to the frictions generated by nationwide mandatory minimum wages, in the
sense that many firms are forced to increase their wages to comply with the updated
wage agreements. In some firms the upward nominal wage rigidity can result in a wage
structure that may not be appropriate for some workers, causing fewer hirings and/or
added dismissals.
Legal provisions for mandatory extensions exist in several European countries such
as Spain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium, and they are also an
important feature of the Portuguese wage setting system (the so-called “portarias de
extensão”). This means that every year collective agreements update the wage floors of
around 30,000 job titles. Given the widespread use of extension mechanisms, the coverage
of these “minimum wages” is close to 90 percent of all dependent workers in the private
sector.
The evidence presented in Chapter 5 shows that firms that are more strongly affected
by the change in the bargained wage floors increase their separation rates and, more
importantly, significantly decrease their hiring rates, leading to fairly sizeable higher job
destruction rates. Furthermore, higher wage impacts are also associated with greater
failure rates of firms.
However besides the importance of the upward nominal wage rigidity, we should not
lose sight what is still the most important source of nominal wage rigidity in Portugal:
the fact that labour legislation strictly forbids cuts in base wages. Indeed, according
to the Portuguese law, a firm cannot reduce contracted wages, including other regular
and periodic monetary or non-monetary pay components, unless this is permitted by
collective agreements. As a general rule, only bonuses, commissions and other monetary
or non-monetary benefits associated to the worker’s performance, not included in the
collective agreement, may legally be reduced. Due to this legislation many studies place
the Portuguese labour market among the most rigid countries in Europe.
Against this background, the research presented in Chapter 4 analysed how firms, in
the presence of downward base wage rigidity, combine different channels of labour-cost
adjustment in response to adverse shocks. Since firms are primarily concerned with total
compensation per employee, the assessment of the importance of these alternative labour
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cost adjustment strategies is crucial to evaluate the overall degree of labour cost flexibility
and its implications. At this respect it is important to notice that under the assumption
of a common negative shock, and in the absence of nominal wage cuts, those firms that
are able to freeze their base wages are those where base wages exhibit the lowest degree
of downward rigidity.
The evidence obtained shows that base-wage flexibility has a strong positive impact
on employment in the face of negative shocks, and that such impact is significantly
reinforced by the existence of alternative margins of labour cost adjustment. In particular,
the availability of compensation components (bonuses, benefits and promotions) that
firms can freeze or cut in bad times and the possibility of recruiting new employees at
lower wages contribute to partly offset the negative impact of base-wage rigidities on
employment.
In sum, the evidence collected should inter alia call into question the functionality of
the architecture of the Portuguese wage setting system. In particular, it raises very serious
concerns with respect to the widespread use of extension mechanisms and the existence
of old-fashioned legislation that strictly forbids cuts. In the current low-inflation regime
nominal wage rigidity has become an active restriction. Indeed, in this environment
employers’ response on the wage margin is limited to the possibility of reducing the wage
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